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Abstract 
Spending almost two decades of experience with one of the largest oil and gas 
production company in the Middle East namely “Kuwait Oil Company” as a 
Team Leader and Senior Counsel for the Projects and Claims Team under Legal 
Affairs Department has undoubtedly inspired me the notion the essence of this 
thesis alongside with that sort of eagerness to research in quest for the knowledge 
which man has always and still run after but the least nevertheless only acquired!  
Before I join the company in late eighties, and on my graduation I found myself in 
cross roads, become a lecturer and embark on the academic career and satisfy my 
desire for research or fight my way in the legal profession as practitioner? I 
walked the second route in the hope of gaining the legal experience with the 
thought of grapping the research route in a later stage in which I now do enjoy 
and live.     
Working with KOC, I have been involved up to teeth in different areas of law 
since a project documents is governed and regulated not only by contract law but 
commercial law, companies law, patent law, labour law, construction law and tax 
law are also incorporated. The dispute resolution methods are addressed as well 
since local litigation is the main method and international adjudication, mediation 
and arbitration are exceptional but used and applied in particular on LSTK, EPC, 
EPF and Technical Service Agreements TSAs.  
Negotiation rounds which were entered with international oil companies on new 
projects and contracts gained me skills and exceptional knowledge in applying 
law and practice as well as sharing expertise not only in law function but in 
commercial and technical angles of the project bearing in mind the diversified 
expertise representing all aspects of business and the approaches followed to 
successfully accomplish a project. 
In the thesis, I’ve opted to deal with the elements of dispute resolution in the 
construction industry on the international scale and on the local or national level ii 
 
choosing State of Kuwait’s legal system and enhancing the research with the 
practical work experience in the Kuwait Oil Company extending seven chapters 
for this aim. 
I fully hope with my humble efforts exerted in this thesis that something valuable 
is added to the endless and depthless ocean of legal knowledge. 
In addition to the introductory section, the analysis of the thesis subject will be 
split into and developed through seven parts.  
Chapter one will define the construction contract, the field of the study subject, 
which will be followed by the mechanism of formation of the contract subject 
matter in chapter two. Then, the next four chapters, the means of the most 
common alternative dispute resolution; namely arbitration, adjudication, expert 
determination and mediation will be examined respectively. Chapter seven will 
mainly focus on the evaluation of the Kuwaiti national oil producer (Kuwait Oil 
Company “KOC”) as a case study and eventually will come up with the 
recommendations. Then, the mission of the thesis would reach the Conclusion 
being the final destination of its journey. 
 I 
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Introduction 
In this thesis I will examine the most common forms of dispute resolution in the 
construction industry as it is practiced internationally and in the State of Kuwait. 
Each selected method of dispute resolution will be analyzed theoretically and 
empirically according to the most essential factors that influence disputants’ 
needs, interests and concerns, such as cost, time and finality. 
The study uses the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) as a case study, and demonstrates 
the process of dispute resolution for the most renowned state company in Kuwait. 
Feedback of the thesis analysis, in addition to comments from experts in this area, 
provide a non-conventional and constructive approach to customizing and 
resolving pitfalls of the dispute resolution process in the Kuwaiti construction 
industry. 
In this thesis, the task of overcoming the alternatives to dispute resolution leads to 
conclusions and recommendations which may help customize manners of conflict 
management. Such conflict management may be implemented when carrying out 
a construction contract through setting out a mechanism that assists in tackling the 
obstacles of a project according to a proper schedule. 
In recent decades it has become obvious that the most desired structure for 
construction contracts’ parties to manage a major construction project through a 
lump sum turnkey agreement for engineering, procurement and construction (the 
so-called EPC contract) is for it to be rendered by the contractor on a fixed price 
that covers all works. 
Such a manner of running major projects has been positively responded to by the 
related markets and is widespread in the construction industry. However, 
managing risk in such a project whilst allocating it appropriately becomes a 
crucial matter that is to be handled carefully - particularly in the early stage of the 
project. II 
 
Recently in the state of Kuwait - in both the public and private sectors – the 
adopted approach has been of large-scale infrastructure and EPC projects; 
consequently, it has become undeniable that the needed approach is one which 
develops a form of construction contract that addresses rights and responsibilities 
and re-allocates risk amongst the parties in the agreement. Such a contract would 
enhance and encourage the achievement of fairness and justice to the extent that it 
could be done. 
Techniques for solving a conflict or dispute, which might arise out of the EPC 
contracts, would be regarded as fundamental, and contracts are required to be 
thoroughly examined and decided upon by both parties’ senior management 
including their legal consultants or lawyers. In order to ensure a steady stream of 
cash flow for a project, a dispute that may arise out of a project should be 
resolved in a cost-efficient and timely manner.    
The aims and objectives of the thesis 
The thesis mainly revolves around the technique of dispute resolution in the 
construction industry through examining various developed means of alternative 
dispute resolution. Put simply, the objective of the thesis will be carried out 
through two phases. To monitor a common existing mechanism of dispute 
resolution in construction industry in UK and to explore to what extent that it can 
be developed and applied in the construction industry in the State of Kuwait in 
particular in Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) contracts. Therefore, special attention 
should be drawn to the Kuwait Oil Company’s practice as a case study in light of 
the entire thesis outcome and to recommend a most appropriate and workable 
manner that can be adopted. Having about seventeen years of experience with the 
Kuwait Oil Company as a Team Leader and Senior Counsel for the Projects and 
Claims has definitely helped me in analysing and developing the thesis as well as 
in devising the most appropriate solutions. 
It is essential that a field which shall be assessed within this task, should be 
defined from the outset of this thesis. Therefore, it is a prudent approach to start III 
 
our mission with a definition of a construction contracts under both Kuwaiti law 
and English law. 
Further, construction projects, mainly large-scale infrastructure projects, are 
usually formed and conducted on the basis of a chain of contracts and sub-
contracts, therefore, a doctrine of privity of contract will be discussed thoroughly 
to draw lines among the parties’ overlapping relationship. 
Consequently, it becomes necessary to depict a regular way to form a construction 
project, particularly in terms of public procurements,  which is often done through 
a tendering process. 
Next, I will evaluate the most common method of alternative dispute resolution in 
the construction industry in both Kuwait and the UK. 
In terms of an alternative dispute resolution to litigation, arbitration has become a 
common name and has been inserted into construction disputes in the State of 
Kuwait, particularly after publishing the Arbitration Law of 1995 which was 
added to the Civil and Commercial Procedure Code No. 38 of 1980 and 
incorporated to the arbitration chapter which can be found in Articles 173 to 188. 
As a result, fundamental dimensions of the Arbitration Law of 1995 will be 
examined thoroughly, both individually and in connection with a case study 
(Kuwait Oil Company “KOC” as the example). 
Adjudication has produced a revolution in alternative dispute resolution, and 
recent legislation been amalgamated in the UK (which came into force at the end 
of the 1990s). The objectives of the Act were mainly to rectify some pitfalls that 
had been observed by concerned parties and commentators during previous 
decades as reflected in the Latham Report. This is a new approach in managing 
the ramifications that come out of the construction contract, such as controlling a 
method of payment and protection of sub-contractors via restrainment of the pay-
when-paid concept as well as providing a statutory right in the construction 
contract to proceed an adjudication as an interim, provisional and speedy dispute IV 
 
resolution mechanism. Regarding the latter, the statutory adjudication will be 
discussed thoroughly in the thesis, showing its pros and cons and to examine to 
what extent such a means of dispute resolution are to be adopted in the 
construction industry in the State of Kuwait. 
Expert determination would be considered as a unique and most recent 
development of an alternative dispute resolution, which has begun to be put in 
use, and will be examined carefully to see to what extent it could be adopted in 
construction disputes.    
Mediation will be described and examined as a non-binding way of resolving a 
dispute. Mediation is a most common way to facilitate and assist parties resolving 
their dispute amicably in the construction arena. 
Finally, Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) will be taken as an example and case study 
to be presented with an assessment to end up with the recommendations that, as 
far as we are concerned, may optimize the alternative dispute resolution in the 
construction industry in the State of Kuwait. 
The thesis consists of seven chapters: 
  Chapter One: Definition of the construction contract. In this 
chapter the main field of the research will be discussed. The construction 
contract will be specified according to its definition both in accordance to 
the Housing, Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act of 1996 as well 
as according to the Kuwaiti Civil Law Code of 1980. 
The principal of privity of contract will be discussed and analyzed to the 
extent that may affect the construction contract itself as well as the 
alternative dispute resolution agreements. 
  Chapter Two: Formation of the construction contract. In this 
section special attention will be given to the tendering process. V 
 
The pre-tender stage will be examined with referring to the “agreement to 
agree” as well as the enforceability of the negotiation phase. 
  Chapter Three: Arbitration. Arbitration is usually at the top of 
alternative dispute resolution techniques; however, as it is organized and 
ruled by lawmakers, it has evolved during recent decades to become a 
traditional private alternative to the court and ultimately would be 
regarded as a private litigation rather than a sort of ADR. 
Kuwaiti arbitration law will be described and examined in details with 
some references to the English law. The question of enforceability of 
foreign award in the State of Kuwait will be discussed as well. 
Chapter Four: Adjudication. In the construction industry, adjudication is 
the most likely way of dispute resolution during the operation of a project. 
Adjudication has been recognized and arranged thoroughly and introduced 
by the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 (the 
Act); therefore, it will be presented and argued in light of the Act. 
The relevant amendments to the adjudication by the Local Democracy, 
Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 (LDEDC Act) will be 
discussed as well. 
  Chapter Five: Expert determination. This type of methodology has 
been developed in the UK and Australia and has become a decisive and 
prompt method that focuses on technical matters rather than legal issues.   
Expert determination is not recognized widely in the State of Kuwait. The 
distinction between expert determination and the arbitration not accurately 
blurred. Reference to the expert witnessing must be presented precisely to 
clear any confusion that may be occurred between them. 
  Chapter Six: Mediation. Mediation is the most central technique in 
alternative dispute resolution, and due to its nature as a non-binding means 
it is based on a compromising solution rather than a judgment.  VI 
 
Types of mediation will be displayed. The enforceability of mediation as 
well as the concept of “without prejudice” will be deeply examined. 
Furthermore, we look at the Med-arb as a combination between mediation 
and arbitration. 
  Chapter Seven: Kuwait Oil Company (case study). In this chapter 
of the thesis, the existing practice of the Kuwait Oil Company will be 
examined carefully in light of the most appropriate recommendations. 
Thereafter, according to the outcome of the thesis journey we will 
recommend the best options that may customize the alternative dispute 
resolution in the Kuwaiti construction industry. 1 
 
 
Does Alternative Dispute Resolution Have A Role to Play in the Construction 
Industry in the State of Kuwait? 
-A look into the most appropriate methodology that may be taken in Kuwait 
in comparison with what is available in the English legal system. 
 
*** 
 
 The construction industry is one of most dynamic sectors of the Kuwait national 
economy.  Construction has been described as a risky, competitive and litigious 
business. Construction often involves hundreds of parties who are strangers to 
each other. Ordinarily, the parties to a construction project live with uncertainty of 
many elements. This uncertainty means that the parties must deal with issues of 
risk. One of the most important risks inherent to a construction project is the risk 
of dispute resolution as it is notoriously time consuming and expensive. 
Therefore, this research is concerned with the best practice and mechanism of 
resolving the construction contract disputes under the Kuwaiti law in comparison 
with English law.  
As this is the focal point of the subject of the research, we will start with the 
definition of the construction contract and the means of forming the contract, and 
then move on to deal with the main subject of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Human beings all over the world, everywhere on earth, in any community or 
society, and in any moment or second, have or may have been a party in a deal or 
bargain, either orally or in writing with a contractor being an entity or individual. 
These deals in fact are agreements, and if emptied into a written form, this form 
would be termed a construction contract.
1 The construction contract in general 
does not have any specific rules or regulations for being formed other than that 
required for any contract.  
Nevertheless, due to the nature of the construction contract, it is needful, to some 
extent, to review the formation of the contract and to identify the moment the 
construction contract has been made.   
With that said, I shall begin to identify the definition and then the formation of the 
construction contract under Kuwaiti law and English law. 
 
 Definition of Construction Contract under Kuwaiti Law 
In addition to the general rules that apply to any contract, the Kuwaiti Civil law 
has a special chapter dealing exclusively with rules of the construction contract. 
Under Article (661) of Chapter One of the second part of the Civil Law No. 
67/1980, the contract of work is defined as the following: 
“A craftsman’s (work) contract is that pursuant to which a party undertakes to do 
work for the other party in exchange for payment without being his follower or 
acting for him. In general, and as the construction contract is a contract of work 
                                                           
1 Would not prefer to go into details about the differences between the agreement and the contract. 4 
 
and due to its importance, there are special rules that organize the building and 
construction contracts in the second part of this chapter” (Articles 689-697).  
Although these civil law rules are applied to any construction contract whether it 
is an administrative contract, commercial contract or civil contract, the special 
rules of either administrative law or commercial law may apply in addition to the 
said general rules if the construction contract falls within its ambit.  
This notion is based upon the principle where provisions of particular application 
apply to amend or exclude provisions of general application, and is a fundamental 
and valid principle of Kuwaiti law. 
Therefore, it is essential to determine whether the respective construction contract 
falls under the administrative contract or commercial contract. Such determination 
must be undertaken in accordance with specific rules and principles that have 
been set by the administrative judicial. 
Under the Kuwaiti law, the Kuwaiti court of cassation in its capacity as the 
primary source of the administrative law has held that the administrative law can 
only be applied to the construction contract if the following provisions are all 
available:
2 
•  If the construction contract is signed with one of the state ministries, 
government department or authorities, but not with companies that are owned by 
the state either totally or partially.
3 
•  The government department has a mandate position in the contract that 
allows or authorizes them to change, modify or verify the conditions of the 
contract or even to terminate the contract for the benefit of the state while paying 
a fair compensation to the other party. 
                                                           
2 Kuwaiti Court of Cassation decisions (254/95, 160/96 session 7/4/1997 Administrative), (43/97 
session 8/12/1997 Administrative),(79,85/97 session 18/5/1998 Administrative), (368/99 session 
19/12/1999 Administrative). 
3 Majed Raghib Alhelo, (Alokod Aledariya wa Altahkeem) Administrative Contract and 
Arbitration (Dar Aljameah Aljadeedah 2004) 18. 5 
 
•    The contract has extraordinary terms and conditions that may be 
considered or construed as unfair, rigid or stringent conditions against the other 
party who enters into the contract with a government department.  
•  The contract is for the purpose of the public utilities such as running, 
operating or any such activities required for operating public utilities. The public 
utility is an expanded term that includes any public services or public or natural 
resources. 
On the other hand, the commercial law can be applied to the contract in specific 
situations such as the following: 
•  First of all, and pursuant to Article (96) of the Kuwaiti Commercial law, 
the provisions of the Civil law would be applied to any commercial contract or 
bargain if the Commercial law did not have any particular provision to this case. 
•  Article (9) of the Commercial law says that as a general principle, any 
bargain or contract that has been made with a merchant or if one involved in that 
bargain or contract is a merchant, then this relationship must be subject to the 
Commercial law regardless of the other party’s entity, unless it’s proven that such 
a deal is not for commercial purposes, and only for civil activity. 
•  Furthermore Article (12) counts any bargain or contract that has been 
made with a merchant as a commercial bargain or contract even though the other 
party was a non-merchant. 
This principle is also applicable to the contract that has been made with the 
government department or authority as long as the other party is a merchant as per 
the court of cassation decision.
4 
Furthermore, a special situation has been brought by Article (5) of the 
Commercial law which contemplates the construction contract of a commercial 
contract when the contractor is obliged to supply a raw material by him and on his 
                                                           
4 Kuwaiti Court of Cassation decision (244/2000, 268/2000 session 4/12/2000 Administrative). 6 
 
expense, or supplies labour. Hence, any construction contract made between the 
government department and a merchant who promises to supply a raw material or 
labour would be regarded as a commercial contract.
5 
•     The characters of the commercial law make it obviously different from 
the other laws and especially from the civil law which is counted as a general law 
for the matters that are subject to the commercial law. 
•  The commercial law is characteristic to flexibility of forming and proving 
the contract. 
•  The commercial contract can be made through any means or ways that 
parties agree with, such as through telephone, telexes, faxes, and email, except for 
a certain limited type of contract due to its nature and importance. This can 
include a contract for establishing a company and the contracts regarding the sale, 
building and the lien of the vessel as well as the sea insurance. 
However the civil contract, as per the Kuwaiti law, for sake of evidence needs to 
be in writing if the deal exceeds 1000 Kuwaiti Dinar.
6 
•  Contrary to the Civil law, there must be ‘consideration’
7 within the 
commercial contract. Absent consideration of any contract will either exclude the 
commercial provisions and refer this contract to the civil law provisions or regard 
it as a worthless contract which cannot be enforced or performed. 
•  The time bar concept in commercial law is enormously different from the 
civil law since its length, in general, is much shorter than the length of the time 
bar in civil law due to the nature of commercial contracts, which are required to 
be stabilized and finalized very rapidly. 
 
                                                           
5 Kuwaiti Court of Cassation decision (512/96 session 22/3/1998 Commercial). 
6 One Kuwaiti Dinar is approximately equal to two Pound sterling. 
7 Consideration is the thing which is rendered in exchange between the contract’s parties. 7 
 
•  Judicially, in terms of civil law cases a creditor or a claimant is not 
allowed to start proceeding or filing a case against his opponent  before he notices 
him judicially to perform his obligation with giving him a reasonable time 
limitation, although in a commercial case he does not need nor is required to do 
the same. 
•  In general, and contrary to the court verdicts, in all matters that have been 
issued by the Court of First Instance, the court verdict in commercial matters are 
enforceable immediately due to the urgency of the commercial matters unless 
otherwise decided by the competent court. 
•  This is how the Kuwaiti legal system run in terms of distinguishing 
between the matters that subject to the administrative law and the others that 
subject to the civil and commercial law.   
 Under English Law  
The definition of the construction contract under the English law has been given 
very special treatment and consideration for the purpose of the Housing Grants, 
Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 (HGCR 1996), which precisely provides 
a limited list of works that can be identified as a construction contract, including 
those excluded; however, they are not excluded in other legal systems, e.g. the 
Kuwaiti legal system. 
Before the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act of 1996 came into 
existence, there had been no specific statutory governing the construction and 
engineering industry. The rules and principles had been devoted by the court 
cases’ principles, and the standard forms of contracts had been published for 
relative organizations. 
Such description to the construction contract “building contract” was made while 
discussing some forms of building contracts such as JCT in terms of examining 
the legitimacy of the provisional payment, prior to the HGCR Act 1996 comes 8 
 
into exist. This is because there was no specific rules that may govern the 
construction contract other than the general principles of the law of contract. 
As a construction contract may comprise concepts like the sale of goods and work 
and labour for a lump sum prices, the rules of the supply of goods Act had applied 
to the provision of commodities and the common law was maintained to apply for 
work and labour. Therefore, such type of contract does not resemble the order of 
manufacturing goods as it was described in the case of Emson Eastern v EME 
Developments.
8 
The construction contract was described as a chain of various operations and 
bargains that are necessary and required to be undertaken by the contractor(s) 
against a sum of money that has to be paid by the employer. 
For example in Keating, which is one of the most renowned and most reputed 
references in the construction industry, the definition of construction was also 
extracted from the judicial definition. In the case of Modern Engineering (Bristol) 
Ltd v Gilbert Ash (Northern) Ltd,
9 Lord Diplock specified a construction contract 
as ‘A building contract is an entire contract for the sale of goods and work and 
labour for a lump sum price payable by installment as the goods are delivered and 
the work is done’. 
At that time, and to some extent until now, a building contractor is a construction 
contract that was part of the law of contracts in general, and was not governed by 
any special codified statute, but only was subject to the general rules of the law of 
contract and the sale of goods including some special rules and regulations.   
 Construction Contract under the Act of HGCA 1996  
Under the English legal system, the only contract that is subject to the Act of 1996 
of HGCA is the “construction contract”. Prior to defining the construction 
                                                           
8 (1991) 55 BLR 114. 
9 [1974] AC 689 (HL). 9 
 
contract as per the Act of 1996, as a new method of approaching and specifying 
the construction contract which is subject to rules of the HGCA 1996, it would be 
worth pointing out diversions to the rules governing the construction contract.   
 
In brief, the reasons that make it so important to identify the construction contract 
(that is subject to the provisions of the HGCR Act of 1996) can be illustrated by 
the following: 
•   Per section (105) of the Act of 1996, the construction contract parties 
have the right to resolve any disputes arising out of such contracts through an 
interim and provisional way of resolving a dispute which is called an 
“Adjudication” (as will be illustrated very broadly later on in Chapter 4). 
•   Usually in the execution of any contract a party does not have to pay 
money until the work is completed and a contractor will not be entitled to make 
any payment until he fulfills his obligations. 
But in accordance with the compulsory provisions of section (109) of the Act of 
1996, a construction contract has to have a mechanism for stage payments, unless 
the agreed work will not take more than 45 days; otherwise the Scheme will be 
applied in order to fill the gaps in this respect. 
•  Also, construction contract parties are obliged, pursuant to section (110) of 
the Act of 1996, to provide an adequate mechanism for determining what 
payments become due and when, including a final date for payment, otherwise the 
provisions of the Scheme will be applied. 
•  In accordance with section (111) of the Act of 1996, the owner/employer 
in the construction contract has no right to withhold any due payment unless he 
serves a notice within a certain amount of time as agreed in the contract. In the 
absence of such an agreement the notice period that is specified in the Scheme 
will be applied, giving details of the amount that is proposed to be withheld and 10 
 
the justifications for such action. In connection with the adjudication a contractor 
has the right to argue for the release of such money.   
•  Prior to the enactment of the Act of 1996, and as is still the case in most of 
the common law and civil system countries, a contracting party was not allowed 
to  stop his work merely because the other party did not perform his obligations 
under the contract. However, in certain cases, the former party proceeded to 
terminate the contract. But under the Act of 1996 section (112) comes a new 
mechanism that can put pressure on the party acting in bad faith to fulfill his 
obligations in a timely manner with no chance to delay his performance. This is 
done by granting a right to either contracting party to suspend his duties/works if 
the other party has not fulfilled his obligations provided that the former party 
serves notification at least seven (7) days before the proposed time for such 
suspension. However, as the right to suspend work is an exception to the general 
rule, such right will cease as soon as the disputed amount is fully paid. 
Therefore, and in order to be considered as a construction contract, the contract 
itself has to consist of or at least relate to, in certain cases, a “construction 
operation”. 
Subsection 104(1) of the Act defines the “construction contract” as a contract that 
has been made with a person, either an individual or a body corporate, to carry 
out, arranging to carry out or supplying labour for the carrying out of a 
construction operation. 
Subsection 104(2) goes further to add another work that has been agreed to be 
done for the purpose of construction operations, such as an architectural work, 
design, surveying, engineering, interior or exterior decoration, laying-out of 
landscape or even giving advice on construction operations. 
 
All the above mentioned type of works would be counted as a construction 
contract and will be subject to Part II of the HGCR Act 1996 which applies the 11 
 
adjudication to disputes that may arise out of these contracts provided that these 
contracts are related to the construction operations as is defined in Section 105 of 
the Act 1996. 
Therefore, the scope of work of any construction contract must be figured out to 
assure that it falls within the definition of construction operations as the latter is 
defined by section 105 of the Act of 1996.   
Subsection 105(1) of the Act of 1996 defines in considerable detail the term 
“construction operations” for which the provisions of the Act apply. 
It was noted by some authors and observers that the basis of the definition of 
“construction operations” has been taken from section 567 of the Income and 
Corporation Taxes Act of 1988 with a slight change.
10  
As per section 105(1) all the construction and engineering works that are required 
for building or forming a structure which is going to be part of land permanently 
or even temporarily will be counted as construction operations. 
In addition to the latter works, there are also many other works which would be 
considered as “construction operations” if they are required for the purpose of 
such works. 
This is formed to include maintenance, painting or decorating internally or 
externally, building cleaning, designing or even giving advice or project 
management would be included in the definition of “construction operations”. 
Also included are a number of civil engineering works
11 and mechanical and 
electrical works.
12  
Furthermore, in the case of Palmers Ltd v ABB Power Construction Ltd,
13 
Thornton J also considers that the work of fabrication or erection of a plant before 
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it is shifted to a final position on the site would be included in the construction 
operations. 
On the other hand, in sub-section 105(2) the Act excludes certain operations from 
the definition of “construction operations” due to its special nature that requires 
other special rules and regulations, such as: 
a)  Drilling for, or extraction of, oil or natural gas; 
b)  Extraction of minerals or tunneling; and 
c)  Assembly, installation or demolition of plant or machinery on a site where 
the primary activity is nuclear processing, power generation or water or effluent 
treatment; or, the production or processing of chemicals, pharmaceuticals, oil, 
gas, steel or food and drink.
14  
 Equality and Freedom of Contract 
In old societies and especially under Islamic law, which was set by Prophet 
Mohamed (PBUH) as a messenger from Allah fourteen centuries ago, and also 
under the English law since the nineteenth century and under the Kuwaiti law in 
its new modern laws, the parties are free to enter into a contract with full 
authorization to introduce qualifications and exceptions to the other contracting 
party’s liabilities or responsibilities. If the parties have done so, then the 
contacting parties will be subject to such agreement.   
The contracting parties are equal and free to form any non-prohibited agreement 
and also are free to choose with whom to contract, as Sir G. Jessel M.R said in the 
case of Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson
15 that ‘Men of full age 
and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting and that 
their contract when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and 
shall be enforced by courts of justice’.  
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This doctrine has been reflected under the Kuwaiti Civil law Code while it insists 
that a contract is the law of the contracting parties and neither party thereto may 
separately rescind it or amend its stipulations except to the extent of the limits 
allowed by the agreement or where the law provides otherwise.
16 
These principles are concerned with the extent of protection of the equality of the 
parties and the economic interests of the community.
17 However, in certain 
bargains linked with public utilities, the party that desires the services is not in a 
position to negotiate terms but is forced to “take it or leave it”. Such deals are still 
counted as agreements despite the lack of freedom of one party. These agreements 
are known in our civil law systems as a “contract of adhesion”. In essence, this is 
one of the major concerns that have led the legislators to introduce an 
interventions statute to protect the weaker party. As a result, some new statutes 
have been enacted in this regard as well as protecting the economic interests of 
the community in general as they are affected by social and commercial 
transactions.
18 
 Privity of Contract 
Under civil law, the principle of privity in broad means that the contract only 
produces its effects towards its parties once the contract properly raised and 
constituted. The parties to a contract, other than any parties, are the sole obligated 
parties to perform the contract and the sole obligated parties to discharge 
whatever obligations contained under a contract. Where the parties are the sole 
obligated to perform the contract, this is the privity of contract with respect to 
persons and it is termed as the Subjective Privity of Contract; and where the 
parties are the sole obligated to discharge whatever obligations contained under a 
contract, this is the privity with respect to the object in the contract and it is 
termed as the Objective Privity of Contract. 
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Under English law, privity of contract is a fundamental principle where rights and 
obligations created by a contract were only enforceable by and against the parties 
to that contract. The principle though evolved in the middle of the 19th century 
and continued to apply up to nowadays was not saved from comment and 
subjected to heavy criticism. That heavy criticism resulted in an act issued in the 
20th century which substantially overturned the principle (Act 1999). Under 
Section 1 of the Act it provides that, in respect of contracts made after 11 May 
2000, a third party may enforce a term of the contract if either: 
•  the contract expressly states that the third party may enforce the term in 
question; or 
•  the term ‘purports to confer a benefit on him’ and the contract does not 
make clear that the parties did not intend the third party to have a legal right to 
enforce it. 
Therefore, a third party is not entitled to enforce a contract term unless he or she 
is expressly identified in the contract; identification can be by name, by 
description or by reference to a class to which the third party belongs. Moreover, 
enforcement by the third party is subject to all other relevant terms of the contract 
in question. 
Back to the principle under the civil law, the binding force of a contract therefore 
has a privity in the two aspects mentioned above, and we will illustrate both 
aspects somehow in some details as follows: 
Subjective Privity of Contract  
In general, a contract only affects the parties thereto entered, and this effect does 
not exceed them to a third party unless otherwise expressly stipulated for the 
benefit of the designated third party. In this context we will deal with two aspects: 
first the effect of contract on its parties and second the effect of contract on third 
party. 15 
 
Effect of Contract on its Parties 
When we explain that the principle of privity only produces the effects of the 
contract towards its parties, it is worthy clarifying what the contracting parties 
mean since the contracting parties are not only limited to these very parties. The 
word “contracting parties” meaning comprises not only these parties themselves 
but also the persons representing them under the contract or what is termed by as 
the successors under the civil law concepts. In this sense, the Court of Cassation 
in Egypt held that, ‘the contract is only binding and produces its effects towards 
its parties and their universal successors whether it was formal, informal or 
registered’.
19  
The successors are either universal successors or particular successors, and 
principally the contract affects the universal successors but the effect may also 
extends to the particular successors. It would be of necessity under such chapter to 
illustrate and explain in brief who those universal successors and particular 
successors are. Universal successors are those who succeed a person for his or her 
entire financial patrimony as to the rights and obligations, or in a part thereof such 
as the heirs and the devisees for a part of the heritage while particular successors 
are those who succeed a person for an identified real estate or a right in rem 
thereon such as the buyer who succeeds the seller in terms of a sold thing, and a 
devisee for a real estate in a heritage who succeeds a de-cujus, and a usufructuary 
who succeeds an owner in a right to usufruct. As the successors under a contract, 
being universal or particular, are not counted of the third party the effects of the 
contract pass to them as it will follow below. 
Universal Successors 
Under Kuwaiti civil law article 201 paragraph (1) provides that ‘the effects of the 
contract shall pass to the contracting parties and to the universal successors 
without prejudice to the law of inheritance’. 
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Also, article 145 of the Egyptian civil law provides that, ‘the effect of the contract 
shall pass to the contracting parties and to the universal successors without 
prejudice to the rules pertaining to inheritance unless the contract or the nature of 
transaction or the provisions of law otherwise state that such effect does not pass 
to the universal successor’. 
Contemplation of the aforementioned civil law articles reveals that the effect of 
the contract passes to the universal successors and this means that the rights 
generated by the contract pass to the heir after the death of the contracting de 
cujus. As for the obligations against the estate, the principles of Shari’aa provide 
that no estate passes to heirs before settling the debts.  
As a result of passing the effect of the contract to the universal successor, the 
successor becomes entitled to all what was entitled by its predecessor. The Court 
of Appeal in Assiut, Egypt assured this notion when it held that,‘the heir is a 
universal successor to the de cujus and shall not be deemed a third party in terms 
of the contract that is entered into by the de cujus’.
20 
 
 
Exceptions on Contract Effect Passage to Universal Successor 
The general principle as has been already explained is the passage of contract 
effects to the universal successor. Since, as known, every rule has exception the 
foregoing principle has its exceptions as well. The universal successor being and 
still in such capacity may not be passed the effects of the contract. Articles 201 & 
202 of the Kuwaiti civil law brought three exceptional cases in this sense: 
•  where the contracting parties agreed not to pass the effects of their 
contract to the universal successor. This applies since the contract is the law of 
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contracting parties and if so stipulated it becomes valid so long as it does not 
contradict or conflict with the public order and morals. 
 
•  where the nature of the right or obligation arising under of the contract is 
impassable from the contracting party to its universal successor. The 
impassability might be substantial or legal e.g. if a person is entitled to the 
usufruct right by virtue of a contract, such right shall not be passable to his or her 
heirs when deceased because the legal nature of the usufruct right is bound to its 
enjoyer i.e. the contracting party and pass away by the death of him or her. 
•  where there is a provision in the law provides that effects of the contract 
shall not pass to the universal successor e.g. article 27 of the Kuwaiti Company 
Law which provides that a partnership is deemed terminated when one of the 
partners deceased, article 612 of the civil code which provides that the tenancy 
contract is deemed terminated by the death of the tenant if the reason of entering 
into the contract was based on the tenant’s profession or any other considerations 
relate to him or her as a person. 
Under the three exceptions shown above, despite the contract effects shall not 
pass to the universal successor he or she would maintain the capacity as a 
universal successor. 
Impassability of Contract Effects to Universal Successor being a Third Party 
There are cases where a universal successor is deemed to be in a capacity of a 
third party. One of such cases is imposed by the law i.e. the law directly entitles a 
heir some rights which are not vested in to him or her by inheritance by his or her 
de cujus in the purpose of protecting the heir against the potential imprudent 
behavior of his de cujus. Under such cases the heir is deemed to be a third party in 
terms of this behavior. The law gives the de cujus the right to dispose of the entire 
of his or her monies and property during his or her life either by selling or 
donation even if such disposition negatively affected the heirs. Nevertheless, the 18 
 
case is different if the de cujus disposed of all of his or her monies or property as 
a will for a beneficiary after his or her death. This behavior though being a right 
for the de cujus, endangers a perspective right for the heirs which is in 
controversy with the public order and consequently deemed void in case his or her 
disposal exceeds one third (1/3) of the monies or property. The disposal shall be 
also void in entirety if it is excercised during the illness of death and it is meant to 
be a donation.
21  
The Particular Successors 
Article 202(1) of the Kuwaiti civil law states that, “where the contract establishes 
obligations and rights in personum related to a thing passed thereafter to a 
particular successor, these obligations and rights shall pass to this successor 
concurrently with the thing if they are a pre-requisite thereto, and the successor is 
aware thereof at the time the thing is passed”. 
The above provisions were a mere confirmation to the applications adopted by 
French and Kuwaiti judicature in this aspect. The French jurisprudence is 
approximately in common consensus that a particular successor shall not be 
passed the obligations related to the property inherited unless a law rule so 
provides or the successor expressly or impliedly accepts passing the obligation 
thereto. 
At any rate, what is important under this part is that the effect passing to a 
particular successor is different from that passing to a universal successor. We’ve 
already defined and have shown who the particular successors are, and now we 
shall deal with the effects of contract and when these effects pass to the particular 
successors. 
 
Passing of Contract Effects to Particular Successor 
                                                           
21 Article 224 of the Kuwaiti Family Law 51/1984. 19 
 
Kuwaiti civil law code has set a criterion that indicates when the effect of a 
contract shall pass to a particular successor when provided under Article 202 that 
they shall pass if they are pre-requisite thereto. As we mentioned earlier, this 
criterion is a translation of what the judicature in Kuwait and in France adopted 
under the court judgments even before the issuance of the new Kuwaiti civil law 
code. The rights are deemed a pre-requisite of a thing if they are complementary 
thereto as well as the obligations, they also deemed a pre-requisite of a thing if 
they are definitive thereto. Therefore complementary rights to a thing are in a 
matter of fact a follower to this thing. For the obligations, if they specify a thing 
they should pass with also therewith for a predecessor cannot pass to a successor 
more than he or she owns thus, the rights completing a thing and the obligations 
thereof specifying are a pre-requisite for a thing and pass therewith to the 
particular successor. 
 
 
Applications of the Rights Passable to Particular Successor 
•  The rights in rem set for the benefit of a thing. If a contracting party 
established by virtue of a contract a corporal right for the property then the 
particular successor to whom the property was passed receives it with such right. 
•  The right which secures a thing whether in rem or in personum and 
because security is completing and enhancing the thing, then if a creditor assigned 
his or her right to the assignee, the right altogether with its securities passes to the 
assignee. 
 
•  The rights in personum the purpose of which protecting the thing e.g. a 
house insured against fire, if it is sold then the insurance passes with the house to 
the buyer. 20 
 
Applications of the Obligations Specifies a Thing 
•  The obligation which restricts the usage of a thing. If the contracting party 
is originally obligated to use a thing for a specified usage the very obligation 
passes to the particular successor. 
•  The right of servitude which is notarized by virtue of law stipulations, 
therefore if a contracting party established a right of servitude as per a contract on 
a real estate then such real estate passes to the particular successor accompanied 
by the servitude. 
Privity of Contract towards Third Party 
We mentioned that the rule is that the successor be not of the third party. In 
certain cases a successor whether universal or particular becomes of the third 
party and consequently the effects of a contract normally do not pass thereto or 
exceptionally passes thereto on basis of a will. 
As for the third party who is not a party to a contract and not a successor of both 
parties to a contract, the effects of a contract do not pass thereto so long as he or 
she is outside the contracting circle. Nevertheless and for considerations of justice 
and business tranquillity the effects of a contract may be passed to the third party. 
Justice may rule that a third party is entitled to initiate the (direct action) which is 
originally the action of one of the contract parties versus the other under a 
contract whom this third party of course is not a party thereto. The foregoing 
proposition shall not be real unless it is specially provided under the law. Here 
comes Article 662 of the Egyptian civil law code to provide that’ Sub-contractors 
and labourers work for a contractor each has the right to directly claim on owner 
in no excess than the amounts credited to the Contractor in time of bringing the 
law suit’. 
Under Kuwaiti law, Article 682 of the civil law provided that ‘A sub-contractor as 
well as workers who are employed by the original contractor to execute the work, 
may claim directly from the employer that which accrues to them from the 21 
 
contractor to the extent of that which is due to the latter from the employer at the 
time of commencing proceedings’. 
Another image for the third party in a construction contract where a sub-
contractor is a party to a contract with a contractor and the latter does not fulfill its 
obligations towards it, the sub-contractor can recourse directly to the employer 
whom no direct contractual relationship bind them e.g. in terms of accrued 
consideration owed by the contractor, in this example the sub-contractor is vested 
in the right by virtue of law to go directly and sue the employer for any dues 
accrued (Article 682 Kuwaiti civil and Article 662 Egypt civil cited supra). 
Privity of Arbitration Agreement 
We hereunder shall deal with a sort of absolute privity where the binding effect of 
an agreement would not be passable to successors or a third party but only bind 
the parties to this arbitration agreement. When parties agree to arbitrate their 
disputes, they give up the right to have those disputes decided by a nation court. 
Instead, they agree that their disputes will be resolved privately, outside of any 
court system. The arbitration agreement thus constitutes the relinquishment of an 
important right- to have the dispute resolved judicially – and creates other rights 
which may not be acceptable by any other parties. The rights it creates are the 
rights to establish the process for resolving the dispute. In their arbitration 
agreement, the parties can select the rules that will govern the procedure, the law 
governing the arbitration, and frequently, the arbitrators, whom the parties may 
choose because of their particular expertise in the subject matter of the parties’ 
dispute. The parties’ arbitration agreement gives the arbitrators the power to 
decide dispute, and defines the scope of that power. In essence, the parties create 
their own private system of justice. 
The parties’ arbitration agreement is frequently contained in a clause that is 
embedded in the parties’ commercial contract. The agreement to arbitrate is thus 
entered into before any dispute had arisen, and is intended to provide a method of 
resolution in the event that a dispute will arise. However, if there is no arbitration 22 
 
clause in the parties’ contract, and a dispute arises, at that time the parties’ can 
nonetheless enter into an agreement to arbitrate, if both sides agree. Such an 
agreement is generally referred to as a submission agreement. However, 
submission agreements are much less the parties’ often cannot agree on anything. 
For that reason, it is generally better for the parties to agree to arbitrate at the 
beginning of the relationship, when they are still on good terms. 
Even though the arbitration clause is most often contained within the contract 
between the parties, under most laws and rules it is nonetheless considered a 
separate agreement. It thus may continue to be valid, even if the main commercial 
contract where the arbitration agreement is found may be potentially invalid. In 
most jurisdictions, this doctrine of separability permits the arbitrators to hear and 
decide the dispute even if one side claims, for example, that the contract is 
terminated, or never existed in the first place, or is invalid because it was 
fraudulently induced. Such claims would not deprive the arbitrators of jurisdiction 
because they pertain to the main contract and not specifically to the arbitration 
clause, because the arbitration clause is considered a separate and distinct 
agreement, it is not impacted by claims of invalidity of the main contract, and still 
confers jurisdiction on the arbitrators to decide the dispute. The separability is 
adopted in many arbitration laws and rules. 
In light of the important rights that are relinquished when the parties agree to 
arbitrate, the question of the arbitration agreement’s validity is critical. Arbitration 
is a creature of consent, and that consent should be freely, knowingly, and 
competently given. Therefore, to establish that parties that actually consented, 
many national laws, as well as the New York Convention, required that arbitration 
agreement be in writing. In addition, the Convention required that in some 
circumstances, the written agreement be signed by both parties. 
The issue of whether the agreement was in writing, signed, and therefore valid, is 
likely to arise when one party seeks to renege on its agreement to arbitrate. 
Although the party may have agreed to arbitrate, after a dispute arises it may 23 
 
decide that it would rather go to court, and will therefore commence litigation. In 
addition, the issue of the arbitration agreement’s applicability to specific parties 
may arise when one party asserts that it never signed the agreement, or when non-
signatory tries to enforce the agreement against a signatory. In these situations, 
the privity of the arbitration agreement appears.  
Article II of the New York Convention provides that Contracting States must 
recognize arbitration agreements in writing. If the local court is seized of a matter 
that is in fact the subject matter of a binding arbitration agreement, the court must 
stay the proceeding and refer the parties to arbitration. This is an image where 
even the court respects the privity principle as to the parties consent to arbitrate 
not litigate. 
Although the privity of arbitration agreement is absolute as we mentioned supra, 
and although there is a trend today toward finding an arbitration agreement 
enforceable even if not all formalities are strictly met, courts still have justifiable 
concerns about requiring a party to arbitrate if it appears that the party did not 
agree to do so. The question of whether a party signed a contract containing an 
arbitration clause can raise issue of intent as well as formal contract validity. 
Moreover, in some instances, the privity question may arise about a third party 
who did not sign a contract that was valid between at least two other parties. In 
this case, validity of the contract in not an issue; rather the question is whether a 
non-signatory can compel arbitration with signatory. 
Because consent to arbitration is fundamental, courts have asserted that 
‘arbitration agreements apply to nonsignatories only in rare circumstances’. 
Increasingly, however, there appears to be a trend among tribunals and courts to 
extend the obligation to arbitration to nonsignatories. The issue arises in many 
different contexts. Frequently, there is an attempt to bind a parent company of a 
subsidiary that is a signatory, or a manufacturer. 24 
 
With respect to s. 8 of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, the 
contracting parties may confer to non-signatory party a right to compel arbitration 
provision stipulated in their contract.  
S. 8 states:  
  1) where- 
    a) a right under section 1 to enforce a term (“the substantive term”) 
is subject to a term providing for the submission of disputes to arbitration (“the 
arbitration agreement”), and 
    b) the arbitration agreement is an agreement in writing for the 
purposes of Part I of the Arbitration Act 1996, 
the third party shall be treated for the purposes of that Act as a party to the 
arbitration agreement as regards disputes between himself and the promisor 
relating to the enforcement of the substantive term by the third party. 
 
2) where- 
  a) a third party has a right under section 1 to enforce a term providing for 
one or more descriptions of dispute between the third party and the promisor to be 
submitted to arbitration (“the arbitration agreement”). 
  b) the arbitration agreement is an agreement in writing for the purposes of 
Part I of the Arbitration Act 1996, and 
  c) the third party does not fall to be treated under section 1 as a party to 
arbitration agreement, 
the third party shall, if he exercises the right, be treated for the purposes of that 
Act as a party to the arbitration agreement in relation to the matter with respect to 25 
 
which the right is exercised, and be treated as having been so immediately before 
the exercise of the right. 
 
Once the contracting parties did so and confer a certain right to a third party and 
this received by the third party, then they may not be allowed to rescind or change 
this provision without the third party consent.  
This is, in fact, on contrary to the general principles of the doctrine of privity of 
contract. 
In the case of Nisshin Shipping Co Ltd v Cleaves and Co Ltd,
22 an agent of the 
ship-owners did negotiate on behalf of the ship-owner with a charter parties for a 
certain commission to be paid by the ship-owner (principal). The agreement that 
then held between the ship-owners and the charter parties which referred to such 
commission has an arbitration agreement.  
A dispute regarding the commission had been arisen between the ship-owner and 
its agent who is a non-signatory party to the chartering parties. The agent referred 
the dispute to arbitration in accordance to the arbitration provision in the 
chartering parties although he was not involved as a party to these agreements. 
The ship-owners resisted such action on the basis of the privity of contract 
doctrine. The court rejected this contention and accepted the arbitration 
proceedings taken by the agent on the grounds that the contract must precisely 
show that the parties do not intend to confer the benefit under their contract to any 
third party or expressly exclude the application of the provision of the Act 1999. 
This is an exception to the rules of the privity of contract related to the arbitration 
process which to be considered and figure out carefully by the competent 
court/tribunal unless the parties clearly defined their intention.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
Formation of Construction Contract 
In general, every construction contract is governed by the general law of 
contracts. Nevertheless, both in Kuwaiti law and English law there are special and 
particular rules and regulations that only apply to construction contracts. Due to 
the complications which are required to set the law, either statutorily or judicially, 
such special rules in addition to the general rules are required for the law of 
contracts. This means that special rules of the construction contract will be 
applied first, and then in the absence of such rules, the general rules of the law of 
the contract will by default be applied. Or in other terms, the priority will be given 
to these particular rules in case of any contradiction between them. This principle 
was more or less adopted in the common law systems, as explained by Holmes in 
the Nineteenth century when he talked about the law of the sale of goods and the 
law of contracts: 
‘The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it 
goes, with what is understood to be convenient; but its form and machinery, and 
the degree to which it is able to work out desired results, depends very much upon 
its past’.
23   
As a general principle of formation, a binding and enforceable contract has to be 
by an exchange of mutual intention and agreeing to create legal obligations and 
rights between the parties themselves. 
So, the essential elements in a legal binding and enforceable agreement pursuant 
to the civil law legal system, in general and with Kuwaiti law in particular 
definitely is not different from what exists in a common law system - in general 
and in English law in particular. This issue will be elaborated in this chapter. In 
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essence, there will be a difference in terminology only in terms of the same 
concepts and rules. 
CONSENT TO CONTRACT 
Consent to contract in plain language is an agreement of the parties to express 
their intention to bind and oblige themselves with certain matter(s) that maybe 
reflected in doing or performing work; paying a sum of money; supplying 
materials; delivering a property; etc. 
This consent can be shown in any way that expresses the intention of parties, 
whether it is done by writing, orally or even by gesture in some small bargains, 
such as by a newspaper or something from the newsagent.
24    
The way to form a construction contract is no different from forming any other 
contract since the same elements and basics of formation are required to exist. 
The construction contract is formed by mutual exchange of intentions between 
two (or more) parties with the intention of creating legal obligations and rights 
between themselves. 
As a result, the contractual liability is raised when one party fails to perform, or 
did not perform properly in an undertaking or promise. 
Such intentions that were exchanged between parties are categorized into two 
steps: the first step is an offer made by one party, and the second step is an 
acceptance to the offer made by the other one. 
Offer 
Under the Kuwaiti law, as well as the common law, whatever expression is made 
first is counted as an offer - and the person who issues it as an offerer - is called as 
an offeree, while the second expression is considered an acceptance. 
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Examining the expression of the offeree is a matter of fact and subject to the court 
judgment, both in the Kuwaiti legal system and in the English legal system. If 
there is any doubt or dispute regarding the certainty of the offer, then when the 
case comes to his custody the judge will have full authority to figure out the facts 
and conditions surrounding the case and will decide on it.
25 For example, under 
the English law, in the case of Spencer v Harding,
26 the court held that the 
invitation tender was only a circular to negotiate for the sale of goods and did not 
amount to an offer. 
The offer, in essence, is a clear and absolute promise that is expressed from one 
party to be legally binding on specific terms and conditions. 
Treitel counts that an offer is ‘An expression of willingness to contract on certain 
terms, made with intention that it shall become binding as soon as it is accepted 
by the person to whom it is addressed’.
27 
As a result the words that are used in the language of expressing the offer ought to 
be strong and clear, reflecting that a party who issues the offer is committed to 
what he offered. 
Generally the offer does not come into effect until it reaches the offeree. But the 
question that is usually raised is how to define “reaches”, and how to identify the 
time that the offer, acceptance or even the revocation has been communicated to 
the opposite party. 
Under the English law, the definition of “reaches” depends upon the means of 
communications. And to specify the point that the expression from one party 
(either it is an offer, acceptance, or revocation) has already reached the other, 
requires a difference between postal communications and instantaneous 
                                                           
25 All the cases that have dealt with offer and acceptance both in Kuwait and UK give a power to 
the court to evaluate the existence of offer and acceptance. 
26 [1869-70] LR 5 CP 561. 
27 Treitel on The Law of Contract, (13
th edn Sweet & Maxwell, 2011) 8.  30 
 
communications (e.g. contacting by face to face negotiations, telephone or telex 
messages).  
During the recent decades, the ways of communication have rapidly developed. 
Since the middle of the last century the use of telex has been greatly scaled-up, 
and the argument regarding the formation of contract by telex has been raised and 
discussed by the British courts. In the case of Brinkibon Ltd v Stahag Stahl,
28 
Lord Wilberforce remarked that due to the absence of the universal rules that can 
cover all the concerns that could be raised regarding the exchange of the telex 
between dealers, any contention must be resolved based upon the parties’ 
intentions in the light of the business practice, or in some cases, by a judgment 
where the risks should be allocated. However, the method suggested by Lord 
Wilberforce has been rejected by the House of Lords, and the rules of Entores Ltd 
v Miles Far East Corpn
29 were applied. 
This is a general rule for forming a contract, including a construction contract. 
But what distinguishes a formation of construction contract is a competitive 
tendering process.  In recent decades, competitive tendering became very 
common in the construction field and is preferred in most procurement 
regulations, either nationally or internationally, as a best mechanism for awarding 
a construction contract at a lowest price. So, in terms of forming a construction 
contract in the tendering process, the question may be raised as to whether the 
tendering process could be discerned as an offer to the tenderers. 
 Tendering process under the Kuwaiti Law 
The philosophy of the tendering process is slightly different under the Kuwaiti 
legal system, being a civil law system from the English law.  
In general any negotiation or an invitation to negotiate between the employer and 
the contractor does not constitute any obligation to end up with an agreement, and 
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contracts do not automatically spring into existence upon the making of tender. 
Both parties are free to negotiate and are not liable to break down, or to cut off the 
negotiation at any stage without reaching an agreement. However, the only 
exception to this principle in the Kuwaiti law which requires the parties to 
negotiate in good faith is, when the employer requests a specified bidder, or 
bidders submit their bid that the costs are due to the work done by him, such as 
studies, drawings, measurements etc. In this case the parties should negotiate the 
bargain in good faith, and any failure to reach an agreement because of bad faith 
or negligent conduct of either one will make him liable to compensate the 
opponent for the loss and damage that he caused. This doctrine finds its basis in 
the general principle of the Kuwaiti law of Tort, where the party who suffered 
from the loss or damage due to the negligence of the other party’s conduct will 
bear the responsibility to prove all the elements forming the paradigm of tort, such 
as the fault (bad faith) and the damage and the causation.
30  
Nevertheless, under Kuwaiti law, during the negotiation stage each party must be 
cautious about his/her words and language as it may constitute a certain level of 
obligations. Such activities may be taken as evidence that give the court an 
exceptional authority either to complete the contract or at least interpret the 
contract.
31 
Hence, as the tendering process is the most common way to form a construction 
contract, it is pivotal to consider such stage carefully since it may have an impact 
on the agreement as whole and the dispute resolution provision in particular.  
 Kuwait Oil Company tendering process 
 Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) is very cautious about its contracts and strictly does 
not enter into any agreement before it has had all required internal or external 
approvals in accordance with its rules and regulations. KOC usually, during the 
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negotiation phase, insists that such negotiation should not constitute any binding 
agreement or obligation to enter into any contract and expressly states such steps 
are merely a negotiation and are under no circumstances considered as an offer. 
For example, such a cautious approach is reflected in section (9) of KOC’s 
Policies and Regulations for Contracts which governs the letter of intent. In this 
regards, KOC clearly narrows the usage of letter of intent to a very limited 
situation. The letter of intent can only be issued in the case where it is imperative 
that mobilization for works or services commences immediately. It is strictly 
required to submit justifications of why the contract cannot be immediately 
finalized, as well as why commencement of works and services cannot be delayed 
pending signature of the contract. A prior approval of Chairmen of KOC and 
other concerned departments are obligatorily required.   
Pursuant to the Kuwaiti Law of General Tenders No. 37/1964, any state 
department, authority or oil Company
32 shall not have any procurement or 
construction agreement except by way of public tender through the Central 
Tenders Committee (CTC). 
In general, and to ensure fairness, real competition and equality, the main 
principle that governs the tender process under the Kuwaiti law is called the 
“Mechanism of Tender”, which means that the CTC should award the tender to 
the lowest price tender submitted in conformity with the invitation. 
In essence, although that the law CTC 37/1964 is an old law issued about 50 years 
ago, it is absolutely of the benefit of the clients, and its financiers as their main 
objective and goal of having an optimum combination of good quality services in 
a low cost as a value for public money.
33  
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Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) will be a case study in this regards as it is totally 
owned by the state and subject to the Law of 37/1964 as a general rule in addition 
to its particular rules. 
KOC is a closed public limited company that is subsidized and totally owned by 
the state as the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC), a state department headed 
by the Oil Minister, and owns all its shares. KPC also carries out the role of the 
general meeting in accordance with its law
34 and the Kuwaiti Company law; 
however, the role of the extraordinary general meeting was given to the Supreme 
Petroleum Council which is chaired by the Prime Ministers. 
KOC has highly developed rules and regulations governing the process of 
tendering, handling and administration of contracts, which is named KOC Policies 
and Regulations for Contracts
35  and which have been prepared in conformity 
with Public Tender Law No. 37/1964, Resolution No. 5/1979 of the Council of 
Ministers (Supreme Council for Petroleum), and amended by Resolution No. 
1/2005. 
The Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) divides its contracts into various categories.  
These categories are based on the price and nature of the required work. It is split 
into contracts that have to be issued, received and awarded by the Central Tenders 
Committee, where its estimated value would exceed 5,000,000 Kuwaiti Dinars 
(K.D.), and the other contracts can only proceed within the company (KOC) and 
its subsidiary KPC. This is because it is required in certain cases due to the value 
of the contract, i.e. it does not exceed 5,000,000 K.D, or, seeks special services or 
works such as those related to drilling, production operations or medical 
equipment, etc. The latter type of contracts can be formed and proceed via a 
normal negotiation in case of “direct contracting” or negotiable in competitive 
terms and bid prices (Mumarasa), or non-negotiable competitive terms and bid 
prices. This is contrary to the former type of contracts which must be formed via 
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the CTC, and which usually proceed in a way of normal competitive terms, and 
bid prices are not negotiable. 
 
 
The tender process for KOC’s projects involve a request for a proposal to the 
involved bidders, and a pre-tender meeting must be held for every request for a 
proposal, unless otherwise agreed in writing between the contracts team and the 
concerned department
36 . The pre-tender meeting includes a site visit that will 
acquaint the bidders with the project. All questions and queries raised by the 
bidders pursuing clarification of the scope of work, or highlighting areas of 
ambiguity or risks, would be answered and clarified by the KOC. A 
supplementary letter involves any change to the scope of work or technical 
specification that will be distributed to the bidders in a sufficient time, and will be 
considered as a part of the tender documents. 
In essence, in lump sum turnkey projects, although KOC prepares the front end 
engineering design (FEED) that comprises all the technical documentation and 
information provided to the bidders prior to the date of bid, it the responsibility of 
the bidders to verify and scope the FEED and to base their bids on it.
37  However, 
after the tender stage and during the contract stage, if the contractor identifies any 
technical inaccuracy in FEED, then he is required to notify KOC immediately 
(within 7 days) with details and alternative proposals; if accepted by KOC, the 
resultant changes are treated as variation
38. Also, with respect to the site 
information and data, the contractor is required, within (120) days of the date for 
commencement or within (120) days after receipt of further data, to use its best 
endeavor to verify the accuracy and sufficiency of such data and to notify KOC 
with any inaccuracy, discrepancies or errors.  Such notification will be subject to 
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the negotiation and discussion between KOC and the contractor and any required 
amendments to the contract will be handled as a variation. 
This is, to some extent, similar to clause 5.1 of FIDIC (Silver Book), Conditions 
of Contract for EPC and Turnkey Projects, which says: 
“The Contractor shall be deemed to have scrutinized, prior to the Base Date, the 
Employer’s Requirements (including design criteria and calculations, if any). The 
Employer shall not be responsible for any error, inaccuracy or omission of any 
kind in the Employer’s Requirements as originally included in the Contract and 
shall not be deemed to have given any representation of accuracy or completeness 
of any data or information, except as stated below…” 
Nevertheless, and as an exemption from the principle of non-negotiable, the 
Kuwaiti Court of Cassation
39 confirmed that the Central Tenders Committee shall 
award the tender to the bidder who submitted the lowest lump sum price; if his 
tender meets with the pre-requisites of the tender documents, nevertheless, the 
court is also compelled by all government departments to negotiate with the 
lowest bidder regarding his reservations or conditions on the tender. If there are 
any, before it proceeds to the second lowest bidder - and if the government 
department did not do so - it would be considered as a breach of the rules of 
protection of the public interest. KOC by default is subject to such a principle.  
Generally, the Commercial Group is the only body that represents KOC in any 
negotiation with the bidders. In some special services or works an ad hoc team 
will be formed to represent KOC in such a negotiation.      
Furthermore, and other than the request for a proposal, section 25 of KOC’s 
Policies and Regulations for Contracts allows KOC to issue an invitation for the 
proposal (IFP) to either a single source or selected companies to assess the 
technical feasibility and the estimated cost based upon the information contained 
in the document. Such an invitation is issued to enable KOC to determine whether 
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or not it is reasonable to proceed with a project when the nature of the work is 
different from KOC’s usual work. KOC must state in such an invitation that it is 
not a request for offers to perform work or services and neither KOC nor the 
invited companies will be bound to enter into a contract.   
With respect to KOC’s projects that are approached via CTC, the following issues 
must be taken into consideration. 
There is no exemption from this principle except to the three cases that are 
specifically mentioned in Articles (43) and (44) of Law of 37/1964 as follows: 
•  The CTC would award the tender to the second lowest bidder if it found 
that the first lowest bidder has reduced his tender to an unreasonable price which 
may cause a very strong doubt about the bidder’s assurance or capability to 
perform the tender in a proper way. 
•  Only to the supplying of commodities tender, the CTC shall give the 
priority when awarding such tenders to the lowest tender, which is supplying local 
products and complies with document requirements - provided that the price 
should not exceed other than the lowest tender of similar products from abroad by 
10% (ten percent).   
These two cases fall within the authority of the CTC and are subject to 
reconsideration and scrutinization by the competent court which means that the 
CTC decision must prove that it is eligible and is in conformity with the rules of 
the Law 37/1964. Otherwise, the lowest bidder who lost the tender will have the 
right to be compensated for all the damages and losses, and even the economic 
losses he incurred.
40 
The third case which needs special treatment is as follows: 
•  In the case that the CTC believes that strong justifications are available for 
preferring a bidder who submitted a high price without falling into the  previous 
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two exemptions, they shall refer this matter to the Council of Ministers for a 
decision in connection therewith. 
The Council of Ministers shall not be obliged to accept the lowest price tender nor 
the technical recommendations without having to produce any reasons for its 
decision. 
This is a very critical and complicated issue that has been discussed and examined 
by the Kuwaiti case law. In fact, there are no cases for dealing directly with the 
power or authority of the Council of Ministers. When failing to reason its decision 
in the case of rejection of the lowest price offer, however, neither the government 
department nor the CTC is authorized to do the same without any reasonable 
justifications. So, the Court of Cassation
41 states that pursuant to the general 
principles of the mechanism of the tender the government department is obliged 
to accept the lowest tender whose offer meets the entire tender requirements on 
the basis that the rules of the public tenders are not optional rules that can be 
taken or left by the government department. It is a strict rule that has been enacted 
for both public and individual interests to ensure fair competition, and to maintain 
the public funds with good services and projects. 
In this case the Court of Cassation concluded that although the court, while it 
weighs the legitimacy of the government department resolution, is limited with 
legality of such a resolution, it has the authority to examine and look into the facts 
that lead the government department to reach its resolution. 
However, in another case
42 the court of cassation considered that the Cabinet or 
Council of Ministers’ approval to the CTC decision of dismissing the lowest 
tender is a way to legitimate it, and cannot be overturned by the court, even 
though it was not a reasoning decision. 
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Nevertheless, in practice, for some major turnkey projects for the Kuwaiti state 
companies, and with the objective of enhancing participation and achieving 
competitive bidding, it started to have the initiative to compensate the bidders 
(usually short-listed or selected companies) for their cost for estimation of the 
bids. This is usually a fixed sum of money offered voluntarily by the employer in 
the invitation for bidding. This step by the state companies expresses its absolute 
good faith and leads the bidders to come up with a genuine bid, as the bidder will 
be confident about the seriousness of the employer, and they will not at least lose 
any cost during the negotiation or bidding period. In accordance with section 
11(b) of the KOC’s Policies and Regulations for Contracts, in certain cases, 
bidders may be reimbursed for their incurred considerable cost in preparing their 
bid submission. Prior approval for such reimbursement must be taken internally, 
in accordance with the KOC’s financial delegation authority with all bases and 
justifications. Furthermore, the following provisions must be incorporated in the 
tender document before closing the bid: 
•  Necessary provisions covering criteria for selection, number and ranking 
of entitled unsuccessful bidders. 
•  Reimbursement of bidding costs to entitled unsuccessful bidders shall be 
effected only after contract signature with successful bidder. 
•  In the event of tender cancellation, bidding fees will be reimbursed to the 
lowest bidder in addition to the other unsuccessful bidders subject to the meeting 
criteria for selection specified in the tender. 
 Tendering Process under the English Law 
However, slightly contrary to the above approach, under the English legal system 
it is very complicated to say that the public departments have full authority to 
reject the lowest bidder without any liabilities. 39 
 
As per the English court cases, an implied contract would arise between the 
bidders whose bids conform to the bid requirements and conditions, and are at 
least considered if others are.  
In English law there are two sorts of rules and regulations that govern a tender 
process, either for the private or public sector. In fact, there are some constraints 
applied to the public sector/public procurement - more than those applied to the 
private sector - as will be illustrated below. 
The England and Northern Ireland, as well as some common law countries such 
as New Zealand and Canada, set and adopt some principles that have to be taken 
into consideration, as well as to be complied with by any client who procures 
goods or services through a tendering process; either the owner himself is private 
or public sector, as long as the client goes through the competition tender. Such 
major principles were discussed earlier, such as: 
•  In general, the client/owner is not obliged to accept the lowest tender, 
since usually the invitation to tender has an express term that gives the 
client/owner the right not to accept the lowest tender. However, there is a 
constraint that has been imposed by the English court that there is a contractual 
obligation which will arise between the client/owner and the bidder, whose tender 
conforms with the tender’s terms and conditions. This must be considered. 
This principle has been adopted by the English court in the Blackpool and Flyde 
Aero Club v Blackpool BC
43 case to declare a new era for the tendering process in 
the UK. This principle is required either for the private or the public sector. In the 
case of Fairclough Building Ltd v Port Talbot BC
44 it confirmed the rules that had 
been adopted in Blackpool, where an implied contract that comes into existence 
between the bidder and the client/owner is to be treated fairly, equally and in a 
good faith. 
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This has been affirmed by the court in this case although it agreed with the 
defendant’s decision to remove the plaintiff from the tender shortlist, as it is 
reasonably taken on the honesty of the client/owner to avoid any conflict of 
interest as the defendant’s architect was married to one of the plaintiff ‘s directors. 
•  The client/owner also has to be complied with the contents of tender 
contracts whether such contents inside or outside statuary regulations. This has 
been adopted by the Northern Ireland court in the cases of Scott v Belfast 
Education & Library Board
45  and J&A Development Ltd v Edina Manufacturing 
Ltd.
46  
In the latter case, which is also called the “Edina case”, the court held that where 
a tender procedure has already been specified, then any departure from this 
specified procedure will apparently be a breach of the client/owner’s tender 
contract obligation. 
Sometimes the court may find the client/owner in a breach of both a duty of the 
tender contract and a breach of the Public Works Contracts Regulations as it was 
held by the Technology and Construction Court in the case of Harmon CFEM 
Facades (UK) Ltd v Corporate Officer of the House of Commons.
47 In this case 
the court found the defendant in breach of tender contract when it unfairly gave a 
successful bidder alone a certain procedure; for in post-tender negotiations as well 
as in breach of the Regulations, the defendant failed to reasonably justify its 
decisions. 
In general, in the tendering process, the client/owner has to act fairly and in good 
faith in certain areas, as it was identified recently in the case of Scott v Belfast 
Education & Library Board:
48 
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(1)  Fairness applies to the nature and application of the specified procedures 
in a particular contract. 
(2)  Fairness applies to the assessment of the tenders according to the stated 
criteria. 
(3)  Fairness applies to the evaluation of the tenders in a uniform manner and 
as intended by the tender documents. 
Furthermore, there are statutory rules applied to the public procurement. These 
rules are split into two sorts of rules; domestic regulations and the European 
Community regulations that are applied to all country members of the European 
Union including the UK. 
In addition to its domestic regulations, all the European countries are obliged to 
implement and incorporate the European regulations into its legal system. For 
example, and with respect to the tendering and procurement process, this mean 
was clearly stipulated in the EC Treaty such as Articles 12, 28, 43 and 49, which 
apply to the public procurement within European Union regime countries. This 
way of treatment was supported as well by the European and domestic judiciary 
system as it was confirmed in the case of Commission of the European 
Communities v Ireland
49 where the court held that it is discrimination when the 
Dundalk Council required the bidder to comply with the Irish technical standard, 
rather than the equivalent international bodies. Consequently, the European 
procurement regulations incorporated in the UK’s Public Sectors Contracts 
regulations, govern the public sector procurement and the procurement in the 
utilities sector, and is called the Directives. 
As a result, nowadays all of these rules govern public works and utilities in the 
UK. In essence, the most important provisions that have been set out by the 
Procurement Regulations are as follows: 
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•  The only procurement project that is subject to the Procurement 
Regulations is that its value exceeds the certain financial threshold as specified in 
the Regulations. 
•  Any technical specifications that are required to be met by the bidder have 
to be clearly specified in the tender documents. However, the bidders are not 
obliged to stick with domestic technical specifications as long as the equivalent 
standard can be met and stuck with. In the UK this provision faces some 
difficulties as the provisions of Public Contracts Regulations require certain 
British standards. But now these conditions can be overcome by having an 
equivalent standard.  
•  All bidders from the European Community countries should be treated 
equally. 
•  Nevertheless, there are certain types of projects exempted from the latter 
provision and can be limited to domestic contractors due to the nature of these 
projects, which are usually related to the security reasons such as 
telecommunications projects. 
Finally, the Procurement Regulations also specify the limited and restricted ways 
of how the public authority proceeds its tender. In essence, there are four means 
of procedures to process a tender, such as: the opining procedure; restricted 
procedure; negotiated procedure; and the competitive dialogue. All these ways to 
seek a tender are restricted with certain provisions that must be followed or 
otherwise the public authority will be considered in breach of the Procurement 
Regulations, which may lead to compensate a damaged or suffered bidder for his 
cost of tender, losses and any profit that’s expected to be gained from the project. 
In the case of Blackpool,
50 Lord Bingham in his judgment sees that the invitee 
should be protected at least to the extent that his bid was in conformity with the 
tender, and is submitted before the time the bid lapsed. Lord Bingham sees that 
                                                           
50 [1990]1 WLR 1195. 43 
 
there is a contractual obligation that has arisen that gives the bids conforming 
with the other bids, a right to be at least considered. 
Furthermore, in the case of Harmon CFEM Facades (UK) Ltd v Corporate 
Officer of the House of Commons,
51 the court found that in accordance with 
Public Works Contracts Regulations 1991 (PWR), the public authority has to fall 
within the criteria that had been stipulated by such regulations. It also must 
comply with Article 6.30.5965 of the Treaty of Rome (as amended at Maastricht), 
which set criteria where a base for the awarding of the tender is as follows: 
1)  either the lowest price; 
2)  it is economically advantageous. 
Any decision in this regard by the public authority has to be in compliance with 
such criteria, and must be fair, regardless of the nationality of the bidders. Any 
breach of these criteria or not even setting any criteria could entitle the suffered 
bidder damages that include his tender cost and the profit margin that he might 
have achieved if he had won the tender.  
In conclusion, according to MJB Enterprises Ltd v Defence Construction (1951) 
Ltd
52 it is necessary to distinguish between the two principles that overriding the 
relationship between the parties under the tendering process in the common law 
legal system;  
a)  An implied obligation to treat compliant bids fairly and equally would be 
applied to the process regardless of whether or not a contractual obligation arose 
between parties. 
b)  Apart from the aforementioned principle, the terms and conditions and the 
term of the invitation to tender may constitute a separate contractual obligations to 
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enter into an agreement between the inviter and the compliant bidders in 
particular where these bidders have been purposely selected by the owner. 
  
Cost of Tendering and Enrichment  
But what if the Contractor (being the offerer) for some reason - having too much 
faith, for instance - thought that his offer shall be entertained or his offer is so 
attractive that the Employer may accept it, and set out performing his obligation 
unilaterally with the result that such performance produced had its fruit and 
benefits for the Employer? What, even more, if this Employer received the 
benefits and enrichment because of the performance of the Contractor, and 
nevertheless denied the right of the Contractor to receive consideration? How 
does the Contractor get the Employer to fulfill his obligation?    
The above questions impose a problem dealt with under both the civil and 
common law systems as “Unjust Enrichment” or “Restitution”, which will be 
discussed below.    
Due to the various reasons as well as to its nature, it is common in the 
construction industry for parties of a construction contract to commence a planned 
project before signing a written document, or before their completed agreement 
came into existence, especially when most of the essential issues had been agreed, 
with some pending a further negotiation. Also, sometimes the work or project is 
already finished even though the parties have not signed any contract, or broadly a 
contractor begins a work pursuant to the letter of intent issued by the owner. As a 
result, the usual question that can arise in such cases is of which basis that the 
contractor can be compensated for his work and incurred expenses. So as this 
issue is not treated under the English law as simple as under the Kuwaiti law, we 
will start to illustrate under the English law, and then as per Kuwaiti law. 
 Under English law 45 
 
The law of obligations, under the English law, has its bases in the law of contact, 
tort and restitution. In essence, the latter source of obligations (restitution) comes 
into action later than the others, and overlaps with such bases of obligations; this 
makes it difficult, in some cases, to identify the appropriate or applicable base for 
the subject claim. It was noted by Lord Goff, in the case of Henderson v Merrett 
Syndicates Ltd,
53  where he said: 
  The situation in common law countries includes of course England, which 
is exceptional. In that common law grew a procedural framework which 
was uninfluenced by Roman law. The law was categorized by reference to 
the forms of action, and it was not until the abolition of the forms of action 
by the Common Law Procedure Act of 1852 that it became necessary to 
reclassify the law in substantive terms. The result was that common 
lawyers did at last separate our law of obligation into contract and tort, 
though in doing so they relegated quasi-contractual claims to the status of 
an appendix to the law of contract, thereby postponing by a century or so 
the development of a law of restitution. 
It was also remarked by commentators that the law of restitution recently 
completed the trio of obligations. Hence, a claimant can make his claim not only 
on the basis of contract or tort but also on the basis of the law of restitution.
54 
The doctrine of restitution is based upon the unjust enrichment of the defendant at 
the expense of the claimant. Although the principle of restitution was originally 
recognized by the civil law system, it is also accepted by a common law system as 
it was remarked by Lord Wright in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson 
Combe Barbour Ltd:
55 
  It is clear that any civilized system of law is bound to provide remedies for 
cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, which is 
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to prevent a man from retaining the money of or some benefit derived 
from another which it is against conscience that he should keep. Such 
remedies in English law are generically different from remedies in 
contract or in tort, and are now recognized to fall within a third category 
of the common law which has been called quasi-contract or restitution.  
The House of Lords recognized the concept of unjust enrichment as the 
foundation of the law of restitution where in the latter, the claimant can recover 
what he unjustly paid or delivered to the defendant.
56 
In case there is no contract in existence between the disputed parties, it is possible 
to compensate the party who carried out a work on his expense on the bases of 
restitution. 
Approaching restitution as a way of recovering damages requires four elements 
that must be present in such a case, which are:
57 
•  The defendant should be benefited or enriched. 
The benefit received by the defendant can be money, goods, services or may be 
by wrongdoing. It is easy to assess and calculate the damages in the case of 
money or specific goods benefits, while it is difficult in the case of services or 
other nonphysical benefits. In the case of BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt 
(No.2),
58 Robert Goff J said ‘by receipt, the recipient is inevitably benefited; and 
(subject to problems arising from such matters as inflation, change of position and 
the time value of money) the loss suffered by the plaintiff is generally equal to the 
defendants gain, so no difficulty arises concerning the amount to be paid’. 
•  The defendant’s enrichment should be at the claimant’s expense. 
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Proving this provision, the claimant has to prove that he lost against what the 
defendant gained, whether it was money paid, goods supplied, or services 
rendered to the defendant. 
•  Such an enrichment was unjust. 
Here the benefit gained should not transfer to the claimant on eligible reasons. So, 
the benefit may be delivered by mistake, fail consideration, or even claim 
quantum meruit. 
•  There are no defenses. 
The claim of restitution should not be resisted by a defense of good faith in 
purchase, change of position or in public policy. In the case of Lipkin Gorman v 
Karpnale Ltd,
59 Lord Goff ascertained that ‘The recovery of money in restitution 
is not, as a general rule, a matter of discretion for the court. A claim to recover 
money is made as a matter of right; and even though the underlying principle of 
recovery is the principle of unjust enrichment, nevertheless, where recovery is 
denied, it is denied on legal principle’. 
 Cost of Tendering 
The cost of tendering and estimating the required work, especially for major 
projects, usually costs a bidder an extremely large amount of cost, specifically 
when it is needed to hire an outsourcing surveyor, or estimating expertise to check 
and evaluate the foreseeability of the project. This cost in general should be borne 
by the bidder himself to obtain the tender, and the employer will not be liable for 
the bidder’s expenses. Nevertheless, the bidder may deserve to be reimbursed for 
the cost of tender in certain cases. 
If the contractor performs additional services at the employer’s request, he may be 
entitled to a reasonable payment. In the case of William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd v 
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Davis,
60 the court held that, ‘Although no binding contract had been concluded 
between the parties, a promise should be implied that the defendant would pay a 
reasonable sum to the plaintiff in respect of the services rendered’. 
Also if the contractor does a substantial amount of preparatory work over and 
above the normal tendered preparation, which expressly or impliedly is requested 
by the employer, such as performing a small quantity of design and no contract is 
ever placed, then the contractor will have a right to payment of reasonable sum.
61 
 Under Kuwaiti Law 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter One regarding the applicable law to the 
construction contract under Kuwaiti jurisdiction, as per Article (5) of Kuwaiti 
Law of Commerce, a building construction contract is considered a commercial 
transaction and is subject to the Law of Commerce. And as we have seen, the 
merchant transactions under Kuwaiti law can be proved by any means of proving 
regardless of the value of the transaction itself. This is contrary to the Civil law 
which does not allow to prove any transaction whose value exceeds 1000 Kuwaiti 
Dinar, other than the written evidence.  
As a result, a construction oral contract can be proven as per Kuwait Law of 
Commerce by any means of evidence including oral witnessing. Additionally, as 
per Kuwaiti law jurisdiction, if there is an agreement between parties without 
specifying the price of contract, then the court can decide on the reasonable price 
having estimated by an expert, or by the court itself if it found itself capable to do 
so. This is usually what happens, especially for an urgent or contingency work 
that is usually performed before parties have agreed upon the price or other such 
details. But, in essence, the difficulty can arise when a precedent agreement 
cannot be approved or denied by a defendant; then the question that may arise is 
how to compensate a plaintiff for his loss, or work he performed. In fact, if any 
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agreement, either oral or written, can be proven between parties, then we only 
have a way of unjust enrichment to compensate a loser or suffered party.  
If this means cannot be approached by a plaintiff, as it is the best way to claim his 
loss or damage, then a basis of unjust enrichment approach can be taken by the 
plaintiff in accordance with Article (262) of Civil Law which provides, “Every 
person who enriches himself without lawful cause at the expense of another 
person shall be liable to the extent of the riches obtained to compensate such other 
person for the loss sustained by the latter; the said liability shall continue to exist 
even when such enrichment has disappeared at a later date.” 
Generally, and considerably similar to the English law in this regard, there are 
three elements required to exist in such a case in order to apply the provisions of 
the unjust enrichment (restitution) in accordance with the Kuwaiti Civil law:
62  
 
•  The defendant should be enriched 
Utterly similar to the English law, the defendant might be enriched whether by 
money, goods or services that he received, or any negative benefits that he has 
received, such as paying his debts on his behalf. 
Nevertheless, such benefits do not need to exist until the date of filing the case, 
and the plaintiff can claim his damages even though such enrichment has 
disappeared at a later date. 
•  Such enrichment should be at the plaintiff’s expense 
This expense can be a direct or indirect expense, and can be goods or money that 
has been delivered to the defendant, or services that have been performed for the 
benefit of the defendant, or even such expenses that are tangible or intangible. 
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•  There is no cause for such enrichment 
That means if there is a reason for this enrichment, the claim should be based 
upon said reason; such a contract, or the law and the court, should look into the 
contract or the said law to examine the plaintiff’s claim, not to the Unjust 
Enrichment rules.  
 
 51 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
Arbitration 
The construction industry in general, as distinct from other industries, has an 
excess number of claims and disputes, particularly with regard to “turnkey” 
contracts. Furthermore, as with all other types of contracts or legal deals, the 
disputes in construction contracts can be resolved through several means. 
Different from the English law and FIDIC’s models, the Kuwaiti law, although 
giving this type of contract special rules that are badly needed, does not give such 
contracts any special treatment in terms of dispute resolution. However, in 
practice, parties to a construction contract, in particular with major projects, often 
adopt or refer to an alternative dispute resolution method such as adjudication, 
conciliation, mediation or arbitration, rather than the normal litigation before local 
courts.  
Under this chapter we shall deal with the arbitration as it is the most common way 
which is used to resolve disputes in connection with turnkey contracts in the 
construction industry in the State of Kuwait.  
A Look at Kuwaiti Law 
 At present, Kuwait has quite an organized judiciary system - amongst the most 
contemporary of judiciary systems - with two degrees of litigation. The first 
degree which is the courts of first instance and courts of summary justice and 
practice. The second degree court is the Court of Appeal and Cassation. The 
Court of Appeal and Cassation is at the summit of the judiciary pyramid, which 
ensures the right application and enforcement of the law. The rules of arbitration 
for civil and commercial disputes are incorporated within the judiciary systems of 
Kuwait by special and distinctive rules that are different from those applicable 
under normal litigation. This approach was adopted by the Kuwaiti legislators to 
facilitate and expedite the resolution of commercial disputes at both the local and 52 
 
international level. Furthermore, it is intended to support the arbitration tribunal 
and to ensure its verdicts and awards are enforced properly, without any delay or 
challenge.  
The Definition of Arbitration 
Generally there is no single global definition for the arbitration. It differs from 
one legal system to another based upon what can be arbitrated in each legal 
system. 
Kuwaiti law does not define the arbitration, although it is quite organised to the 
arbitration. However, the Kuwaiti Court of Cassation defines the arbitration as an 
agreement to refer to any depute that has arisen, or may arise in the future due to 
an independent person or persons in lieu of a competent court for their 
determination.
63  
Such a definition meets all elements of what national and international 
commentators have tried to embody in the definition of arbitration. For example, 
Q Hogg states that ‘arbitration is the reference for binding judicial determination 
of any matter in controversy capable of being compromised by an agreement by 
way of accord and satisfaction or rendered arbitrable by statute between two or 
more parties to some person or persons other than a Court of competent 
jurisdiction’.
64  
The definition by the Kuwaiti Court of Cassation includes all four elements which 
are to be required in any arbitration, whether an institutional or an ad hoc 
arbitration. These elements include: the arbitration agreement whether as a 
provision in the main contract or as a condition of arbitration; a dispute or 
conflict; a reference to an independent third party; and a final and binding award.  
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Distinction between a Court Procedure and Arbitration 
There is a distinct difference between a court procedure and an arbitration 
procedure. Generally in an arbitration the parties are free to agree upon their own 
procedural rules; on the other hand, the tribunal can adopt a suitable procedure to 
the dispute. 
One of the essential characteristics of arbitration is that it is based upon 
contractual liberty, which means that there are no fixed rules of procedure. Party 
autonomy is the first principle in arbitration. The parties should be free to agree 
upon any procedures whichever they agree. The principle of party autonomy is 
not a new concept, but one which has been at the heart of the arbitral process and 
is indeed a major reason why parties choose arbitration rather than litigation.  
Nevertheless, the arbitration tribunal must follow the strict rules of pleadings; 
defence; discovery of documents; and to follow very strictly the Public Policy.
65 
The freedom to choose their own set of procedures is a part of the arbitration 
process in many countries. In France, for example, the parties are naturally free to 
choose or not to choose the applicable law to the proceedings, either in their 
arbitration agreement, or once a dispute has arisen. This is stated in the French 
Arbitration Law, Article 1494(2) of the New Code of Civil Proceedings, as the 
arbitrator’s freedom to determine the procedural rules is “in so far as necessary” 
in keeping with its liberal tradition. 
In Kuwait, arbitration is not subject to the same rules applied to legal litigation. 
Article 182 of the Civil and Commercial Procedure Code No. 38 of 1980 reads: 
The arbitrator shall render his award without compliance with pleading 
procedures, save the proceedings provided for in this chapter. Nevertheless, the 
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litigant parties may agree upon certain proceedings to be followed by the 
arbitrator in that respect. 
The award rendered by the arbitrator shall be based upon law provisions, unless 
he is authorized to compromise and conciliate where he shall not comply with 
such provisions, save those relating to public order. 
The rules governing urgent self-executing judgments shall be applicable to the 
arbitrator’s award. 
The Arbitrator’s award shall be rendered in Kuwait; otherwise the prescribed 
rules applicable to the arbitrator’s awards in a foreign country shall be applied in 
that respect. 
This article states that the arbitrator shall render his award without compliance to 
the pleadings procedures, and this goes to illustrate the fact that there is great 
flexibility in the procedures adopted by arbitration in Kuwait.
66This is very much 
the same procedural rules in most jurisdictions. There is a great tendency for the 
arbitrators to be as flexible as possible. 
In the English Law, section (33) of the Arbitration Act 1996 states: 
33(1) The Tribunal shall- 
a)  act fairly and impartially as between the parties, giving each party a 
reasonable and opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his 
opponent; and 
b)  adopt a procedure suitable to the circumstances of a particular case, 
avoiding unnecessary delay or expense, so as to provide a fair means for the 
resolution of the matters falling to be determined. 
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(2) The Tribunal shall comply with that general duty in conducting the arbitral 
proceedings, in its decisions on matters of procedure and evidence and in the 
exercise of all other powers conferred on it. 
This section in the English Arbitration Act of 1996 states the fact that the tribunal 
is positively required to use flexibility and adaptability of arbitration to evolve an 
appropriate arbitral format to meet the individual circumstances of each case. In 
particular, it does this through its decision on procedural and evidential matters, in 
section 34. The keynote in this process is the avoidance of unnecessary delay and 
expense. It is now absolutely clear that it is unnecessary for arbitral to follow the 
“court” procedure slavishly. 
In comparison to the Model Law, article 18 of the Model Law provides: 
 ‘The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full 
opportunity of presenting its case. 
It can be noted that an arbitration provides greater procedural flexibility, but in the 
case of civil matters in the English court, the parties must follow the strict rules of 
pleadings, defence, discovery of documents, and to follow very strictly the Rules 
of the Supreme Court and the County Court Rules. There is strict time limits for 
every action, and if not followed then the action can be struck off. There is always 
the problem of cost and inflexibility in a court procedure. 
There are certain aspects of principles which the parties must pay particular 
attention to. Firstly, the principle of equality; this principle is important because it 
is mandatory for the arbitrator to follow. As in section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 
the tribunal must act fairly to both parties. Hence, the parties deciding to arbitrate 
must always bear in mind the principles of equality. However, Kuwaiti law does 
not express or refer to this principle of equality directly. Still, it is implicitly 56 
 
applied to every arbitration.
67Therefore, the tribunal must give each party “full 
opportunity” although giving full opportunity to both parties could lead to delays. 
Giving full opportunity to both parties is mainly to avoid any gross injustice, and 
to be fair to both parties. 
Secondly, in terms of public policy, it is akin to court procedure. Parties who 
agree to arbitrate must avoid infringing public policy principles. Anything 
contrary to the public policy would not be entertained in arbitration. Regarding 
Kuwaiti Arbitration Law, it is clearly spelt out in Article 182 of the Civil and 
Commercial Procedure Law No. 38 of 1980. The Article reads “... The award 
rendered by the arbitrator shall be based on law provisions, unless he is authorized 
to compromise and conciliate, where he shall not comply with such provisions, 
save those relating to public order...” The parties cannot agree with anything 
which is contrary to public policy. In the Kuwaiti context, the word “public order” 
refers to public policy, and parties cannot infringe this principle. The arbitration 
must also take note that this is an important principle. In England, the principle of 
public policy is in the context of common law. 
Thirdly, the arbitration agreement must not affect the rights of third parties, unless 
there is a special provision which allows this. In most cases this is rare
68 . 
However, there are instances whereby the arbitrator would seek the assistance of 
the court to make it possible for third parties to attend the arbitration or also to 
enforce the award. In Kuwaiti Law this can be found in Article 180 of the Civil 
and Commercial Procedure Code No. 38 of 1980, chapter 12. Article 180 reads 
“... Consequently, the arbitrator shall suspend his work and refer the case to the 
Chief Judge of the Court originally competent to hear the dispute so as effect the 
following: 
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(A)  Adjudicating the legally prescribed penalty upon the witness who fails to 
appear or abstain from answering. 
 
 
(B)  Having third parties adjudged to submit any document in their possession, 
which is deemed necessary for retention of the relevant award...” 
The Kuwaiti Arbitration law is like most other Arbitration laws whereby parties 
cannot contract anything which is contrary to public policy principles, and the 
courts are to assist parties in terms of anything to do with third parties. The 
tribunal must always conduct the arbitration fairly to both parties as explained 
earlier. 
Evolution Of The Judiciary System And Arbitration In Kuwait 
The magazine named “Al Ahkam Al Adleyah “(The Judicial Judgments) was the 
prevailing and applied rules of law enforceable in the country before 
independence. After independence in 1960, Kuwait embarked on establishing 
broad bases of a developed legal system. No sooner had the magazine law been in 
application than it revealed its insufficiency to meet the regulation of the 
transactions of the society and the people inter se even before the discovery of 
oil.
69When oil has been discovered in the late forties, and life started to develop 
and change took place rapidly, it was inevitable for law to confront such 
development and changes and set up solutions to cope with new reality rather than 
to become a stumbling block. Thus the magazine declined and legislation started 
to make the relevant law rules in different aspects that dealt with civil, 
commercial, maritime, litigation and arbitration.  
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 As a matter of fact arbitration has not been a stranger or a new comer to State of 
Kuwait as it was known and conducted in a primitive shape being the only and 
essential means of dispute resolution in all domains whether civil, commercial, 
personal statutes or even the criminal questions
70 where disputing opponents 
resort to the ruler or religion men to arbitrate and finalize the dispute by a final 
decision. The arbitrator for instance in criminal matters applied the “eye for an 
eye principle” and owing to the victim family acceptance, the arbitrator may 
quantify the damage and impose a sum of money called “Diyah” against the 
respondent who pays and acquitted. 
Officially, the first time that the State of Kuwait applied the arbitration as a 
method of its dispute resolution was on 1934 when the British Petroleum 
Company started to explore for the oil in the area of Arabic Peninsula. In the 
Concession Agreement between the Amir of Kuwait (whom represent the State) 
and  Kuwait Oil Company Limited (British Petroleum) to explore and produce the 
oil in the territory of the State of Kuwait, it was stated in clause 18 of the 
Concession Agreement that : 
“a) If at any time during the currency of this Agreement and difference or dispute 
shall arise between the parties hereto concerning the interpretation or execution 
hereof, or anything herein contained or in connection herewith, or the rights or 
liabilities of either party hereunder, the same shall, failing any agreement to settle 
it in any other way, after discuss the same with the British High Commissioner in 
the Gulf, be referred to two arbitrators, one whom shall be chosen by each party, 
and a referee, who shall be chosen by the arbitrators before proceeding to 
arbitration. 
b) Each party shall nominate its own arbitrator within sixty (60) days after the 
delivery of a request so to do by the other party, failing which its arbitrator may at 
the request of the other party be designated by the British High Commissioner in 
the Gulf. In the event of the arbitrators failing to agree upon the referee within 
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(60) days after being chosen or designated , the British High Commissioner in the 
Gulf  may appoint a referee at the request of the arbitrators or of either of them. 
c) The decision of the arbitrators, or in the case of difference of opinion between 
them, the decision of the referee, shall be final and binding upon both parties. 
d) In giving a decision the arbitrators or the referee shall specify an adequate 
period of delay during which the party against whom the decision is given shall 
conform to the decision and that party shall be in default if that party has failed to 
conform to the decision prior to the expiry of that period and not otherwise. 
e) The place of arbitration shall be such as may be agreed by the parties and in 
default of agreement shall be London. 
After the dawn of independence broke in 1960, Law No. 6 of 1960 regulating 
Civil and Commercial procedures was promulgated and issued. The third section 
of it was set aside for local arbitration but not the international arbitration. This 
organization of such optional arbitration was primarily developed by Law No.3 of 
1971, which added a new paragraph to Article 264 of the aforesaid law that 
provides that one or more Arbitration Panels shall be formed at the Court of First 
Instance, each of which is chaired by a Counsel or a Justice Judge elected by the 
General Assembly of the competent court, with the membership, duly selected of 
two merchants by Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The Panel shall hold its 
sitting at the place appointed by the head of Panel where disputes brought before 
it free of fees. The Panel may be aided by one of the court officials as a 
secretariat. The arbitrators’ award shall be awarded by the majority votes and 
shall not be appealed. The award shall be entrusted to the Clerks department 
within five days following the date of issuance.
71 
In 1980, the present Law of Civil and Commercial Procedures No.78 has been 
promulgated and issued where it contained provisions deal with implementation 
of foreign arbitral awards issued by arbitration institutes abroad on the field of 
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international commercial relations in Kuwait. Nevertheless, this law has not dealt 
with international commercial arbitration in essence and neither dealt with the 
procedures and terms of reference or the arbitral award, the modality of issuance, 
its challenge, setting aside etc.. as the Kuwaiti legislator’s attitude remained 
looking upon arbitration as an exceptional route for litigation other than litigating 
at state courts at least in case of domestic arbitration. 
Such development, though slight, was as a matter of fact not accompanied by 
suitable steps that should have been taken by the Kuwaiti legislator to cover the 
broad scale of international arbitration and keep pace with the requirements of this 
era in which businesses are booming nationally and internationally. This is, in our 
view, the reason why the number of disputes that were resolved pursuant to these 
rules of arbitration was kept at very small rate.
72  
A New Trend of Arbitration under Judicial Arbitration Law 11 of 1995  
The Kuwaiti legislator felt and understood the importance of arbitration for the 
modern commercial life particularly when the practicality revealed an ill 
application of article 177 of the Law No. 38 of the year 1980 and the reluctance of 
people to resort to the arbitral panel under such a law.  
Recently, the latest intervention of the State in favour of arbitration was made in 
1995 through the promulgation of Arbitration Law No.11 of the year 1995, which 
encourages and gives more flexibility to the parties to resolve their disputes by 
means of arbitration. 
Moreover, the law in question has obliged some parties to resolve their disputes 
through the new judicial arbitration process as is mentioned in the second 
paragraph of Article 2 of Arbitration Law No.11 of 1995: ‘…2- It shall alone have 
exclusive jurisdiction to determine on the disputes arising between the 
Government Ministries, Authorities, Public Corporation and Companies whose 
capital is fully owned by the State, Government or between all such institutions’.  
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This fashion of compulsory arbitration has only been adopted in very narrow 
ways and only for certain cases due to the nature of these cases - as can be seen in 
the two following examples: 
•  Kuwaiti Labour Law No 38 of 1964 pertaining the resolution of disputes 
arising between the employer and the trade union which had not been resolved 
amicably which states that:
73 
“ when a dispute arises between an employer and all or a number of his workers 
regarding the conditions of work. The following proceedings shall be followed to 
settle the dispute: 
1.  Direct negotiations between the employer or his representative and the 
workers or their representative shall be conducted; if both parties reach an 
amicable settlement, the settlement shall be registered with the ministry of Social 
Affairs and Labour within seven days of signature of such settlement in 
accordance with the formalities set down by the Ministry. 
2.  If both parties fail to settle the dispute by negotiation, either or both parties 
may apply in person, or though a representative, to the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Labour which shall endeavour to settle the dispute; 
3.  If the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour fails to resolve the dispute 
within fifteen days of the date on which the said application was submitted, the 
dispute shall on the expiry of the said time –limit be referred to the Arbitration 
Committee for Labour Disputes, which shall be formed from the following:  
- A department of the high Court of Appeal designated every year by the General 
Meeting of the said Court; 
- The head of a prosecution department delegated by the attorney General; 
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- A representative of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour appointed by the 
Minister; the employer or his representative, and the representative of the workers 
may attend before the said Committee, provided that the representative of either 
party shall not be more than three. 
The award of the Arbitration Committee shall be final and binding on both 
parties.” 
•  The same concept can also be found in the Amiri Decree No. 2 of 1984 
pertaining to regulating the Kuwait Stock Exchange Market under Article 13 
which states:  
“An Arbitration Committee shall be set up within the market, by a resolution 
passed by the Market Committee; it shall be chaired by a number of Judiciary, to 
be selected by a supreme Judiciary Council; the Committee’s duty shall be the 
settlement of all disputes relevant to dealings effected in the Market; dealing in 
the Market shall be deemed to be an acknowledgment of acceptance of 
arbitration, with fact shall be stated in the papers of said dealings. Awards made 
by the Committee shall be binding on both parties to a dispute; the resolution 
setting up the Committee shall lay down the proceedings for reference and 
settlement of the dispute.” 
The Arbitration committee would not handle arbitrations free of charge as it was 
under the Law no. 3 of the year 1971. Irrespectively, the legislator estimated fees 
for arbitration as article 13 of the Law 11/ 1995 stipulated the necessity of the 
objecting party to deposit an amount “ namely 100 Kuwaiti Dinars “ as surety on 
submission of the notice of objection. 
One more crucial feature of the Law 11/ 1995
74 is the repeal of article 177 of the 
Law of Civil and Commercial Procedures No. 38 of the year 1980, further 
stipulating that the Arbitration Panels provided for herein shall be subject to the 
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provisions of Law 11/ 1995 whilst applying the provisions of the Law 38/ 1980 
where it is not in contradiction with the provisions of the Law 11/ 1995. 
Nevertheless, arbitration, in the true technical global sense, in Kuwait still faces 
some obstacles in respect to the confidence of the public
75 as far as its viability as 
a method of dispute resolution when compared with the classic judicial authority. 
Shapes of Arbitration Practice in Kuwait 
Arbitration practice in Kuwait takes different shapes as to the modality through 
which an arbitration case may be conducted based on the desire of the disputants 
themselves to opt for the modality that will maintain the maximum benefit for 
each one:  
1.  Optional Arbitration which is provided under the Law of Civil and 
Commercial Procedures issued in 1980, articles 173 to 188.
76  
2.  The Ministry of Justice Optional Arbitration provides that the Ministry of 
Justice may constitute one or more arbitration panels
77 that are free of fees to deal 
with the disputes of the concerned parties agree in writing to submit thereto. The 
legislator proposed to broaden the constitution
 of the arbitration panel so as not to 
be limited only to the membership of merchants with the purpose of enlarging its 
scope of jurisdiction
78 to include disputes which lack other technical or scientific 
specialties such as engineering, medical or labour specialties.  
Thus, the legislator gave the Minister of Justice the power - via issuing a decree - 
to regulate the said different specialties tabling. Moreover, the organizing of the 
tables and the selection of arbitrators would be performed according to the 
required specialty of the subject dispute to be submitted to the panel. 
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3.  The Permanent Institutional Arbitration undertaken by the Chamber of 
Commerce issued on 28-6-1958 where the personality of arbitrators play an 
important role, even more than the arbitration. This role is to make good offices 
conciliate and re-conciliate rather than to resolve the dispute by means of 
arbitration. The arbitral panel under such modality constitutes of merchants and 
nobles and not legal persons. 
4.  The International Arbitration where the Kuwaiti legislator does not 
distinguish between the domestic and international arbitration but it considers 
each arbitration case conducted outside Kuwait as foreign even though a Kuwaiti 
law is applied or even if it was between Kuwaiti parties. Therefore, all the 
provisions related to the implementation of foreign judgments are applicable 
thereon.  
Disputes That Can Be Arbitrated          
As a general rule, matters that cannot be conciliated may not be arbitrated,
79 and 
the concept of such an article must be understood in light of the principle derived 
from the civil law code which states that in case the object of obligation is in 
violation of the law, the public order or the good morals, a contract shall be 
void.
80 The same meaning is provided under the principle which reads that 
matters related to public order may not be conciliated and that conciliation only is 
valid where there are any financial rights generated thereof.
81  
Thus we see that the violation of law rules of one side, and the non-ability of the 
matter of the dispute are to be conciliated with the other side; this poses a 
question regarding the ability of arbitrating three matters under the Kuwaiti legal 
system: 
a.  Bankruptcy 
                                                           
79  Article 173 para. 3 of the Law of Civil and Commercial Procedures. 
80 Article 172 of  the Kuwaiti Civil Law. 
81 Article 554 of the Kuwaiti Civil Law . 65 
 
Under Kuwaiti law a merchant may be declared bankrupted at the request of one 
of its creditors or at his own request; the court also may render a judgment by its 
own based on a request of the prosecution general.
82In the case mentioned, the 
matters related to bankruptcy cannot be arbitrated but the financial rights 
generated from bankruptcy may be conciliated and accordingly arbitrated. 
b.  Trade Mark 
The Kuwaiti commercial law provides criminal penalties for the falsification of a 
registered trade mark; imitation or usage of a counterfeited trade mark; using a 
trade mark which is the property of a third party; or selling of products labeled 
with counterfeited, falsified or placed without legitimate right.
83 Such matters 
therefore, cannot be arbitrated but the financial rights generated thereof may be 
arbitrated. 
c.  Commercial Representation 
All disputes arising out of a commercial representation contract shall be referred 
to the competent court wherein jurisdiction for the contract is executed.
84 This 
provision raises the question whether the essence of the provision means that 
these disputes cannot be arbitrated but only litigated before the designated court. 
The answer to this question requires a profound reading of Article 282 of the 
commercial law code which provides that the competent judge shall quantify the 
compensation irrespective of any opposite agreement. In light of the reading of 
the aforementioned two articles, we deduce the intents of the legislator which will 
nullify any agreement that occupies the jurisdiction of the competent court.  
Arbitration Agreement – The Kuwaiti Approach 
The parties may agree to arbitrate any arising dispute and stipulate for such 
agreement by incorporating into the contract an “Arbitration Clause”, and this 
                                                           
82 Article 557 of the Kuwaiti Commercial Law. 
83 Article 92 of the Commercial Law. 
84 Article 285 of the Commercial Law. 66 
 
what is known as the pre-dispute arbitration agreement. If the contract does not 
include an arbitration clause and a dispute arises between the parties, they may 
enter into a post-dispute arbitration agreement which is termed as an “Arbitration 
Charter”. Kuwaiti jurisprudence distinguishes between the pre-dispute and the 
post arbitration agreements.
85 Thus the Kuwaiti approach on this subject came in 
conformity with the global norm in this respect.   
Aminoil V Government of the State of Kuwait 
One distinct advantage of ad hoc arbitration is that it may be shaped to meet the 
wishes of the parties and the facts of the particular dispute. It needs the 
cooperation of the parties and their advisers for this to be done efficiently and 
effectively. It is however, an expensive and time-consuming process to draft 
special rules for an ad hoc arbitration. Time and money can be saved by adopting 
or adapting, rules of procedure which have been specially formulated for this 
purpose. The best set of rules is the Uncitral Arbitration Rules. However, it is not 
advisable to try to adopt or adapt institutional rules (such as those of the ICC) for 
use in ad hoc arbitration, since such rules make constant reference to the 
institution concerned and will not work properly or effectively without it. 
In the case of Aminoil arbitration between the Government of the State of Kuwait 
and the American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil) the inherent flexibility of 
ad hoc proceedings was a considerable advantage in a dispute involving legal 
principles. Time limits were fixed which took account of the reasonable 
requirements of both parties, and the issues were defined in a way which 
considerably shortened the time spent in dealing with the case. The day to day 
presentation of the Government’s case was left in the hands of the external 
lawyers retained by the Government, but the agent alone had authority to make 
immediate decision on behalf of the Government on the many practical and 
logistical questions that necessarily arise during the conduct of major arbitration. 
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The procedure adopted also provided that the parties should file their pleadings at 
the same time, which they did over a period of months in an exchange of 
memorials, counter-memorials and replies. By this simple device, either party was 
labeled as defendant- an application which is sometimes resented, where each 
party considers that he has justifiable claims against the other. In the same spirit, 
the arbitral tribunal ordered that the Government should lead on some issues and 
that Aminoil should lead on others.   
The Agreement to Arbitrate 
Like any agreement, arbitration is to be mutually agreed upon by the parties 
involved, and can consist of the exchanging of an offer and an acceptance, which 
was earlier elaborated regarding the formation of the construction contract. 
However, it is stipulated in Article 173 of the Kuwaiti Civil and Commercial 
Pleadings Law that the arbitration may not be established unless it is in writing. In 
essence, the commentators look to this provision as a condition for proving the 
arbitration agreement is not for the formation of the agreement. The arbitration 
agreement is required to be included of all essential elements that need any 
arbitration such as the matters that can referred to in the arbitration, or identifying 
an arbitrator either namely or institutionally and the power of tribunal, etc. In 
essence, the Kuwaiti law, neither statuary nor judiciary, have identified the 
meaning of the writing, but simply leave it to the general principles of the Law of 
Evidence. 
 The Kuwaiti law in this regard is in some extent in conformity with English law. 
It is provided by s 5(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996 that the provisions of the Act 
only apply to the arbitration agreement that is in writing. Nevertheless, an 
arbitration agreement which is not writing is not invalid, but is outside the scope 
of the 1996 Act.  Moreover, the common law may apply in case the oral 
agreement is pursuant to s81 of the Arbitration Act 1996. Contrary to the Kuwaiti 
law, s (2) of the 1996 Act defines the meaning of the agreement in writing as 
follows: 68 
 
•  If made in writing, whether or not it is signed by parties. This also applies 
where the parties refer to terms which are in writing in accordance with s5 (3) of 
1996 Act; or 
•  If made by the exchange of communications in writing; or 
·  Evidenced in writing. This includes where the agreement is recorded by one 
of the parties, or by a third party, with the authority of the parties to the 
agreement, per s5(4) of 1996 Act.  
Independence of Arbitration Clause  
 The question of the independence of the arbitration clause was in question and 
unsettled till a recent time when determined by cassation court judgments. It is no 
secret that both jurisprudence and judicature were divided; both struggled for the 
determination of this matter while the legislation did not initiate any step towards 
the entire problem, neither under the previous law nor the new one. There is an 
opinion under the old law which adopts the notion that the legitimacy of the 
contract where the incorporated arbitration clause shall be the jurisdiction of the 
court and not the arbitrator.
86 Another opinion under the new law says that it is 
incontestable under jurisprudence and judicature that if the arbitration clause is 
incorporated in the contract, it shall be independent from that contract being a 
separate legal behavior and consequently the arbitration clause shall not be 
effected by a probable rescission or even voidance of the original contract which 
produced the dispute, unless the reason that voided the original contract includes 
the arbitration clause also.
87 Such a change of the jurisprudence and judicature 
situation towards this question in the absence of a law provision constitutes a 
progressive development for the benefit of arbitration. 
 
 
                                                           
86 Fouad Abuzeiad, Yearbook,vol.IV,1979,p.139. 
87 Abdulrasoul Abdulreda, ‘European – Arab Arbitration Symposium in Tunisia’,1985. 69 
 
 
 
Effect of the Contract on an Incorporated Arbitration Clause 
The effect that principally emerges from incorporating a contract with an 
arbitration clause takes the jurisdiction from the judicial authority represented by 
the court, and gives this jurisdiction to the arbitration panel. The Kuwaiti law 
explicitly provided that the courts have no jurisdiction to handle disputes that 
have been agreed upon referring them to arbitration; the plea of lack of 
jurisdiction may be waived expressly or explicitly.
88 The Kuwaiti legislator’s 
Interpretative Memorandum explains therein the withdrawal of the jurisdiction 
from the court, supported in its attitude by the Egyptian judicature, stating that it 
frequently happens when an opponent proceeds to the court in connection with a 
dispute that was agreed upon to resolve by arbitration. Both jurisprudence and 
judicature were in controversy about the legal conditioning of such behavior. One 
opinion described the behavior as violation of functional jurisdiction, and another 
adopted the notion of “law suit acceptance” rules, but the legislator was of the 
first opinion which is also adopted by the Egyptian Court of Cassation in a 
number of judgments. Accordingly, paragraph 5 of article 173 was decisive in 
providing that the courts lack the jurisdiction of handling disputes that have been 
agreed upon by parties to be referred to arbitration, and such jurisdiction is not 
connected to the public order due to the parties’ autonomy and the nature of the 
agreement which is the essence of arbitration. Therefore, and based on the lack of 
a jurisdiction plea, being not connected to the public order, all effects of the plea 
are arrayed such as the lapse of the right to use the plea if the substantial argument 
started and the plea was not made. The silence to use it by then is deemed to be an 
implicit waiver of the plea.
89 
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Our Assessment of the Legislator’s Position
90    
We remarked that the Kuwaiti legislator tended to consider the plea of lack of 
jurisdiction as non-connected to the public order, to save the courts the trouble of 
judging its non-competence to handle a dispute that arises out of a contract 
incorporating an arbitration clause. The legislator shouldered the burden of 
allegation the plea of lack of jurisdiction of the court on the party assuming the 
existence of an arbitration clause incorporated in the contract whose failure to use 
it will result in an implicit waiver of the plea by such a party.
91  It seems to us that 
the legislator still looks upon arbitration, being a private means for the opponent 
parties to resolve their dispute, as a rival who threatens to dethrone the state 
judicial order despite the state efforts to issue the judicial arbitration law 11 of 
1995. 
Nevertheless, arbitration in its true technical and global sense still faces obstacles 
in the State of Kuwait with respect to the confidence of the public
92 in terms of its 
viability as a method of resolving disputes when viewed in comparison with the 
state classic judicial authority.  
Countries in the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, Oman, UAE and Qatar have gone quite far towards the issuance of 
arbitration law codes derived from the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules.
93 However, Kuwait so far has not 
taken the due step to issue an arbitration law that may satisfy the needs of 
domestic and international trade regarding the volume of transactions of a foreign 
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nature and the reluctance of the foreign entities to recognize the judicial 
arbitration under Law 11 of 1995 as an effective means of dispute resolution. 
In the following section we are going to deal in detail with arbitration in the State 
of Kuwait in a comparing with other systems as is needed.   
A Process of Arbitration in Kuwaiti legal system 
The Kuwaiti legal system first organised arbitration within the pleading of Law 
No. 6 of 1960. This law was amended mainly through law No. 3 of 1971, by 
adding Article 264 which states that one or more arbitration panels are to be 
formed and held in the seat of the Court of First Instance, and the presidency over 
the panel shall be taken over by the Counsel or a Justice judge to be selected by 
the General Assembly of the competent court and its membership, duly 
comprising two merchants. The award of such panel shall be rendered by the 
majority and shall be final and binding and is not to be appealed. This was the 
first step in adopting arbitration in the Kuwaiti legal system. Later, this was 
reorganised through the civil and commercial pleadings law issued by Decree 
Law No. 38 of 1980 on June 4th 1980. This law was annexed by other 
amendments by laws under numbers 121 of 1986; 42 of 1987; 3 of 1988; 44 of 
1989; 57 of 1989; 47 of 1994 and 18 of 1995. As the legislators realised that to be 
in pace with the evolvement of commercial transactions, it must moved forward 
to develop the arbitration procedure by incorporating new provisions under part 
12 of the Pleadings Law Article 173-188. 
In 1995, there was a special law namely No. 11 of 1995 on the judicial arbitration 
stipulated by Article 177 of the pleadings law. There have been major changes in 
the arbitration law because the arbitration law in Kuwait is always keeping in 
pace with the international arbitration. Also the amendments have been made to 
avoid any serious irregularity of the law. Many international commercial contracts 
are carried out in Kuwait and there has always been a need to keep pace with the 
international law in Arbitration. 72 
 
On March 29th of 1995 under Law No. 11/1995 the judicial arbitration 
department was established in a judicial form with a high level of degree of 
expertise duly comprising litigants’ arbitrators so as to solve whatever civil and 
commercial disputes the litigants may bring. Regarding disputes of natural and/or 
judicial persons which are instituted by or against the State of Kuwait, its 
institutions or affiliated companies of such disputes may be brought before the 
said Arbitration Panel under the same rules of procedure. 
Summary of Articles from 173 to 188 of the Civil and Commercial 
Procedural law No. 38 in 1980 
Prior to going into details to illustrate the Arbitration Law No. 11 in 1995, it is 
worth describing in summary how the arbitration was run under the Kuwaiti law. 
Law No. 11 in 1995 concerned arbitration in civil and commercial clauses in 
addition to cancelling Article 177 of the civil and commercial procedure law, 
while Law Decree No. 10 in 1978 approved joining the 1958 New York 
Convention on the acknowledgment and implementation of the foreign arbitration 
award.
94  Agreement in arbitration is possible, whether before the occurrence of a 
dispute (the arbitration provision in the contract) or after it (condition of 
arbitration), thus eliminating the jurisdiction of the courts of the state. Agreement 
of arbitration must be in writing as a condition proving the agreement on 
arbitration.  Arbitration is not allowed in matters where reconciliation is not 
possible, for example, arbitration in border disputes, and punishment and rights 
violating the sacred law. Agreement is permitted only to those who have authority 
to act to the rights, or the rights under dispute. If there are several arbitrators, then 
the number must be odd. Arbitrators may be removed, reinstated or dismissed 
upon the approval and consent of parties or the court’s decision or judgment. 
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The Position of New York Convention of 1958 under Kuwaiti Law 
The New York Convention of 1958 is, to date, easily the most important 
international treaty relating to international commercial arbitration. Indeed its 
general level of success may be regarded as one of the factors responsible for the 
rapid development of arbitration as a means of resolving international trade 
disputes in recent decades. The New York Convention is plainly a considerable 
improvement upon the Geneva Convention of 1927, since it provides for a much 
more simple and effective method of obtaining recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. The New York Convention also gives much wider effect 
to the validity arbitration agreements than does the Geneva Protocol of 1923; and 
again the Convention replaces the Protocol, as between states which are bound by 
both. In order to enforce arbitration agreements, the New York Convention adopts 
the technique found in the Geneva Protocol of 1923. The Convention, in Article 
II.3 requires the Court of contracting states to refuse to allow a dispute which is 
subject to an arbitration agreement to be litigated before its courts, if an objection 
to such litigation is raised by any party to the arbitration agreement.
95 The New 
York convention is intended to apply to international agreements, rather than to 
purely domestic agreements; and it is in this sense that the Convention has been 
interpreted by national laws implementing the Convention, such as the Kuwaiti 
legislature by Law Decree No. 10 in 1978. 
In terms of the enforcement of the arbitration award under Kuwaiti law, and as the 
Kuwaiti law treats the international arbitration and domestic arbitration 
differently, it is worth to describe the criteria in order to distinguish between the 
international arbitration and the domestic arbitration in accordance with the 
Kuwaiti law; thereafter, the rules that govern each one will be elaborated. 
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 The arbitration under Kuwaiti law is categorized based on the seat or place of the 
arbitration as follows: 
•  The main factor to differentiate between the international arbitration and 
the domestic arbitration is the seat of the arbitration.  
•  So, if the arbitration panel had been held and issued its award outside the 
State of Kuwait’s territory, then it would amount to a foreign arbitration award 
irrespective of the arbitration parties’ nationalities. 
•  Consequently, if the arbitration tribunal takes its seat within the State of 
Kuwait’s territory, it would be considered as a domestic arbitration.     
If this is defined, then the rule of the enforcement of arbitral award will be as 
follows: 
•  For the domestic arbitration award, the way to enforce it is stipulated in 
Articles 184 and 185 of the Civil and Commercial Pleadings Law 38 of 1980, 
which is put in two steps: 
-  The original award shall be deposited, along with the original arbitration 
agreement, with the Clerical department of the competent court originally hearing 
the dispute within ten days following the determined award.  
-  The award shall not be enforceable, save under an order issued by the 
Chief Judge of the court where the award was deposited. After having perused the 
award and the arbitration agreement, it shall meanwhile verify the nonexistence of 
the impediments of its implementation and the basis of appeal limitation, if the 
award is appealable and not urgently self-executing. 
On the other hand, for the enforcement of the foreign arbitration award, the 
Kuwaiti distinguishes between two cases: the award that is issued in the state that 
a member of the New York Convention of 1958, or, from the state that is not a 
member of the convention. 75 
 
In case an enforcement of a foreign arbitration award is issued in a convention 
member state, it will be treated like a domestic arbitration award and the same 
procedural rules that applied to the domestic award, as it is stipulated in Article 
185 of the Civil and Commercial Pleadings Law, will be applied here to, provided 
that these rules does not impose substantially more onerous conditions or higher 
fees or charges on the enforcement of arbitral awards than those imposed on the 
state of the seat of arbitration tribunal.
96  
But for the foreign arbitral award of a non-member of the convention, it will be 
treated in accordance with the reciprocity principle, i.e. the foreign arbitral award 
will be treated in Kuwait as such state treats the Kuwaiti arbitral award.
97 
Nevertheless, in general, there are provisions that have been stipulated in Articles 
199 and 200 of the pleadings law to be required for enforcement of any foreign 
arbitral award which is as follows:
98 
1.  The foreign arbitral award has been issued by a competent tribunal and the 
appointment of the arbitrators all have been done in accordance with the 
arbitration agreement and the laws of the state of the seat of arbitration. 
2.  The parties genuinely have been represented before the tribunal and they 
have been treated equally and each party has been given a full opportunity of 
presenting its case. 
3.  The foreign arbitral award is final and enforceable in the state of seat of 
arbitration. 
4.  The subject award does not contradict any other award or judgment that is 
issued in the State of Kuwait nor to the contrary of the public policy.
99 
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It should be noted that reference to the public policy in this regard does not 
mainly mean the national public policy but the international public policy. 
5.  The subject matter of the dispute is capable of settlement by arbitration 
under the Kuwaiti law.  
The original authenticated copy of the foreign arbitral award must be submitted 
attached with an official Arabic translation. 
 Kuwaiti Arbitration Procedure and how it Works 
In Kuwait, arbitration can be divided into two different kinds of arbitration: the 
voluntary arbitration, and the compulsory arbitration where the parties are obliged 
by law to resort to arbitration. Voluntary arbitration is agreement between parties, 
individuals or by the body corporate. This kind of arbitration is common among 
private individuals and commercial enterprises. As it has been discussed earlier, 
voluntary arbitration is simple, non-costly and is to be fair to the parties. This type 
of arbitration is to maintain confidentiality. 
Voluntary arbitration is divided into judiciary arbitration and reconciliatory 
arbitration depends upon whether the arbitrators are chosen from the judicial body 
or from other professional’s bodies. In some cases a judiciary judge is appointed 
as an arbitrator to determine on a purely unusual legal dispute which needs 
judicial expertise to decide on it. This type of arbitration is also a voluntary 
arbitration and is absolutely required for an arbitration agreement referring to 
such arbitration.
100  In Kuwaiti law, this type of arbitration can be seen in the old 
Article 177 of the Civil and Commercial Pleadings Law 38 of 1980, which allows 
the formation of one or more arbitration panels to be held in the seat of the Court 
of First Instance or in any other location to be specified by the Chief of the Panel 
and should be headed by the counsel. Alternatively, a justice judge is to be 
selected by the General Assembly of the competent court, and its membership, 
duly comprising two merchants or experts of other specialized areas to look into 
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the disputes agreed upon by concerned parties in writing to be brought before 
it.
101 Kuwaiti’s Code of Procedure has regulated arbitration in Articles 173 to 176, 
178 to 188 Chapter XII. Parties may resort to a permanent arbitral tribunal setting 
forth rules in advance to settle disputes known as institutional arbitration such as 
the Arbitral Tribunal of the Kuwaiti Engineers Association.  
Compulsory arbitration is whereby the parties must by law resort to arbitration. 
Compulsory arbitration exists in collective labour disputes, and can be found in 
Article 88 of the Labour Law No.38/1964, and in disputes dealing with the 
Kuwaiti Stock Market, in Article 13-Special Decree issued on 14/8. 1983. 
The judiciary arbitral tribunal has been set up under law 11/1995 and the tribunal 
is given powers to settle disputes among ministers, government bodies or the 
general body corporate, and state-owned companies or among such companies, 
the Code of Procedures 2/2. In essence, unlike most common law countries, 
arbitration in Kuwait is described by the Court of Cassation
102 as a judiciary 
dispute resolution process rather than an adjudicative process as the arbitration 
tribunal formed by the state and its award is also protected by the state. In general, 
there are the components of ordinary arbitration in Kuwait with those distinct 
characteristics, and these components consist of persons, subject matter, and 
reasons. 
Firstly, when dealing with persons, it must be said that these persons should in the 
first place be eligible to proceed for arbitration. Under the civil code-Article 107, 
the person must have a sound character and if the person is disabled, the court 
could assign a legal assistant to proceed on the person’s behalf. If the action is 
taken without the legal assistance, then the award is considered null and void. If 
for unknown reasons or due to any unforeseen circumstances, if the party is 
unable to attend, a power of attorney can act on the person’s behalf (Civil Code-
Article 702/1-Procedure-Article 57). In the choice of an arbitrator, this may be in 
                                                           
101 Sarkhooh (n 95) 81. 
102 1/1973 session 19/3/1975 Commercial. 78 
 
the agreement or the court can decide for them Procedure –Article 174 and Article 
175. The arbitrator must remain neutral at all times, and if not neutral, can be 
removed in accordance with Article 178/3. 
In dealing with subject matter of the arbitration agreement, it must be said that the 
subject-matter should not be against the public policy of the state. In accordance 
with Article 173 of the Procedural law arbitration is not allowed in matters which 
cannot be settled through reconciliation and which are required to be read with the 
contents of the Article 554 of Civil Code law of 67/1980, which does not allow 
conciliation nor mediation in matters relating to public order, but only to the 
rights and obligations that come out of these matters. Such matters relate to 
general discipline such as nationality; eligibility; status of the persons; civil 
interests; bankruptcy; divorce; inheritance; wills; administration; or any penal 
matters that cannot be brought for arbitration. This is called the subject matter of 
arbitration. The agreement to arbitrate must not fall within these categories, and 
the subject matter must be clearly identified in the arbitration agreement.  
Thirdly, in terms of ordinary arbitration, there must be reasons to proceed with 
arbitration. The reason of ordinary arbitration is the encroachment upon an 
exclusive right or the threat to encroach on that right. This may sound obvious, 
but the arbitration law in Articles 173 to 176 and 178 to 188 are worded in such a 
manner that the arbitration agreement must be of a commercial nature. This must 
be in the form of an agreement-article 173. Article 173 states ‘...Agreement may 
be made on arbitration in a specific dispute and on arbitration in all disputes 
arising from the implementation of a certain contract. Arbitration may not be 
established, save in writing...’    
Ordinary Arbitration/Judiciary Arbitration (mixed arbitration) 
There are basically two main types of arbitration in Kuwait: there is the ordinary 
arbitration whereby the parties have agreed to arbitrate (this has been discussed 
earlier as the voluntary arbitration), and the other is compulsory arbitration 
whereby parties must resort to arbitration. This is for industrial disputes, disputes 79 
 
in relation to Engineers, and Kuwaiti Stock Exchange disputes. However, since 
1971, there has been the mixed judiciary arbitration system which consists of a 
judiciary and non-judiciary element. This mixed judiciary will be discussed first, 
and later the ordinary arbitration will be discussed. In the mixed arbitration, 
Article 264 of the Law of Procedure-under No.3/1971 stipulates that the 
jurisdiction court may have one or  more arbitral tribunals chaired by a judge or a 
counsellor, who is chosen by the general assembly of the court, with the 
membership of the two traders chosen by the Chamber of Commerce. In essence, 
this is an exemption to the general principle of prohibiting judges from acting as 
arbitrators at all, even without charging for his work, in order to maintain the 
independency of the judges, pursuant to Article 26 of the Law of Organizing of 
Kuwaiti Judiciary System No. 23/1990. Such prohibition is still valid except for 
the purpose of judiciary arbitration under the law of 1995.
103 
The Arbitral Tribunal is to convene in the place decide by its chairman. The 
tribunal is to consider civil or commercial disputes agreed to in writing by the 
concerned parties. The tribunal is not governed by the rules of the civil and 
commercial law of Procedure (except those mentioned in Chapter III of the 
second book). The Tribunal is allowed to hear witnesses; carry out inspection; 
seek the help of experts if needed; and assign one of the Court personnel to act as 
a secretary. 
It must be noted that the composition of the tribunal is dominated by the non-
judiciary element consisting of two traders, and the other is chosen from the 
judiciary. A similar line can be drawn in France where parties are allowed to 
entrust the court with an open agreement to settle disputes through the application 
of rules of justice. It is to be found in Article 14 of the French Law Procedure. 
In Kuwait the mixed arbitration has been gaining more importance, and the 
Procedure Law No. 38/1980 changes were made whereby the chosen arbitrators 
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were not confined to traders. They could be chosen from other professions and the 
authority of the tribunal has been expanded as well. The tribunal is allowed to 
issue awards or orders included in Provisions A, B, and C of Article 180 of the 
Law of Procedure. The Tribunal could impose fines on absentees, or persons 
abstaining from answering questions or ordering others to show documents in 
their possession. This goes to show that the mixed arbitration has been gaining in 
strength since introducing Article 264 of the Law of Procedure under No. 3/1971. 
This is extraordinary authority given to the tribunal where the mixed arbitration is 
not given to the ordinary tribunal, which is only confined with regular rules of 
conducting arbitration.
104  
Such judiciary arbitration has been described by some commentators
105 as an 
institutional arbitration. Pursuant to Article 1 of the Arbitration law of 1995, the 
majority of the tribunal arbitrators must be from the judiciary members 
(Counsel/judge) and headed by one of them as well. In the judiciary arbitration, 
the tribunal mostly conducts the trial in accordance with procedural law, except 
when the parties are agreed upon and when nature arbitration is required. 
Judiciary Arbitration under law No. 11/1995 
It is characterized by the following characteristics: 
-  The mixed nature of nature tribunal formation guarantees the 
effectiveness, independence and neutrality awards. 
-  The second article of the new arbitration law provides that the arbitral 
tribunal settles disputes free of charge. 
Article 2 reads: 
The Arbitration Panel shall have jurisdiction over the following issue: 
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1)  To determine and render arbitrations on the disputes the litigant parties 
concerned have agreed to bring before it. 
Moreover, it shall have jurisdiction over the disputes arising from the contracts 
after enforcement of this law which comprises provisions covering settlements of 
such disputes through arbitration, unless otherwise is stipulated in the relevant 
contract or in any such other system of Arbitration. 
2)  It shall alone have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the disputes arising 
between Government Ministries, Authorities, Public Corporations and the 
Companies whose capital is fully owned by the State-Government or between all 
such institutions. 
3)  To determine on arbitration applications and petitions submitted by 
individuals or private firms against Government Ministries, Authorities, 
Departments of Public Corporations regarding disputes arising between them, 
unless the relevant dispute was already brought before the judiciary, i.e. the 
Courts of Law.  
The dispute brought before the Arbitration panel shall be free of fees. 
The analysis of this Article reveals the following remarkable issue that needs 
careful consideration: 
•  As it was elaborated earlier in this thesis,
106 the Kuwaiti system 
distinguishes between two types of contracts that are signed with the state 
department/ authorities: the administrative contract and the commercial/civil 
contract. The criteria and conditions which are required to distinguish between 
them also have been described. 
By virtue of the above sub-Article 2(2), due to the plain drafting and 
understanding of it, all the contracts that are signed among the state departments, 
or with its public corporations and companies which are totally owned by the 
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state, have to be referred to by such judiciary mixed arbitration tribunal.  This 
raises a very critical concern according to the eligibility of such reference to the 
arbitration. 
The Kuwaiti Constitution States in Article 169: 
‘The law regulates the settlement of administrative suits by means of a special 
Chamber or Court, and prescribes its organization and manner of assuming 
administrative jurisdiction including the power of both nullification and 
compensation in respect of administrative acts contrary to law’. 
Furthermore, since the Kuwaiti Constitution has been published on 1962, the 
administrative court was only established by the Law of Establishing the 
Administrative Court No. 20 of 1981. And between the time of publishing the 
Kuwaiti Constitution and establishing the Administrative, the Kuwaiti court had 
not particularly looked at the eligibility of arbitration in the administrative 
contract; it had only assessed the arbitration award itself which implicitly meant 
that referring the administrative contract disputes to the arbitration was eligible 
and the concerned arbitration tribunal has a jurisdiction. This has been perceived 
by the Kuwaiti court decision of a dispute between the Ministry of Public Works 
and one of its construction contractors.
107 
In this case an administrative construction contract was signed between the 
Ministry of Public Works and a construction contractor. Clause 31 of this contract 
said: ‘Any difference or dispute that may arise hereto concerning the subject of 
the Contract or its execution, shall be referred to one arbitrator chosen by parties. 
The decision of the arbitrator will be final and binding’. 
The dispute had arisen and the parties had entered into an arbitration charter that 
formulates the procedures of the tribunal, which consequently decided on the 
dispute.  
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The Contractor was not happy with the award and challenges it before the Court 
on the basis of nullity of the arbitration on such a contract.  
The Court dismissed the appeal and decided that the arbitration was eligible and 
the tribunal had jurisdiction to decide upon the dispute. 
This was before the law of establishing the Administrative Court came into 
existence in 1981, which Article 2 of this Law gives exclusive jurisdiction to the 
Administrative Court to decide on any disputes that arise out of the administrative 
contract.  
After that and before issuing the Law of Arbitration in 1995, the Kuwaiti Court
108 
decided that pursuant to the law of establishing the Administrative Court, no 
tribunal - either court or arbitration - has a jurisdiction to look at any 
administrative dispute arising out of the administrative contract except the court 
appointed by the law of 1981. The Court in this case distinguishes between the 
administrative matters and the civil and commercially-related to administrative 
matters, since the latter can be referred to as arbitration tribunal, but the earlier 
cannot to be referred to any tribunal, except to the Administrative Court. 
Nevertheless, after the promulgation of the Arbitration law of 1995, the situation 
of the arbitration tribunal jurisdiction regarding the administrative contract has 
become a more contentious matter. The debate in this regard has been drawn to 
the two facets of the matter: firstly, regarding the criteria to distinguish between 
the administrative and the commercial issues in the administrative contract, the 
court cases do not precisely characterize each of them, but only refer to public 
order as a keynote to differentiate between each of them. Any matter that is 
related to the public policy would then be subject to exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Administrative Court. However, it was remarked by commentators that a notion 
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of public policy has been developed and changed as a result of life revolution all 
over the world, and particularly in the Middle East region.
109  
Secondly, with respect to compulsory arbitration, there is an uncertainty relating 
to the constitutionality of the rule of this content, as it contradicts with principles 
of the liberty of choosing the way to resolve disputes. Due to the stringency of its 
procedure, the Kuwaiti Constitutional Court has not yet seen this issue nor has 
referred to it.     
Nevertheless, because of the following reasons we are finding that it is eligible to 
refer the administrative contract to the private arbitration: 
•  In addition to the rules of the Arbitration Law of 1995, the legislators keep 
it up with enacting other new legislations that allow specifically the state 
department to include an arbitration clause in its contract, particularly in a typical 
administrative contract such as Concession Contract, Monopoly, BOT, etc.  For 
example, in the latest enactment that organizes the BOT agreement, Article 15 of 
the Law No. 7 of 2008 expressly allows any state department that enters into an 
agreement in accordance with this law to resolve the disputes arising out of such 
agreements through the ordinary arbitration. And due to the limitlessness of such 
a right, the parties in this regard are not restrained with a domestic arbitration and 
may agree to refer their dispute to either an ad hoc or intuitional international 
arbitration.  
This also can be seen in Article 16 of Kuwaiti Foreign Investment No. 8 of 2001, 
which allows reference to ordinary arbitration in any agreement that may sign 
with foreign investors.  
The Explanatory Memorandum of the issuance of this law clearly mentions the 
right to refer to either a domestic or international arbitration.
110 
                                                           
109 Mileeje (n 102) 276. 
110 The Kuwaiti commentators have concluded that the explanatory note of law have the same 
power of the law itself. 85 
 
•  Moreover, in the terms of the international convention for dispute 
resolution, the State of Kuwait has become a member of the Convention of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID) in 1978. The 
convention has been entered into force in the State of Kuwait since March 4 1979, 
and since then the State of Kuwait has concluded bilateral treaties (BITs) with 
many state parties of the Convention to promote, protect, and attract foreign 
investments. 
And according to Article 25 of the Convention, the Centre has a jurisdiction over 
a legal dispute arising directly out of an investment.
111 However, the Convention 
does not delimit the definition of the word “investment”, leaving the contracting 
parties a large measure of freedom to define that term, and their specific 
objectives and circumstances may lead them to do so,
112 unless the Centre 
jurisdiction can define it. That freedom does not, however, appear to be unlimited, 
considering that “investment” may well be regarded as embodying certain core 
meanings which distinguishes it from “an ordinary commercial transaction” such 
as a simple, stand alone, sale of goods or services . 
In the case of Salini Construction SpA and Italstrade SpA v Kingdom of 
Morocco,
113 the tribunal recognised that the transaction in connection with the 
construction of a highway was included within the concept of “investment”.  
Furthermore, the Convention state party cannot deny the jurisdiction of the Centre 
on the basis of public order argument. In the case of AMCO v Republic of 
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Indonesia,
114 the tribunal rejected the Indonesian government argument regarding 
its jurisdiction to look at the intervention action made by the military. 
For all the above arguments and to go with the flow of the revolution in 
international business and transactions, we are of the opinion that the definition of 
the Administrative has been changed.  
The last wordings of the Article states that if brought under Law No. 11 of 1995, 
and if the said issues were dealt with by the Panel, which is a mixed panel 
comprising of judiciary and traders, they shall be free of charge. It must be 
mentioned that the state would bear the costs of arbitration on such matters, for 
example anything against Government Ministries and the rest mentioned in the 
Article. However, if the matters are purely civil and commercial, then the private 
parties must pay for the panel. 
Parties to the dispute choose two ordinary arbitrators from the relevant lists 
recorded at the Arbitration Department at the Court of Appeal. If no parties 
choose arbitrators within 10 working days, the Department may appoint 
arbitrators whose names appear in the list and who are specialized in the subject 
matter. Apart from the chairman from the judiciary, there could be two other 
members of the public listed in the panel who understand the subject matter of the 
case. It must be said that these two members who assist the judge would be paid 
by the parties. 
Stages and application 
An application for arbitration is submitted by the concerned parties to the 
Arbitration Department and this application is free of charge. There is no need to 
pay any fees at this stage of application. Application should be submitted in one 
original copy and a number of copies equivalent to the number of litigants. 
Certain information should be given in the application (Article 4, Ministerial 
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Decree No. 43/1995) including date of applying; name and title of litigants; 
address; name of their representative; subject matter of the dispute; brief 
pleadings; and name of their chosen arbitrator. 
The application should also consist of a copy of the arbitration agreement or the 
clauses stipulated for resorting to arbitration in the contract. As soon as the 
Arbitration Department receive the application, it should notify parties to choose 
their arbitrator within 10 working days of notification, otherwise the Department 
would appoint an arbitrator whose name appears in the list in the panel. The 
arbitrator must be specialized in the subject matter of the dispute. 
If the chosen does not set his fees, the Department with the assistance of the 
Chairman would estimate the fees to be set. The arbitration parties must deposit 
fees at the treasury within 10 days. If one party fails to pay his share of the fees, 
the other party may pay fees and later would be able to claim the fees, if the party 
wins. The Arbitration Department after three days of depositing fees in the 
treasury should submit the application to the arbitral tribunal chairman to fix the 
date and venue for the session. 
The Arbitration Department would notify the parties of the date and venue of 
considering the demand and the formation of the arbitral tribunal and the date of 
submitting documents before the session. Though the legislator does not set a 
certain form for notification, he sets a date for it (Article 179-Procedure). 
Notification can be done through registered letter; telegraph; telex; fax; telephone; 
email or any other means (unless agreed otherwise by the parties). 
Article 179 reads: 
The arbitrator shall within 30 days from accepting the arbitration, notify the 
litigant parties of the date and venue of the first session set for hearing the dispute, 
without compliance with the rules prescribed in this law for notice serving. An 
appointment shall be fixed for them to submit their documents, their pleadings, 88 
 
and defence. Awards may be rendered pursuant to the submissions of one party if 
the other party fails to appear on the fixed date. 
In the event of several arbitrators, they shall jointly handle the investigation 
proceedings and each one of them shall sign the minutes and verbal process, 
unless they unanimously agree on delegating one of them for a certain procedure 
and confirm his delegation in the minutes of the session, or in case the agreement 
on arbitration authorises one of them to do so. 
Awards may be issued on the basis of documents or memorandum, submitted 
even by one party as long as the other had the chance to submit his documents but 
he had failed to do so. Disputes are held in closed doors. In some cases, 
arbitration would be held with documents only. After an award is made, the 
tribunal has no right to amend it or cancel it. The Kuwaiti court may enforce the 
award, if the parties do not settle by paying the award. 
In accordance with Article 10 of the Arbitration of 1995, the award of judiciary 
arbitration is final and binding and may not be challenged by any way which may 
apply to challenging or appealing the court verdict in the ordinary way. It can 
only be objected before the Court of Cassation (Supreme Court) on the 
extraordinary way which is only limited to the following reasons:
115 
1)  Violation of the law or any erroneous applications or misconstructions of 
the same. 
2)  Occurrence of nullity of any award, verdict, arbitration or invalidity of the 
relevant proceedings to a prejudicial extent affecting such award or verdict. 
3)  If the Arbitration Panel has rendered an award contradictory to a former 
ruling already made in respect of the litigant parties which has conclusively 
possessed the determinative effect of an adjudicated order, whether rendered by 
an ordinary court of law or by any Arbitration Panel. 
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4)  In case of actualizing or realizing any cause under which a rehearing is 
permissible. 
Ordinary Arbitration 
Unlike judiciary arbitration (mixed arbitration) in the ordinary arbitration, the 
process does not start with notification. The arbitration agreement is considered a 
notification for the parties. The arbitrator within 30 days of accepting the 
assignment should inform the parties of the date and venue of the first session. 
The arbitrator should set a date for the parties to submit their documents, 
memorandum and aspects of defence, Article 179 of the Law No. 38 of 1980. The 
arbitrator can proceed with mail, telegraph, fax, telex or telephone. The arbitrator 
has no right to determine any issue outside the mandate of arbitration. The 
arbitrator has no right to judge whether a document is forged or not. However, 
this needs to be decided by the courts in a criminal part of the law. 
In order to settle certain dispute, the arbitrator is allowed to take verification 
measure. In accordance with article 179/1 the arbitrator needs to set a date to 
submit their documents and memorandum. The arbitrator can issue his award on 
the basis of documents presented by one party if the other fails to submit 
documents on the fixed date. 
The arbitrator is allowed to summon the parties or one of them for questioning. 
He can get the help of witnesses, experts or carry out inspection. The arbitrator 
should abide by the time limits stipulated in the arbitration agreement or in Law; 
it is six months according to Article 181/1. The time limits are to begin when 
notifying the parties of the date of the arbitration session, otherwise by any party 
referring to the court dispute if it was previously raised. The arbitrator must give 
the award within six months of the notification of the arbitration. The aim is to 
make sure that the arbitration is conducted in a cost-effective and speedy manner. 
Article 182 90 
 
The Arbitrator shall render his award without compliance with the pleadings 
procedures save the proceedings provided for in this Chapter. Nevertheless, the 
litigant parties may agree upon certain proceedings to be followed by the 
arbitration in that respect. 
The award rendered by the arbitrator shall be based on the law provisions, unless 
he is authorised to compromise and conciliate, where he shall not comply with 
such provisions, save those relating to the public order. 
The Court of Cassation decided that although the arbitration award is amounted as 
a sort of judiciary verdict, it is not required to have all the essential requirements 
that must be availed in the ordinary court verdict when reasoning the award.
116  
In accordance with Article 186 of the Procedure Law of 1980 the award of 
ordinary arbitration must be final and binding and may not be challenged in any 
way of appealing, unless agreed otherwise by parties.  
Nevertheless, the arbitration award shall not be appealable at all if the arbitrator is 
authorized to compromise and conciliate, or if he is an arbitrator of Appeal, or if 
the value of the relevant action does not exceed KD 500. 
The rules governing urgent self-executing judgments shall be applicable to the 
arbitrator’s awards. 
Generally, the arbitration must be run in Arabic language and all the documents, 
witnessing, cross-examining must be in Arabic language or at least to be 
translated to Arabic unless parties agreed to run the trial in the other language 
particularly when choosing a non-Arabic arbitrator. This is an exemption given to 
the arbitration on the contrary to the ordinary judiciary trial which must be run in 
an Arabic language as it is a public order pursuant to Kuwaiti Constitution.
117 
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The Arbitrator’s award shall be rendered in Kuwait, otherwise the prescribed rules 
applicable to the arbitrator’s award in a foreign country shall be applied in that 
respect. 
It must be said that the arbitration award is binding to both parties; if one party 
refuses to pay the award, then the enforcement of the award will be done by the 
court. 
Appeal is governed by rules applicable to judiciary judgments, and the Appeal 
must be made within 30 days. 
 92 
 
   93 
 
Chapter Four 
ADJUDICATION 
Introduction 
Adjudication has become one of the most crucial methods for dispute resolution at 
the present time. Though widely used to solve different types of disputes, it is 
principally and specifically the preferred method in dealing with disputes of 
construction industry contracts due to the particular nature of such contracts, i.e. 
long-term and complicated contracts that require disputes to be resolved quickly 
and amicably. The United Kingdom, as the leader of the common law school, is 
deemed to be the pioneer in the field of studying and developing the mechanism 
of dispute resolution, in particular adjudication, in construction contracts despite 
the early opposition of some senior construction lawyers who stood against this 
method. Adjudication was barely known in construction industries before its 
appearance in 1976, when it was crystallized in the technical sense ever since. 
Adjudication has evolved through two stages. The first one, when the legislator 
introduced the adjudication mechanism to the contract models JCT and NCE in 
1976 and 1993, respectively.
118 It was added to the JCT system ( the ‘Green 
Form’) to protect the sub-contractor from abuse that might be waged by the 
employer on exercising his right to set-off, following the decision of House of 
Lords in Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd v Gilbert Ash (Northern) Ltd, 
119  
which gives the employer the right to exercise the normal rules and rights of set-
off against the sub-contractor as  stated by Lord  Reid ‘ It is now admitted, and 
my view properly admitted, that at common law there is a right of set-off in such 
circumstances: but that right can be excluded by contract’. Viscount Dilhorne also 
added, “The sub-contract is related to the main contract but it is wrong, in my 
opinion, to describe it as the creature of the main contract. If it were the case, 
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which in my opinion it is not, that under the main contract the amount certified in 
an interim certificate and the amount included in the amount certified attributable 
to sub-contract work had to be paid without deduction, then one would not expect 
a sub-contract not to reflect that.” In Gilbert, Lord Reid concurred with the 
common-law doctrine of set-off in such circumstances, but noted that such a right 
could be excluded by contract.  
The second stage, with the investigation undertaken by Sir Michael Latham, a 
former Conservative MP and ex-director of the UK House Builders Federation, in 
the beginning of the 1990s to come up with his 1994 report entitled Constructing 
The Team, Final Report of the Government / Industry Review of Procurement and 
Contractual Arrangements In The UK Construction Industry [HMSO, London, 
1994. Amongst the thirty principle recommendations made by Sir Latham: a 
quick and temporary resolution to construction disputes, reflected in an 
extraordinary statute, Part II of the Housing Grants, Construction and 
Regeneration Act 1996 (came into effect the first of May, 1998). In fact, in 
addition to Sir Michael Latham, Lord Woolf has considered and noticed the 
problem of time and cost in civil litigation while he was carrying out a survey and 
review of the English court system, which gave an understanding of what these 
aspects of actions look like. Consequently, a number of common law system 
countries followed the UK in this regard, such as New Zealand with the issuance 
of Adjudication under the Construction Contracts Act 2002, Australia and 
Singapore. The International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC), in 
1999, issued their model that included adjudication procedures as mentioned in 
clause 20 in both the Conditions of Contract for Construction (For Building and 
Engineering Works Designed by the Employer - The Red Book) and the 
Conditions of Contract for EPC/ Turnkey Projects (The Silver Book).  
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The word “Adjudication” is an old word which is utilized in various fields in 
different ways. Therefore it seems meaningless without being used in a particular 
field or area.
120  
In a literal understanding, adjudication means making an official decision about 
who is right in a disagreement between two groups or organizations.   
In fact, neither the Act of 1996 nor its Scheme has defined adjudication. Most of 
the legal scholars have tried to define adjudication based on its process and 
mechanism. John Uff describes it as ‘Pay now, argue later’.
121 Judiciary-the court 
had considered the adjudication provisions of the HGRA 1996(“the Act”) in the 
first time in Macob Civil Engineering Ltd v Morrison Construction Ltd.
122The 
adjudication was defined in a descriptive way in this by Dyson J, as he gave a 
semi- definition of adjudication    when he tried to describe the intention of the 
Parliament in enacting the Act as introducing a speedy mechanism for settling 
disputes in construction contracts on a provisional interim basis and requiring the 
decisions of adjudicators to be enforced pending the final determination of 
disputes by means of arbitration, litigation or agreement.
123  
The ambit of Dyson’s description reveals a definition for adjudication in the sense 
that it is an interim, speedy mechanism for provisionally setting disputes in 
construction contracts, provided that the adjudicators’ decisions to be enforced 
after the dispute are finally determined by the arbitrator, the judge or by the 
parties’ agreement.  
 The Victorian State Government defined adjudication as the process that allows 
for the rapid determination of progress claims under building contracts or sub-
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contracts and contracts for the supply of goods or services in the building 
industry, without parties getting tied up in lengthy and expensive litigation or 
arbitration. 
Nevertheless, the precise definition to be given to adjudication, in my view, is the 
one made by Derek Simmonds when he stated
124   that adjudication is just a 
process under which a dispute between contracting parties is decided by a neutral 
person (the adjudicator) after examining the arguments of the parties.
125  
The latter definition corresponds with Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary, in 
which adjudication is defined as: 
(3)  A form of Alternative Dispute Resolution (q.v.). It is used widely in the 
construction industry and allows disputes to be determined by an adjudicator 
comparatively swiftly while work progresses. The adjudicator’s decision is 
binding, unless and until the dispute is finally determined by legal proceedings, 
arbitration (q.v.) or the agreement of the parties. The parties may, however, accept 
the adjudicator’s decision as finally determining the dispute. 
 In the jurisdictions of Middle East countries such as Kuwait, Egypt
126  and the 
others, adjudication is still nascent and its mechanisms do not enjoy due respect 
by the concerned people because adjudication has not yet been adopted in 
legislation or incorporated into contract models, and has not yet been precisely 
defined by any law resources, i.e. legislation, courts or scholars. Dr.Hani Salah 
El-Din (a reputable Arab expert in the field of BOT projects), in his book  
Altanzeem Alkhanony wa ataakody limashroaat albonyah alasaseya almomawala 
an tareeq alqetaa alkhass (The Legal and Contractual Regulation of Infra-
Structure Projects Financed by Private Sector),  did not translate the word 
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“adjudication” properly when he dealt with adjudication under the FIDIC model 
contracts. He called it “Al-Khebrah” (”Expertise”), which we think has exactly 
the meaning of expert determination, while Dr. Mashael Alhajeree gave 
adjudication a very suitable name in Arabic which is closer to the definition under 
the English legal system: Lejan Atasweyah (“Adjudication Boards”).
127  
  Importance of Adjudication – Why Adjudication? 
Adjudication, being a private process, provides a simple, elegant and effective 
tool to resolve complex legal disputes. It is better for the contracting parties to 
adopt such marvelous means for the sake of the following: 
1- Experience: 
The adjudicator to be chosen to resolve a dispute is definitely an experienced one. 
His selection by the parties is attributable to such experience which pours into the 
wise judgment of the file and reaching an acceptable decision. Thus, experience 
adds to the confidence of the parties in the adjudicator and constitutes one of the 
characteristics of adjudication's importance. 
2- Expeditiousness: 
As time limit is confined to 28 days for the adjudicator to deliver the decision, it 
appears to have no time wasted in partisan legal tactics and delays. The 
adjudication will commence immediately with an analysis of the applicable legal 
authorities and identification of the evidence that supports the positions of each 
party to the dispute. The adjudicator shall promptly examine material witnesses 
under oath in the locations where they are found. There is no need to repeat the 
process years later in an expensive litigation. The speed of the adjudication is one 
of the most important characteristics of this method of dispute resolution as a 
preliminary procedure where speed is given priority over accuracy.
128   
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3- Enforceability: 
When the adjudication is completed the decision may be quickly confirmed as an 
enforceable court judgment if it is recognized by its parties. It may be appealed as 
permitted by the parties' agreement and applicable law. 
4- Cost Efficiency: 
Since fees of adjudication are always capped and the process is timely limited, 
this represents cost efficiency for both parties who may as well agree to split the 
fees. So cost efficiency is available all over the process.   
 Characteristics of Adjudication 
The concept of adjudication, although being a type of alternative dispute 
resolution means, is different to some extent. Adjudication characteristics can be 
summed up as follows:
129  
-  it is not regulated by legislation or rules of law. 
-  it is not supervised by the State authorities. 
-  its decisions do not have an immediate binding effect. 
-  its decisions are not executable with immediate effect.   
 
 
 
 
 Adjudication Process    
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During the last decade, the adjudication system has become global and used by 
various bodies of law and modern countries. This section will focus on the 
adjudication under Pt II of Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 
1996 (the “Act”) and on adjudication under Kuwaiti jurisdiction in particular. 
 Adjudication under Pt II of the Act 
The rules of adjudication under the Act only apply to disputes arising out of 
construction contracts for the carrying out of construction work in England, Wales 
and Scotland. 
The right to apply adjudication under the Act is set out in section 108, which 
provides as follows: 
 (1) A party to a construction contract has the right to refer a dispute arising under 
the contract for adjudication under a procedure complying with this section. 
For this purpose "dispute" includes any difference. 
In Rok Build Ltd v Harris Wharf Development Co Ltd,
130 it is confirmed that only 
the parties to a construction contract have the right to refer their dispute arising 
out of the contract to adjudication or if one of the parties thereto may have 
assigned the contract to a third party.  
In Andrew Wallace Ltd v Artisan regeneration Ltd,
131 it was clearly held that it is 
only a party to a construction contract that can refer its disputes or differences to 
the adjudication. 
 
 
In this case, it is also required that any challenge or argument regarding the 
identity of the adjudication’s parties should be raised at an early stage of the 
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proceedings. And if there is any real question about the identity of a contracting 
party, this should be raised clearly at an earlier stage before the publication of the 
adjudication’s decision. There are some behaviors of one of the contracting 
parties that can be impliedly construed as recognition of the other party, i.e. the 
party who paid substantial sums of money to a certain company as a contracting 
party cannot at a later stage of adjudication challenge his entity. 
It should be noted that the reference to “legal representative” for the purpose of 
CPR 6PD 3.2(a) is a reference to a person who is retained or nominated by a 
client to give it legal advice and to represent it in certain proceedings.
132  
It is also added in Total M&E Services Ltd v ABB Building Technologies Ltd,
133 
that the differences, incorrect or the mistake of a proper party does not make a 
basis or grounds for challenging the jurisdiction of the adjudication as long as [the 
mis-description where the parties (claimant and defendant) at all stages were 
aware of the true and real identities of the contracting parties and no one could be 
misled. 
A similar concept is adopted by the courts and the laws of Kuwait. The pleas 
pertaining to the form of proceedings ought to be produced and expressed initially 
before dealing with the facts and objective pleas. Hence, in a later stage of 
proceeding, the parties are not allowed to discuss or challenge the pleas of form, 
i.e. the name of the company cannot be challenged in a later stage during the 
objective pleas so long as such question has not been raised in the stage of 
expressing the pleas of form.     
(2)The contract shall: 
   (a)  enable a party to give notice at any time of his intention to refer a dispute to 
adjudication; 
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In accordance with this sub-clause and the following sub-clause it was decided in 
Aveat Heating Ltd v Jerram Falkus Construction Ltd
134 that the exact meaning of 
referral should take place from the date of receipt date not from the date of 
sending or dispatching the notice. It was also decided that the provisions of 
s.108(2)(c) and (d) are mandatory rather than directory, so the parties should 
comply with such provisions and any contrary  agreement will be excluded and 
the scheme will be applied. 
For the purpose of the mechanism of account the duration of time for either the 
referral notice time or the adjudicator decision time, the fractions of a day should 
not have been taken into account.  
Even more, in respect of counting the weekend days off (Saturday and Sunday) it 
was held in Godwin v Swindon BC
135that the two weekend days shall not be 
calculated, while in Anderton v Clwyd CC
136  the court held that calculation of the 
two days should not disregard the weekend and the reference to the word “day” in 
CPR 6.7 meant calendar day for the notice, which is also upheld by Coulson J in 
Hart investments Ltd v Fidler & Anor.
137     
    (b) provide a timetable with the object of securing the appointment of the 
adjudicator and referral of the dispute to him within 7 days of such notice; 
As a result of the above principle it is also mentioned in Aveat Heating Ltd v 
Jerram Falkus Construction Ltd
138 that the adjudicator has no jurisdiction to reach 
his decision out of the time set in this Section without the approval from the 
parties or from the referral party for the first extension. 
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This indicates the importance of setting a time table in the contract through which 
the appointment of adjudicator and the referral of the dispute to him shall be done. 
Such timetable shall not take more than seven days. 
   (c)  require the adjudicator to reach a decision within 28 days of referral or such 
longer period as is agreed by the parties after the dispute has been referred; 
   (d)  allow the adjudicator to extend the period of 28 days by up to 14 days, with 
the consent of the party by whom the dispute was referred; 
   (e)  impose a duty on the adjudicator to act impartially; and 
  (f)  enable the adjudicator to take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and the 
law. 
(3) The contract shall provide that the decision of the adjudicator is binding until 
the dispute is finally determined by legal proceedings, by arbitration (if the 
contract provides for arbitration or the parties otherwise agree to arbitration) or by 
agreement. The parties may agree to accept the decision of the adjudicator as 
finally determining the dispute. 
(4) The contract shall also provide that the adjudicator is not liable for anything 
done or omitted in the discharge or purported discharge of his functions as 
adjudicator unless the act or omission is in bad faith, and that any employee or 
agent of the adjudicator is similarly protected from liability. 
 (5) If the contract does not comply with the requirements of subsections (1) to 
(4), the adjudication provisions of the Scheme for Construction Contracts apply. 
It is worthy analyzing the conditions that are required by this section to refer the 
dispute to the adjudication. 
These rules of adjudication only apply to construction contracts according to the 
definition which has already been demonstrated in chapter one.
139 The section sets 
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out certain minimum procedural rules to be followed as well as giving the parties 
(by removing the traditional role and authority of the engineer and architect to 
make a decision on the disputes or differences during the contract) the right to 
refer their dispute to an independent party who restricted to issue his decision 
within the time limit, otherwise the Scheme for Construction Contract will apply 
pursuant to section 114(4) of the Act which states: ‘Where any provisions of the 
Scheme for Construction Contracts apply by virtue of this Part in default of 
contractual provision agreed by the parties, they have effect as implied terms of 
the contract concerned’. 
It is also provided under the Act that the contract between the parties should be in 
writing.  Section 107 of the Act states: 
 (1) The provisions of this Part apply only where the construction contract is in 
writing, and any other agreement between the parties as to any matter is effective 
for the purposes of this Part only if in writing. 
The expressions "agreement", "agree" and "agreed" shall be construed 
accordingly. 
(2) There is an agreement in writing: 
(a)  if the agreement is made in writing (whether or not it is signed by the parties), 
 (b)  if the agreement is made by exchange of communications in writing, or 
(c)  if the agreement is evidenced in writing. 
(3) Where parties agree otherwise than in writing by reference to terms which are 
in writing, they make an agreement in writing. 
(4) An agreement is evidenced in writing if an agreement made otherwise than in 
writing is recorded by one of the parties, or by a third party, with the authority of 
the parties to the agreement. 104 
 
(5) An exchange of written submissions in adjudication proceedings, or in arbitral 
or legal proceedings in which the existence of an agreement otherwise than in 
writing is alleged by one party against another party and not denied by the other 
party in his response constitutes as between those parties an agreement in writing 
to the effect alleged. 
(6) References in this Part to anything being written or in writing include its being 
recorded by any means. Adjudication” 
Although this section clearly widens the ambit of the Act as it qualifies there will 
be an agreement in writing, if the agreement is “ evidenced in writing “ and where 
the effect of an oral agreement “ is alleged in adjudication proceedings and not 
denied by the other party in his response”, it has considerable difficulty since the 
Act came into force. It is provided that the provisions of the Act apply only where 
the construction contract is in writing. The most difficult question is whether and 
to what extent oral contracts may be subject to the provisions of the Act. In RJT 
Consulting Engineers Ltd v DM Engineering (Northern Ireland) Ltd,
140 the oral 
agreement had been made between the parties to undertake design input by the 
appellants. Since the dispute arose between the parties the respondents 
commenced adjudication proceedings against the appellants, who challenged the 
right to seek adjudication by denying that the agreement was in writing and 
therefore within Part II of the Act. The case came before the Technology and 
Construction Court in Liverpool, where Mackay J concluded that it was not 
necessary that the evidence submitted in support of the agreement should identify 
all terms of that agreement. He said ‘I hold that it is not necessary to have the 
terms identified and the extensive documentary evidence in this case is well 
sufficient to bring it within the adjudication proceedings’. Accordingly, the 
declaration sought by RJT that the agreement was not an agreement in writing 
pursuant to the Act was refused.  
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This decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal in which it was held that, in 
order to meet the requirements of section 107 of the Act , all the terms of contract 
had to be in, or evidenced in, writing.     
Lord Ward stated that under section 107, the whole of the agreement and not part 
of it has to be evidenced in writing with the exclusion of the instance falling 
within sub-section 5 where the material or relevant parts alleged and not denied in 
the written submissions in the adjudication proceedings are sufficient. Lord Ward 
concluded that sub-section 5 cannot dominate the interpretation of the section as a 
whole, and that the need for writing is a pre-condition for the application of the 
other provisions of part II of the Act not just the jurisdictional threshold for a 
reference to adjudication.  
On the other hand, in Treasure & Son Ltd v Dawes,
141 there was distinction 
between a contractual adjudication and a statuary adjudication and it was held that 
in case of a contractual adjudication, the adjudication process is not undermined 
by the fact that the terms of original contract were varied orally and that the 
principal adopted by the Court of Appeal in RJT Consulting Engineers Ltd v DM 
Engineering (Northern Ireland) Ltd
142 was not applicable to a contractual 
adjudication. 
Akenhead J stated that under a contractual adjudication where the terms of the 
original contract (containing the adjudication clause) were orally varied, such 
contractual adjudication could only be undermined if it was an express term of the 
contract itself to the effect that oral variations of the terms were not to be 
considered valid unless recorded or evidenced in writing. Essentially the parties 
will have agreed in a binding contract that disputes will be referable to 
adjudication. If there is some oral variation to the terms of that contract, that does 
not itself undermine the contractual enforceability of the adjudication process. If 
the original agreement is binding and whether or not the oral variation is binding, 
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there still remains a binding adjudication agreement of which either or both 
parties may make use from time to time. 
In determining whether there is an obligation to adjudicate in an arrangement, 
stated that one has to look at the contract.   
If there is a written obligation to adjudicate you need to adjudicate.  
If there is a written obligation to adjudicate that written obligation may have been 
amended by a subsequent oral obligation to resolve disputes in a manner different 
than adjudication. However, the oral agreement does not undermine the written 
obligation to adjudicate. 
If there is no written obligation (binds both sides) there may a statutory duty (on 
one or more parties) to adjudicate – this will not be written in the agreement but 
may impose a duty (as opposed to an obligation or a written obligation) to 
adjudicate. 
In fact, section 107 of the Act typically follows section 5 of the English 
Arbitration Act 1996 and in particular sub-section (5). This approach is also 
adopted in the Kuwaiti law of arbitration, as these methods of dispute resolution 
are considered alternative ways to resolve the disputes other than the litigation as 
it applies for any dispute.  
It is a worthwhile to refer to the “letter of intent” and whether it can be considered 
as an agreement in writing in accordance with section 107. In Hart Investments 
Ltd v Fidler & Anor
143 Coulson J deeply discussed this issue and came up with a 
holding that the “letter of intent” needs to be examined in every single case based 
on its own facts but there are several very fundamental elements that must be 
available in the “letter of intent” to accept it as an agreement in writing. Basically 
the work scope has to be completely identified in the “letter of intent” or in any 
referred-to document such as “tender document” that gives a plain discernible 
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measure to the scope of work that is required to be done by the parties and the 
terms and conditions. The price of the contract and the time is also required to be 
specified
144. In addition, recently it was confirmed by Akenhead J in the case of 
Diamond Build Ltd v Clapham Park Homes Ltd
145 that the “letter of intent” can 
create a contract between the parties who are bound by thereby unless agreed 
otherwise.   
Nevertheless, it was noted that some difficulties may occurred to verify whether 
or not there is a contract “in writing” which could be sometimes impossible to be 
run by the adjudicator with such a limited timescale. 
Therefore, a new regimen comes to exists by the Local Democracy, Economic 
Development and Construction Act 2009 (LDEDC Act). According to s. 139 a 
construction contract that enter on or after 1st of October 2011 does not required 
to be “in writing” in order to apply the rules of HGCA Act 1996. However, in 
compliance with current provisions of section 108 (2), (3) and (4) an adjudication 
procedure are still required to be in writing and accordingly the parties should 
include such provisions in their contract, otherwise the Scheme adjudication 
provisions will apply. 
 Definition of a dispute 
It is always anticipated that any deal, agreement or bargain might face difficulties 
which lead to differences or disputes between parties. Therefore, as adjudication 
is an irregular means to resolve disputes, British legislators adopted a provision 
that a party cannot refer a matter to adjudication unless there is a dispute or 
difference between the parties in a construction contract. It is stipulated in section 
108(1) of the Act that: “A party to a construction contract has the right to refer a 
dispute arising under the contract for adjudication under a procedure complying 
with this section. For this purpose ‘dispute’ includes any differences”. 
                                                           
144 The concept was cited in the case of Harris Calnan Construction Co Ltd v Ridgewood 
(Kensington) Ltd [2007] EWHC 2738 (TCC). 
145 [2008] EWHC 1439 (TCC). 108 
 
The wording of this section means if there is no dispute between parties then the 
adjudication does not have jurisdiction and its decision cannot be enforced. As a 
result it has become necessary to define the words “dispute” and “differences” 
precisely. This issue has been debated in several cases involving arbitration, as the 
same concept has been adopted in the Arbitration Act 1996 as well, to ascertain 
the applicability of arbitration agreement.  
In the case of Collins (Contractors) Ltd v Baltic Quay Management (1994) Ltd,
146 
Court of Appeal, it was argued whether the failure to serve a withholding notice 
in accordance with section 111 of the Act may lead to the conclusion that there is 
no dispute which can be referred to arbitration or adjudication. In this case, 
Collins, the contractor, carried out work for Baltic, which neither paid Collins a 
certified amount nor served it a withholding notice. Then Collins started legal 
proceedings in respect of the amount not paid. Baltic applied to the court to stay a 
litigation proceeding in accordance with section 9(4) of the Arbitration Act 1996, 
which states: “On an application under this section the court shall grant a stay 
unless satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative, or 
incapable of being performed”, on the basis that the parties had an agreement to 
arbitrate. Collins argued that in the absence of the service of a withholding notice, 
there was no “dispute” between the parties to be referred to arbitration as a pre-
requisite to the applicability of section 9 of the Arbitration Act 1996. The Court of 
Appeal found that, in spite of the absence of a withholding notice pursuant to 
section 111 of the Act, the dispute existed as long as Baltic did not admit 
Collins’s claim and, as a result, Baltic was entitled to a stay in the litigation 
proceedings in accordance with section 9 of the Arbitration Act 1996. 
The mere fact that a party (a claimant) notifies another party a (respondent) on a 
claim does not automatically give rise to a dispute. A dispute only arises when a 
claim is not admitted.
147 
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A very important case in this regard is Fastrack Contractors Ltd v Morrison 
Construction Ltd.
148 In this case many principles and issues related to the meaning 
of “dispute” and the jurisdiction of adjudication have been discussed and 
established.  
 The Requirements of a "Dispute" 
Essentially, it should be borne in mind that the HGCRA refers to a "dispute" and 
not to "disputes". As a result, the referring party can only refer a single dispute, 
although the Scheme allows the disputing parties to agree, thereafter, to add more 
than one dispute to the dispute reference under one contract and related disputes 
under different contract. 
Usually, all through the performance of construction contract many claims, 
disputes, differences, failure, bad performance, delay or default that may arise. 
Many of these claims can be collectively or individually create or establish a 
dispute. Such dispute may consist of a different matters that cause a dispute.  
But, it is necessary at the moment of referring this dispute to the adjudication or 
any competent jurisdiction such as arbitration (for the purpose of Arbitration Act 
1996), these matters to eventually form a dispute which consequently will confine 
the adjudicator with this dispute.  
So, the referred party should crystallize his dispute carefully ensuring it does not 
include any other dispute or any reference to any other contract, even it is related 
to this dispute, without a pre-agreement with his opponent. 
In fact, this is a fundamental issue that may cause to raise a question in respect of 
the correctness of the dispute reference itself as well as the legitimacy of the 
jurisdiction of the adjudicator to decide on this issue. Therefore, the dispute 
reference should be examined carefully. The wording of the notice of 
adjudication, like any commercial document, must be construed against the 
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underlying factual background from which it springs and which will be known to 
both parties. Thus, at any one time, a referring party must refer a single dispute, 
albeit that the Scheme allows the disputing parties to agree, thereafter, to extend 
the reference to cover "more than one dispute under the same contract" and 
"related disputes under different contracts”.  
The statutory language is clear. A "dispute", and nothing but a "dispute", may be 
referred. If two or more disputes are to be referred, each must be the subject of a 
separate reference. It would then be for the relevant adjudicator nominating body 
to decide whether it was appropriate to appoint the same adjudicator or different 
adjudicators to deal with each reference. Equally, what must be referred is a 
"dispute" rather than "most of a dispute" or "substantially the same dispute".  
However, it should be noted that the referring party can unilaterally cut out of the 
reference some of the pre-existing matters in dispute and shorten the notice of 
dispute to some matters less than the totality of those in dispute. This action 
actually does not meant that notice include a new dispute has not been raised 
previously provided that the dispute is substantially is the same as the pre-existing 
one. 
It is essential to answer the question “what dispute?” a dispute only arises when 
the subject-matter of the claim had been notified and rejected by the opposing 
party. The way of rejection can be emerged in many forms. For instance, a) an 
express rejection, b) modifying the claim while it is discussed among the parties, 
or c) ignoring or keeping silent over an identified or reasonable period of time.  
This is clear from a consideration of two decisions, one concerned with arbitration 
and the other with the dispute resolution procedure that is required to have been 
gone through in many civil engineering contracts before arbitration can be 
commenced. In the arbitration field, the Court of Appeal stated in Halki Shipping 
Corp v Sopex Oils Ltd
149 that a "dispute" with respect of the Arbitration Act 1996 
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should be given its ordinary meaning and in order for there to be a dispute when 
any claim which the opposing party has been notified of which that party has 
refused to admit or has not paid, whether or not there is any answer to that claim 
in fact or in law.  
In the civil engineering field, the Court of Appeal in Monmouthshire CC v 
Costelloe & Kemple Ltd
150 held that a rejection of a claim does not necessarily 
occur when the claim is submitted to the engineer or during subsequent exchanges 
of views in relation to that claim. A dispute only arises when the claim is rejected 
in clear language. An obvious refusal to consider the claim or to answer it can, 
however, constitute such a rejection. A dispute only arises when it emerges that a 
claim is not “admitted” by the receiving party. 
These cases help in showing that a claim and its submission do not necessarily 
constitute a dispute, that a dispute only arises when a claim has been notified and 
rejected, that a rejection can occur when an opposing party refuses to answer the 
claim, and that a dispute can arise when there has been a bare rejection of a claim 
to which there is no discernable answer in fact or in law. 
However, the essential first step in determining whether jurisdiction exists 
in order to appoint an adjudicator under the HGCRA is to identify the 
content of the suggested dispute. Only then is it possible to consider 
whether the claiming party has fulfilled the necessary precondition of a 
submission of the underlying claims to the other party followed by that 
party subsequently rejecting them. 
… The wording of the notice of adjudication is in wide terms and includes 
the general reference of:  
"disputes that have arisen ...issues as to  [Fastrack's] rights to payment of 
the sums set out below ... or such other sums as the adjudicator shall find 
payable under the following headings ... caused ... by [Morrison's] 
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breaches of contract; ... loss of profit as a result of the repudiation ... such 
other sums as the adjudicator deems appropriate." __ 
All these disputed issues had arisen separately to the issue of interim 
application no. 13 and all were in dispute by the date that the notice of 
adjudication was served.
151 
It is also necessary to mention the extent of facts and matters that can be relied 
upon in a dispute to make it ripe. A dispute only arises when the issue or claim, 
along with all related facts and matters, has already been served upon the other 
party, which should be given sufficient opportunity to respond, whether by 
admitting, rejecting or modifying the claim, before commencement of an 
adjudication. A mere allegation made in order to attempt to initiate adjudication 
that is not supported by sufficient facts is called an “adjudication ambush” in the 
UK and is harshly criticized by commentators and is not permitted by courts, as 
held in Edmund Nuttall Ltd v R G Carter Ltd.
152 Seymour J commented that in 
determining the difference in meaning between a claim and a dispute the ordinary 
use of English should be used. Hence a dictionary can be used to distinguish one 
from the other. 
The difference between a claim and a dispute is that a claim is an assertion of a 
right but a dispute is an argument as to the validity of that assertion. 
A dispute is a disagreement where opposing views (claims or assertions) are 
expressed (sometimes in a heated manner). 
An adjudication is where each contending party has stated his claim (assertion or 
view) and put forward arguments – it is when both parties then argue that the 
dispute starts. 
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Finally, in this context it is also worthwhile to talk about the word “dispute” as 
mentioned in Clause (66) of the ICE forms of contracts and subcontracts. In the 
case of AMEC Civil Engineering Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport,
153 
Jackson J set out seven propositions about the definition of the word “dispute” for 
the purpose of applying clause (66) of ICE Condition which are: 
-1- For the purpose of arbitration or adjudication the meaning of word “dispute” 
should be defined or described in a normal and simple way not in the that the 
lawyers would described. 
-2- Although the meaning of word “dispute” is simple and plain, the litigation 
over the years contributed to develop the meaning of word “dispute” and make it 
much clear, even though it is not utterly identified. 
 
 
-3- The notification of one party (claimant) to the other party (respondent) does 
not  necessary give rise to a dispute. Pursuant to the judicial precedent, the dispute 
arises when the claim is not admitted by the opponent. 
-4- He gives some examples about how it can be deduced that the claim is not 
admitted by the respondent whether it is expressly or impliedly inferred from the 
case. 
-5- Remaining silent by the respondent for a while it does not necessary meant 
that the claim is not admitted. It is based on the fact and condition of the case and 
the structure of the contract. 
-6- Imposes a deadline to that a respondent to respond the claim is not usually a 
period that can be posted/ exceeded unless it is a reasonable. In all cases the 
period is subject to the court discretion. 
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-7- If the claim does not present clearly by the claimant that make the respondent 
neither be silent nor expressly reject it, then the claim can be considered not 
admitted and can be referred to arbitration or litigation.  
In the Ringway Infrastructure Services Ltd v Vauxhall Motors Ltd,
154 Akenhead J 
stated that though these seven propositions that have been raised in Amec are 
related to arbitration, it is also can be applied to adjudication because there is no 
good reason in principle to differentiate in law or in fact as to a dispute or a 
difference in adjudication as opposed to in arbitration. 
For the purpose of accelerating the adjudication, the same adjudicated dispute 
should not be referred again to another adjudication  if the first adjudicated 
dispute has been exhausted.  This is meant to make the adjudication time-efficient 
on one hand and cost-effective on the other, unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties. This principle is adopted in HG Construction Ltd v Ashwell Homes (East 
Anglia) Ltd.
155 
Such an approach (to re-adjudicate the same dispute) includes not only the word 
“same” but also substantially the same dispute or difference. This is in Ramsey J 
judgment that ‘disputes or differences encompass a wide range of factual and 
legal issues’; this is the reason the approach includes the substantial side of the 
word “same”. If the factual and legal issues are completely identical, the 
possibility of substantially re-adjudicating the same dispute or difference would 
defeat the purpose of Para.9 (2) of the Scheme. 
The nature of adjudication, as previously dealt with, necessitates speed of 
procedure in settling and sorting out the dispute. It is temporarily binding, but 
does not estop the parties from resorting to arbitration or litigation for final 
determination of the dispute.
156   
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However, a crucial question pertains to what constitutes a decision, and whether a 
second adjudicator will be bound by the reasoning of a decision made by the first 
adjudicator. In a second adjudication between WH Malcolm Ltd v Amec Group 
Ltd
157, Amec argued that the correct method for the claim’s measurement was 
SMM7, and Malcolm contended that the question of measurement had already 
been decided by the first adjudication. Accordingly, it could not be seen again by 
the second adjudicator. The case came before the Outer House of the Court of 
Session in Scotland.
158  Lady Smith found that although the method of 
measurement of SMM&7 was part of the first adjudicator’s reasoning in reaching 
her decision, this was not the issue of the first adjudication nor did it form a part 
of the decision of the first adjudication. She also recognized that the applicability 
of SMM7 was part of the parties’ contention in the first adjudication; 
nevertheless, she decided that ‘it was manifestly not an issue which was referred 
to the first adjudicator, although it could have been. Nor was it part of the 
decision’.  
This gives reason for every concerned party to be cautious; they must understand 
very clearly the issue pertaining to adjudication when drafting the notice of 
adjudication. 
Furthermore, in the case of Redwing Construction Ltd v Wishart,
159  the judge 
added that if the first adjudicator is martially different from the second 
adjudication, the reasons for his decision may establish a noticeable idea for the 
second adjudication. It would thus fall under one of the following cases: 
1.  Any decision which can be described as deciding the dispute, as referred 
or as expanded effectively within the adjudication process, is binding and cannot 
be raised or adjudicated upon again in any later adjudication. 
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2.  In contrast, any decision or part of a decision which can be described as 
not deciding the dispute, as referred or as expanded effectively within the 
adjudication process, is not binding and can be raised or adjudicated upon again in 
any later adjudication. 
 As a result of the aforementioned, where the adjudicator gives an opinion in court 
terms of “obiter dicta”,
160 on a matter or point which was not part of the dispute, 
such opinion will not be jurisdictionally considered part of his decision. 
The Finality of adjudication 
The nature of adjudication, as previously dealt with, necessitates speed of 
procedure in settling and sorting out the dispute. It is temporarily binding, but 
does not estop the parties from resorting to arbitration or litigation for final 
determination of the dispute.
161    
It was obvious that one of the objective of enacting the Housing Grants, 
Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 is mainly to establish a swift and speedy 
mechanism to resolve a construction contract dispute to ensure those construction 
projects running smoothly without disrupting the cash-flow of the projects. In 
fact, it has been said on a number of occasions by the Court of Appeal that the 
decision of an adjudicator is intended to be enforced summarily.  
As result, a party of construction contract has to comply with the adjudicator’s 
decision and to implement such decision immediately without delay as long as the 
adjudicator issuing his decision upon his jurisdiction. Consequently, the 
successful party can claim summary judgment to enforce the adjudicator’s 
decision in case of any rejection may raised by his opponent. 
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Nevertheless, the adjudication system is not isolated from the whole legal system 
in UK but also to be complied with such legal system with special attention to be 
drawn to the civil procedural rules and regulations. 
One of the major maybe face the immediate execution of the adjudicator’s 
decision is when the successful party being in a financial difficulties position. The 
problem is here if the loser party is obliged to pay to the successful one, whom is 
becoming insolvent, the amount decided by the adjudicator then those money will 
be received by the liquidator and being part of the fund applicable to be 
distributed among the successful party’s creditors. So, the question can be raised 
here whether it is possible to the court to stay the execution of the adjudicator’s 
decision pending the outcome of the final determination by the competent 
jurisdiction, arbitration or litigation. The provision of Part 24.2 of Civil Procedure 
Rules enables the court to give summary judgment against either the claimant or 
the defendant on the whole of a claim or on a particular issue if the court 
considers the party, whom the award will be in his favour, has real prospect of 
succeeding his claim and there is no other reason why the case or issue should be 
disposed of at trial. In the case of Rainford House Ltd v Cadogan Ltd
162 Seymour 
J referred to the case of Bouygues (UK) Ltd v Dahl-Jensen (UK) Ltd
163 where the 
claimant in the latter case in the first instance was given a summary judgment 
while it was dismissed in the Court of Appeal and stay of the execution because 
claimant in liquidation in accordance with requirements of rule of 4.90 of the 
Insolvency Rules 1986 based on the evidence that submitted before them which 
prove that the claimant in liquidation. 
So, Seymour J, by examining the evidence brought before him, he found that 
there is a compelling reason to refuse summary judgment while in the other case 
Wilcox J refused to stay execution of summary judgment because of the material 
submitted before him to the risk of future non- payment was not based on 
compelling and uncontradicted evidence.   
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However, in the case of Wimbledon Construction Co 2000 Ltd v Vago
164 Coulson 
J set a very important principles that the court should be taken into its account 
when it exercises  its discretion regarding a stay of execution in adjudication 
enforcement proceedings as following: 
•  The adjudication is mainly enacted for a quick and inexpensive dispute 
resolution. 
•  As result to the above, the decision of adjudicator should be enforced 
immediately and the claimant should take his due money as soon as possible. 
•  When the court exercises its discretion should bear in mind the RSC Order 
47 while it examines the application of a stay of execution of summary judgment. 
•  The inability of claimant to re-pay the amount awarded to him at end of 
the final determination by the competent jurisdiction can constitute a ground to 
stay the execution of summary judgment. 
•  If the claimant is in insolvent liquidation the stay of execution should be 
granted. 
•  Even the if the evidence suggests that the claimant party is in difficult 
financial position, it is not necessary to stay the execution of summary judgment, 
if these difficulties in his financial position: 
(1)  the claimant position is the same or similar to its position when signing the 
contract. 
(2)  this difficulties due to the defendant delay in his payment to the claimant.   
We take another angle with respect to the nature of adjudication being temporary: 
the jurisdiction being exclusive, it would not prevent the English court from 
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exercising jurisdiction to enforce the decision of an adjudicator or deciding 
matters related to the enforcement of such decision of a temporary nature.
165  
Further to the above discussion according to the finality of the adjudication’s 
decision, it is worth to it on its own since it is one of the most crucial issues which 
reflects the efficiency of adjudication as a means of dispute resolution in the 
construction industry. In effect, under the HGCA Act of 1996, the adjudicators’ 
decisions have been clearly made as provisionally binding and enforceable until 
the concerned dispute is overturned or confirmed by the ultimate competent 
tribunal – the court or arbitration - if the parties do not agree with the decisions.  
The intention of Parliament to give such a speedy and temporarily binding dispute 
resolution was confirmed by the High Court in the case of Macob Civil 
Engineering Ltd v Morrison Construction Ltd
166 as stated that: “Parliament ... has 
made it clear that decisions of adjudicators are binding and are to be complied 
with until the dispute is finally resolved”. This is the general nature of the 
adjudication decision unless the parties agree to accept it as finally determining 
the dispute .The same tendency in a virtual way was taken by the Scheme for 
Construction Contracts in Paragraph 23(2), as it goes behind section 42 of the 
Arbitration Act of 1996, and commands the parties to comply with the 
adjudicators’ decision - at least temporarily - until the disputes are finally 
determined by an ultimate competent tribunal. The Scheme allows the 
adjudicators to issue their decisions, if not complied with their decisions, in a way 
of peremptory orders requesting the parties to comply with their decisions. In a 
case of Outwing Construction Ltd v H Randell & Son Ltd,
167 the court affirmed 
that the provisions in the Scheme for the enforcement of peremptory orders and 
the abridgement of time where it is necessary would be appropriate and reflects 
the intention of Parliament to enforce the adjudicator decisions without delay. 
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Most of the adjudication decisions are dealt with money that is to be paid by one 
party to his opponent; therefore, the enforcement of such decisions would be 
greatly concerned by both parties. The adjudication decisions may be 
implemented amicably or otherwise the adjudication creditor party will proceed to 
claim for the enforcement of the decision. The way to obtain the enforcement of 
the adjudication decision is to file a claim before the High Court seeking a 
summary judgment under Part 24 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Usually the court, 
in general, abridges the time and issues a summary judgment within a very short 
period, unless, in accordance with the case of Swain v Hillman,
168 the defendant 
party who resists the enforcement of the adjudication has a real - and not fanciful 
- prospect for successfully defending the claim, or at least the material submitted 
by him supporting a prima facie case that the allegations were made out. 
Nevertheless, this does not hinder construction contract parties who are ever 
inventive in challenging the adjudicators’ decisions, which has become common 
in the construction industry. However, the notion for an immediate enforcement 
of the adjudication’s decision would maintain while the unsuccessful party is 
bound to comply with the decision unless the adjudicator has acted beyond his/her 
jurisdiction, and has breached the rules of natural justice or the creditor party has 
become insolvent and the principle of an insolvency set-off would be applied to 
the concerned situation. 
The aforementioned grounds to challenge the adjudicator will be elaborated in the 
following paragraphs except, the insolvency situation as it was discussed earlier in 
this chapter. 
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•  Lack of jurisdiction 
Before the adjudicator approaches any dispute referred to him, the following 
conditions are required to exist in order to give him the jurisdiction to decide upon 
such a dispute; otherwise, the decision will not be enforced: 
-  The concerned dispute arises from the contract that has been formed after 
the HGCR Act of 1996 came into force (May 1998). Otherwise, it will be agreed 
between the parties to incorporate an adjudication provision into their contract. 
-  There is a dispute between contracting parties*. 
-  The dispute must arise out of the construction contract where its scope 
mainly falls under the definition of construction operations as it is specified in the 
HGCA 1996 Act*. 
-  The contract must be in writing*. 
-  The referral to the adjudication must be in accordance to the HGCA Act of 
1996*. 
-  The adjudicator must be lawfully appointed*. 
-  The adjudicator must decide upon the dispute within the permitted time 
duration*. 
-  The adjudicator was complying with natural justice while running his 
duties during the trial*. 
As a result, the decision of the adjudicator must be promptly enforced as long as 
the adjudicator has been empowered to look into the dispute and did not exceed 
his jurisdiction, nor was intrinsically unfair or in a serious breach of natural 
justice. Such principles have been provided by court as provisions to underpin any 
action for the enforcement of an adjudicator’s decision, as it was enunciated by 122 
 
Jackson J and approved by the Court of Appeal in the case of Carillion 
Construction Ltd v Devonport Royal Dockyard Ltd.
169  
Generally, the natural justice principle is based on two fundamental elements that 
are required to be considered by the tribunals while they perform their duties, 
which are: the trial must be conducted in an unbiased manner, and each party 
must be given a fair opportunity to present his case and argument. Nevertheless, it 
is not necessary to be counted as a breach of natural justice if the adjudicator 
declines to consider any evidence or argument which, on his evaluation of facts or 
law, is irrelevant. The task of adjudicator is not to act as an arbitrator or judge; he 
is usually chosen based on his technical expertise, not as a lawyer. Therefore, the 
Jackson J, in the case of Kier Regional Ltd (t/a Wallis) v City and General 
(Holborn) Ltd,
170 came to the conclusion that, as was well confirmed by the Court 
of Appeal: “At worst, the Adjudicator made an error of law which caused him to 
disregard two pieces of relevant evidence, namely the expert reports of Driver 
Consult and Precept. In the light of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Carillion 
that error would not render the Adjudicator’s decision invalid”. 
•  Error of law 
The fact that has been adopted by the Technology and Construction Court and 
entirely supported by the Court of Appeal is that the mere error in law is not itself 
sufficient to render the decision that the adjudicator is enforceable. In the case of 
Bouygues UK Ltd v Dahl-Jensen UK Ltd,
171 the adjudicator had made a mistake 
when he had made an order to pay monies for the successful party without making 
any deduction against the retention.  The Court came to conclusion that the 
adjudicator had only made a “plain” mistake which did not substantially affect his 
decision, and he did not go outside his jurisdiction so long as he had merely given 
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a “wrong answer” to the “right question”. Dyson J, robustly stated: “In deciding 
whether the adjudicator has decided the wrong question rather than given a wrong 
answer to the right question the court should bear in mind that the speedy nature 
of the adjudication process means that mistakes will inevitably occur and my view 
it should guard against characterising a mistaken answer to an issue that lies 
within the scope of the reference as an excess of jurisdiction”.   
Nevertheless, it is quite likely that the party will be eligible to resist the 
adjudication decision in case he made an error of law that goes to the root of his 
jurisdiction,which may contradict the concerned parties’ rights or obligations as 
per law and contract. This is may be understood by the language used by Lord 
Kingarth that the adjudicator’s parties may approach the way of challenging the 
adjudication decision on the basis of error of law. In the case of Allied London 
and Scottish Properties Plc v Riverbrae Construction Ltd,
172  Lord Kingarth 
stated that “whatever wide powers may be given to adjudication to facilitate 
speedy resolution of disputes before them, no power is given to make decisions 
contrary to the rights or obligations of the parties arising as a matter of law”. 
However, when challenging the adjudication decision on the grounds of the errors 
of law, fact or procedures must be scrutinised carefully before the court decides to 
accept that such errors constitute an excess of jurisdiction, or a serious breach of 
natural justice. 
Some Important Issues According to the Jurisdiction of Adjudication: 
•  If the adjudication’s award is not made within the agreed period, Section 
108(2) states:” The contract shall- 
(C) require the adjudicator to reach a decision within 28 days of referral or such 
longer period as is agreed by the parties after the dispute has been referred;” 
                                                           
172 [1999] BLR 346, (2000) 2 TCLR 398. 124 
 
The language of this section clearly says that the adjudicator is constrained within 
the time period given to him by this section or as agreed by parties to issue his 
final decision, yet this provision is completely silent as to the consequences of an 
adjudicator failing to issue a decision within the 28 days that has been specified 
by this section or any agreed time. 
In case St Andrews Bay Development Ltd v HBG Management Ltd,
173 the 
adjudicator reached her decision within the time period but she refused to intimate 
it until she receives her fees. Lord Wheatly expressed that although the 
adjudicator is not entitled to delay communication or intimation of a decision until 
her fees are paid, the decision of adjudicator, due to the silent of Act on the 
question of communication of the decision, it cannot be thought that it is of 
sufficient significance to render the decision a nullity as Lord Wheatly said: 
A decision can be reached before (i) fees are paid; or (b) reasons are given or (iii) 
a time limit expires. That decision has still been made irrespective of any 
supplemental requirements.  
A decision may however have been a nullity but that relates to how the decision 
was made not what happened subsequently which should not affect the decision. 
Advising of a decision late does not nullify the decision but a null decision does 
nullify a decision made earlier. 
 Time Period for Adjudicator to reach a decision 
The time limitation that is given to the adjudicator to reach his decision is a very 
strict rule that the adjudicator must comply with because the essence of 
adjudication is based on speedy dispute resolution that helps a construction 
project to keep its continuity. In Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd v Lambeth 
LBC,
174  it was suggested that where the adjudicator could not properly, 
reasonably and fairly reach his decision within the time limitation and the parties 
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were unwilling to agree further extension of time, then the adjudicator should 
[not?] decide on the case and should resign. 
Section 108 of the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 
provides that the adjudicator "shall reach his decision within 28 days of referral". 
While the Scheme for Construction Contracts provides that the adjudicator shall 
reach his decision 'not later than 28 days after the date of the referral notice". The 
JCT standard forms of contract directed the adjudicator to reach his decision 
"within 28 days of the receipt of the referral”. 
The axial notion of the above provisions revolves around the time period limit by 
which the adjudicator is committed to reach his decision. Such time period is the 
essence of the decision validity and its capability to enforcement. But, as it may 
be understood from the foregoing provisions, a consensus on the 28 days period 
laps as the maximum limit for the adjudicator to reach the decision, the date of 
commencement of the foregoing period has not been accurately specified whether 
from the date of the notice referral by the referring party or the date on which the 
adjudicator has actually received the referral notice. 
In absence of a uniform language to indicate the time period cited in the three 
provisions, it becomes difficult to understand whether the validity of the 
adjudicator's decision consecutively counts down from the date of referring the 
notice to the adjudicator or from the date of the receipt date of the notice. 
In Richie Brothers v David Philip
175 the court indicated that under the scheme for 
Construction Contracts, time starts to run from the date of the notice referral but 
because of a mishap in the post, the referral notice did not come into the 
adjudicator's hands until five days after posting. Those five days were effectively 
lost to the adjudicator as time had already started to run. This would not have 
been the case if a JCT contract had applied i.e.  
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The previous judgment revealed the difference point that can be existed between 
an adjudicator and another in terms of the application of the said provisions since 
the adoption of the date of notice referral to adjudicator, or the date of notice 
receipt by adjudicator, shall to a far extent impact the admissibility of the decision 
reached to enforcement.  
The gap stretched between the two dates may cause validation or invalidation of a 
decision e.g. five or six days late in receiving the referral notice which was 
referred in a certain date "the date of referral" will cause the decision invalid as it 
shall be deemed delivered out of the 28 days. 
In Barnes and Elliott Ltd v Taylor Woodrow Holdings Ltd
176 in June 2003, the 
adjudicator made his decision in time but sent it to the parties by post. It arrived 
after one day after the deadline had expired. Humphrey Lloyd J held that although 
technically the adjudicator's decision should have been delivered to the parties by 
the agreed deadline, the decision was nevertheless enforceable. The time limit set 
by Section 108 of the Construction Act were important for the effectiveness of the 
adjudication process, but compliance with the time limit was not a dominant 
factor, however, Lloyd J noted that the tolerance did not extend to any longer than 
a day or two. 
Conducting of Adjudication 
In addition to the principals that were discussed earlier in this chapter regarding 
the rules of adjudication, such as the adjudicators should deliver their decision 
within the time specified in the Act or as agreed by parties, there are other 
principals that govern the conduct of adjudication  which need to be looked into 
carefully. 
The first step to be taken to proceed with the adjudication is that the referring 
party (the party in the construction contract who wishes to commence 
adjudication proceedings) should serve the notice of adjudication in accordance 
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with the requirements of the Scheme for Construction Contracts. The special 
attention should be given to what was set out in paragraph one of the Scheme: 
(3) The notice of adjudication shall set out briefly- 
      (a) the nature and a brief description of the dispute and of the parties involved. 
       (b) details of where and when the dispute has arisen. 
       (c) the nature of redress which is sought, and 
       (d) the name and addresses of the parties to the contract ( including where 
appropriate, the addresses which the parties have specified for the giving of 
notices) 
  These are strict rules to be followed by the referring party otherwise the 
decision of adjudicator might be unenforceable by the court. For instance, it is 
clearly mentioned in the scheme that the nomination and appointment of the 
adjudicator must follow the notice of adjudication and that the non-
compliance with such rule deprives the adjudicator of authority, even though 
the responding party had suffered no prejudice. In case IDE Contracting Ltd v 
RG Carter Cambridge Ltd,
177  Havery J said:  
“If the provisions necessary to appoint an adjudicator have not been complied 
with then that such provisions will deprive the adjudicator of the right to make a 
decision unless the other party says the adjudicator still has the right to make a 
decision and that he will be bound by such decision”. 
Furthermore, the adjudicator should act impartially and comply with the “natural 
justice”. The natural justice simply can be understood when decision makers must 
act fairly, in good faith and without bias and must afford each party the 
opportunity to adequately state his case. Such duties are set out in paragraph 12 of 
the Scheme which states:  
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“The adjudicator must act impartially, in accordance with the relevant terms of 
the contract and the applicable law and he must avoid incurring unnecessary 
expense”. 
In fact, these duties are not identical to those which are required to be undertaken 
by the arbitrator while he/she exercises his/her authority within the arbitration as 
it is stated in section 33 of the Arbitration Act. Here, it uses slightly different 
language, stating that the tribunal shall “act fairly and impartially as between the 
parties, giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing 
with that of his opponent”. The arbitral tribunal may consist of one arbitrator or 
three arbitrators, and when the section mentions the term “tribunal”, it means that 
the arbitrator or arbitrators are bound to be fair and impartial between the parties.  
As for the adjudication, unless agreed upon by parties, it is limited and squeezed 
by the timescale that was given to the adjudicator in order to reach the decision. It 
should then be recognized that the “natural justice” cannot be completely applied 
to the adjudication as in Courts or Arbitrators. The adjudicator has to reach his/her 
decision within 28 days, which can be extended to 14 days if it is requested by the 
referral party, otherwise, the adjudicator may have to inform the parties that 
he/she cannot decide the dispute within the time allowed or he/she has to resign. 
In Discain Project Services Ltd v Opecprime Development Ltd
178 Bowsher J said: 
“The rights of natural justice are important since they can be appealed over – 
whilst questions of fact or law cannot be appealed against. However some natural 
justice rules have to be placed secondary to the need to make the Act work.” 
In this sense Bowsher J has clearly indicated that the rights of natural justice 
though crucial to be observed, it comes in the second rank compared to the 
questions of fact and law in terms of the potentiality of being appealable, and 
based on that the adjudicator is to give priority to the questions of fact and law.  
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However, the adjudicator, while he/she is exercising his/her power within the time 
allowed, should not commit any serious or material breach of natural justice. 
Otherwise the adjudication’s decision will not be enforceable by the court. In the 
case Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd v Lambeth LBC,
179 Humphrey Lloyd J 
affirmed that adjudication must be done in a fair manner. Adjudication is more 
like arbitration than an expert’s decision but it is not the same as an expert’s 
decision. 
Adjudications may also involve asking questions rather than simply exchanging 
assertions.  Nevertheless, it is obvious that as per the power that is given to the 
adjudicator by the Act and the Scheme to ascertain the facts and laws, the 
adjudicator is authorized to use the inquisitional procedure rather than the 
adversarial procedure. But the adjudicator must always take into consideration to 
act impartially, treat parties equally, and give each one the same opportunity. For 
example, in order to consume time, the adjudicator can use telephone 
communication but with limited administration matters only. In the case of 
Discain Project Services Ltd v Opecprime Development Ltd
180, Bowsher J said 
that adjudicators can use telephone calls to perform administrative tasks although 
it would be better for a clerk to do such tasks. More detailed telephone 
conversations and telephone decisions on matters of substance are more open to 
dispute. 
According to the Scheme, the adjudicator is not required to provide written 
reasons unless it is requested by parties or by the terms of adjudication. However, 
if the adjudication decision contains an error it does not mean that the 
adjudication decision will not be enforceable as long as the matter that is referred 
to the adjudication falls within its authority, even if there are errors in procedures, 
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facts or law as per the statement of  Thornton J in Sherwood & Casson Ltd v 
Mackenzie:
181 
The courts have made it clear that an adjudication decision will remain 
enforceable regardless of the alleged errors of law or facts which the adjudicator 
may have committed, provided that there is no breach of natural justice and that 
the adjudication was not decided without the proper jurisdiction.  
On the other hand, if the adjudication decision is correct but to the matter that is 
not referred to it, then the decision absolutely will not be enforceable. In the case 
of VHE Construction Plc v RBSTB Trust Co Ltd,
182 Hicks J said: 
An adjudicator can make a right decision even if it is right for the wrong reasons. 
Nevertheless, according to s.140 of the LDEDC Act a “slip rule” has been 
formerly recognized as it has stipulated that the adjudicator to be authorized to 
correct a clerical or typographical error. Contracting parties must agree in advance 
to include a “slip rule” provision in their contract, if the same does not happen, 
then the Scheme will be applied which provides that any correction of the 
adjudication decision must be made within five days of the date of the delivery 
decision to parties. 
Finally, similar to the arbitration, the adjudication remains valid even if the main 
construction contract is terminated. In case of Connex South Eastern Ltd v MJ 
Building Services Group Plc,
183 Havery J stated:  
The next question is whether acceptance of repudiation of an agreement 
brings to an end a provision as to adjudication. It is well established that 
an arbitration clause survives the discharge of a contract by acceptance of 
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a repudiation: Heyman v Darwins Ltd.
184The reasoning in that case in my 
judgment is equally applicable to an adjudication provision. 
Additionally, he described the meaning of the phrase “at any time”, which is 
mentioned in section 108(2) (a). Regarding the time that the referring party can 
proceed with the adjudication, Havery J said: ‘Adjudications are supposed to 
resolve disputes quickly and will remain available for the duration of the 
underlying contract’. 
In addition to the above, Havery J ultimately concluded that the principles which 
he adopted in the aforementioned case were found by asking questions such as the 
following:  
“(1) Has there been an agreement to which the claimant and the defendant have 
been parties and which is an agreement "in writing" within the meaning of s.107 
of the Act?  
Answer: Yes. 
(2) If the answer to question (1) is yes, did the defendant still have the right to 
refer a dispute to adjudication under s.108 of the Act on 24th February 2004 if the 
agreement has previously been discharged by the acceptance of the claimant's 
repudiation? 
Answer: Yes.” 
Regarding DGT Steel and Cladding Ltd v Cubitt Building and Interiors Ltd,
185 the 
court has an inherent jurisdiction to stay court proceedings as issued in the breach 
of an agreement to adjudicate. The same principle was adopted in Channel Tunnel 
Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd,
186 Cott UK Ltd v FE Barber Ltd,
187 
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and Cape v Rosser.
188 Such a principle had been adopted where the court 
considered itself to have the full discretion to stay proceedings before it when 
such proceedings are in breach of an agreement to refer the dispute to an 
alternative method of resolution in the aim of resolving such a dispute between 
the parties prior to final determination either by arbitration or litigation.  
Despite the jurisdiction being discretionary for the court, there was a presumption 
in favour of the parties’ agreement to adjudicate, laying the persuasive burden on 
the party denying the stay of proceedings to establish good reasons for its stance 
(see Cable & Wireless Plc v IBM UK Ltd 
189). 
Using the word “shall” gives an indication that the parties meant to make the 
provisions of the related clause mandatory. 
The distinction between adjudication and other legal proceedings lies in the idea 
that adjudication is not required to be compatible with the regulatory rules of legal 
proceedings. In terms of arbitration it is worth mentioning that there is some 
similarity between the arbitration and the adjudication. It is correct that in general 
the principle rules of the arbitration can be applied to the adjudication. For 
instance, in terms of court proceedings, the judicial review of the adjudicator’s 
decision is considered as species of arbiter. Consequently, it is essential that the 
court has the right to scrutinize the adjudicator’s decision to check whether the 
adjudicator has made his decision in accordance with his jurisdiction or terms of 
reference and the applicable laws and regulations. However the judicial review in 
this regard cannot be extended to cover the correctness of any error or mistake in 
facts or law which had been made by the adjudicator. 
The second type of court proceeding that can also be applied to adjudication 
which is comparable with the arbitration is an action to enforce the adjudication’s 
decision. Neither the arbitration nor the adjudication is considered to be part of 
the state judicial system, thus, their awards are not treated as the court’s award. 
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The latter does not provide any further proceedings to be enforced although the 
arbitration’s decision and the adjudication’s decision require further support from 
the competent court to be enforced in case the concerned party was not willing to 
accept it. 
However, on the other hand, there is an essential difference between the 
adjudication and the arbitration in terms of the nature of their awards. While the 
adjudication’s decision is a provisional resolution ad interim that should be kept 
pending further determination by the competent jurisdiction, i.e. litigation or 
arbitration, the arbitration is a form of conclusive resolution of dispute.  
On the other hand, there are highly essential differences between the regular court 
proceedings and the adjudication. This is obvious in some cases. For example, in 
Austin Hall Building Ltd v Buckland Securities Ltd,
190 the claimant sought a 
summary judgment to enforce an adjudicator’s award that was granted after 
adjudication as per the Act 1996, s.108 in regards to a dispute over payment for 
building works that had been carried out for the respondent. The respondent 
argued that it had been denied the rights to a fair trial cited under the Human 
Rights 1998 Act. Sch.1 Part I Article (6); in essence, the opportunity to present its 
case had not been given thereto as well as a reasonable time in which to respond 
to the account. 
 
Moreover, the statutory time limit (28 days) set for the adjudicator to reach his 
decision was unfair as to the lack of a public hearing (and pronounced judgment 
as well). Considering that the judgment was in favour of the claimant, it is held 
that an adjudicator appointed under the Act 1996 is not a public authority for the 
purpose of s.(6) of the Human Rights Act 1998 and therefore is not bound by such 
Act; the adjudicator did not make a judgment and consequently his decision is not 
enforceable without court proceedings being –not- final. 
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In addition to the above, Bowsher J held that even if the adjudicator had been a 
public authority and had applied s.(6) of the Human Rights Act 1998, it would 
have exempted the adjudicator conduct in regards to time limits because the 
adjudicator had acted according to primary legislation and the respondent would 
have not been able to use section (7)-(1)-(6) thereof in defence to the application. 
As for the right to a public hearing, this right had been waived due to the 
respondent failing to request it. 
 Adjudication under Kuwaiti jurisdiction  
 Adjudication has not been known under Kuwaiti jurisdiction. This is attributed to 
a lack of legislation to regulate adjudication and adopt it as a successful means in 
solving disputes in an early stage. 
Despite the said fact, some individual attempts have been made in order to 
introduce this means into the commercial life; however, not being legislated 
proved to be a stumbling block in attaining the slightest progress towards the 
recognition of adjudication. Feverish efforts are being exerted nowadays by 
scholars and law practitioners to familiarize operating contractors in Kuwait with 
adjudication through seminars, workshops and conferences. Nevertheless, there is 
still some time to go before adjudication will gain the full satisfaction of the 
legislator and promulgate it under the package of legislations in force. 
*** 
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Chapter Five 
 
EXPERT DETERMINATION 
 
Expert determination is a way to resolve a particular technical dispute in a binding 
fashion by an independent third party who is selected by the parties based on 
his/her special expertise in the field of the disputed matter. Such an umpire is 
commonly known as an expert. Expert determination is an old alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism that has been recognized by the English court since about 
250 years ago. It has evolved to become widely accepted as a part of commercial 
disputes. Kendal defines expert determination as ‘a simple procedure by which 
valuation and technical issues are referred to a suitably qualified professional to 
determine ‘acting as an expert and not as an arbitrator’…Unlike alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR), expert determination guarantees a result which is final 
and binding’.
191 
In practical terms, expert determination describes a process by which a talented 
neutral third party’s expertise is appointed and requires the disputant parties to 
answer a specific question or to decide on a particular matter. Therefore, the 
expert determination process - as an alternative dispute resolution - is supposed to 
be flexible, fast, binding and reaching the final resolution of the disputes. Expert 
determination is thus a dispute resolution process which assists disputants  in 
resolving disputes without delay including the expense of going to court or 
arbitration. 
Expert determination is flexible as it basically relies upon the law of contract, and 
its process is mainly set by the contracting parties who can shape the most 
convenient and suitable procedure which is protected by the judicial intervention. 
Contracting parties must set and tailor the process that they wish to have in a 
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future dispute by incorporating the provisions of the expert determination earlier 
in the main contract; alternatively, such a process may be agreed upon when a 
dispute arises.
192 It is up to the disputants’ agreement to have a comprehensive 
expert determination agreement or an ephemeral material agreement.
193 According 
to the Australian case The Heart Research Institute Limited and Anor v Psiron 
Limited,
194 Einstein J described the benefits of an expert determination as follows:  
Expert Determination has apparently been attractive, largely because it is 
less expensive and speedier, avoids the rigours of the application of the 
rules of evidence and procedure and offers a finality which avoids delays, 
potential re-hearing and appeals, which is particularly suitable especially 
where an expert knowledge of the subject is required or where the parties 
may have a continuing relationship.  
Nevertheless, a typical expert determination agreement or clause mainly includes 
the essential components, such as the matter or matters that are to be determined 
by the expert whom in turn should be clearly specified to act as an expert and not 
as an arbitrator whose decision must be final and binding. Generally, the expert 
determination’s rules, mandate, process and the remit to the expert are a matter of 
law of contract and subject to the contracting parties’ agreement; therefore, such 
an agreement should be carefully drafted in advanced of the dispute. Lord 
Thomas in the case of Nylon said that: ‘I…accept that if the parties have chosen 
such a process and the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the expert, then they 
must be held to it, whatever view might be taken as to the appropriateness of the 
procedure for matters submitted to the expert’.
195 
Although the expert determination is a very old mechanism that prevents lawyers 
from entering technical disputes,
196 it also provides a good response to the 
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alternative dispute resolution momentum in the field of construction.
197 Still, to 
what extent does the expert determination differ from other means and ways of 
alternative dispute resolutions, such as arbitration (as it is counted as a method of 
ADR), mediation, conciliation and negotiation? Expert determination 
methodology in resolving disputes is classified as a type of alternative dispute 
resolution. However, due to the most significant feature of expert determination - 
which is providing disputants with a final and binding decision - the expert 
determination is utterly different from non-binding dispute resolution means such 
as mediation, adjudication, early neutral evaluation and others, and is performed 
in a way of simulating a judicial means of dispute resolution such as litigation and 
arbitration. 
In essence, the boundaries between expert determination and arbitration can 
appear somewhat blurred. Nevertheless, there are essential differences between 
expert determination and arbitration. 
The first step to be undertaken by the court is to examine the words of the 
concerned agreement to identify whether the related case falls within the 
definition of arbitration or expert determination in order to apply the most suitable 
rules for each. Each case needs to be examined separately in accordance with its 
own words in a contract’s provisions. The court should not stick to the title or the 
name that is given in the agreement, but should look at the substance of the 
provision rather than its title.  The English courts came to the conclusion that in 
the case of an ambiguity regarding whether it is a dispute resolution arbitration or 
expert determination, the dispute process in which the according umpire is used 
should conclude the matter. If the process involves a judicial enquiry then it will 
be regarded as an arbitration and the rules of arbitration would apply. If there is 
no judicial enquiry required in the process then it will be an expert determination 
and would be subjected to its own rules and principles. This trend was understood 
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from the statement of the Court of Appeal in the case of Re Carus- Wilson v 
Green,
198 where the Court of Appeal stated that: 
The question here is, whether the umpire was merely a valuer substituted 
for the valuers originally appointed by the parties in a certain event, or 
arbitrator. If it appears from the terms of agreement by which a matter is 
submitted to a person’s decision, that the intention of the parties was that 
he should hold an inquiry in the nature of a judicial inquiry, and hear the 
respective cases of the parties, and decide upon the evidence laid   before 
him, then the case is one of an arbitration.  
Such a trend was also adopted by the Australian Court as declared by case of Age 
Old Builders Party Ltd v Swintons Pty Ltd;
199 irrespective of the name given to the 
tribunal, the substance of the dispute resolution agreement itself should be looked 
into. If such an agreement gives the umpire a power to exercise a judicial enquiry, 
and requests the umpire to come to the conclusion in accordance with the law not 
only upon his expertise, then the agreement would be most likely an arbitration 
agreement rather than an expert determination.  
The arbitration is usually described as “litigation in the private sector” as it can be 
substituted for a court in the resolution of all disputes that may arise between 
contracting parties, and refers them to one chosen forum for the resolution of all 
their disputes. As a result, being consistent with the presumption of a sensible 
businessman, it would not be practical to draw a precise distinction between 
similar phrases in order to allow a part of the dispute to be outside the jurisdiction 
of the arbitration and allocated to the court.
200 
 
 
Contrary to such a broad delegation, which is given to the tribunal in approaching 
the arbitration process, in practice, in an expert determination a type of dispute or 
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matter that can be referred to the expert for his/her determination is usually 
specified. This, in essence, is most often a factual issue rather than a point of law, 
and leaves the other types of disputes to be resolved by the court.
201 It is often 
used to narrow the question that is to be referred and answered by the expert 
(whether it is an engineer, architect, certifier, etc). In the case of Mercury 
Communications Ltd v Director General of Telecommunications,
202 the license 
agreement was made between Mercury and BT to run telecommunication systems 
under Section 7 of the Telecommunications Act of 1984. This agreement was 
contained in a provision for a review of the terms of agreement if there is a 
fundamental change in the circumstances.  If either party was unable to agree to 
any change, the dispute should be referred to the Director General of  
Telecommunications for his determination. An issue regarding the pilling was 
referred to the Director General and Mercury did not accept his decision on the 
ground of his misinterpretation of the construction of pricing clause. 
The House of Lord held that the dispute was related to the contractual matter and 
would thus be appropriate to subject it to a private action rather than a judicial 
review; however, the license agreement was made by way of statutory power. 
Although the House of Lords held the conclusion that the court should have a 
jurisdiction to determine the proper interpretation of words at issue, and should 
examine the way the expert interprets the provisions of the agreement since the 
matter is a question of construction and therefore of law unless the parties 
expressly agree to exclude the intervention of the court. 
 Further, while arbitration provides an alternative forum to the courts for the 
resolution of all disputes, expert determination is an alternative forum for certain 
kinds of disputes. Thus, this leaves no room for presumption regarding the 
jurisdiction of the expert. The wide and generous approach to jurisdiction taken in 
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arbitrations based is on the presumption that the parties had agreed to refer their 
disputes to the same body, and does not apply to expert determination.
203 
A comparison of the inherent characteristics and application of both arbitration 
and expert determination can be seen in the case of Northbuild Construction Pty 
Ltd v Discovery Beach Project Pty Ltd.
204 The disputants were parties to a 
building contract which has a dispute resolution provision that allowed for 
arbitration or expert determination alternatively, and expressly precluded an 
appointed expert to act as an arbitrator. Under a procedure formulated and 
modified by the expert and agreed to by the parties, the expert is allowed to 
determine matters of fact, law and quantum. IN addition to this, the expert should 
determine how oral evidence was to be taken, which were permitted to be tested 
in cross-examination. The court is to decide whether the expert has power to order 
cross-examination and whether the expert direction changed the nature of 
reference from an expert determination to arbitration. At first instance, the court 
found that the changes made by the parties to the role of the expert did not change 
his nature; in essence, it was only modified to the extent that the authority enables 
a cross-examination. This decision was resisted by the claimant before the Court 
of Appeal (Supreme Court of Quensland) which by majority has come to 
conclusion that the main difference between the arbitration and expert 
determination is that an arbitrator is obliged to act judicially whilst an expert is 
entitled but not bound to act judicially. They held that it was only can be 
considered as an arbitration if the agreement obliged the expert to act in a judicial 
way. Muir JA said that: ‘The characterisation of a particular dispute resolution 
process as one of expert determination or arbitration must be undertaken by 
reference to the intention of the parties as manifested in the governing 
agreements, which provide the basis for resolving all fundamental questions 
concerning the proceedings’. This was dissented by Atkinson J who was of the 
opinion that by approaching a judicial inquiry such as hearing an oral-evidence, 
and conducting cross-examination, the expert had moved towards not relying 
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solely on his own opinion, which in consequence would be in breach of the 
agreement. 
The most important feature of expert determination in the UK legal system is that 
the expert decision should be final and binding. Therefore, it is necessary that the 
expert himself should be specified under the agreement between the parties or at 
least the modality of electing him is clearly mentioned. 
However, the finality of the expert determination process does not oust the 
jurisdiction of the competent court. The court has an ultimate jurisdiction to 
determine the jurisdiction of the expert, although in the case where the parties’ 
agreement authorizes the expert to determine whether he has a jurisdiction to 
determine the dispute
205the court should not be in a worse position than the expert 
to determine his position.
206 
Stay of Court Proceedings 
According to section (9) of the Arbitration Act of 1996, any court proceedings 
that may be taken in breach of an arbitration agreement will grant to another party 
- when a legal proceeding is brought against him - a right to claim to keep such 
proceedings pending a dispute is concluded by the arbitration tribunal. This is a 
compulsory action to be taken by the court unless the arbitration agreement is 
found null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. In the case of 
Al-Naimi v Islamic Press Services Inc,
207 a dispute arose between the parties of 
JCT minor works which contained an arbitration clause. A claimant had 
commenced proceedings claiming payments due for work performed. A defendant 
contended that whilst the contract contained an arbitration agreement, the court 
proceedings must remain and a dispute to be referred to the arbitration in 
accordance with the Arbitration Act. The court found that the disputed had fallen 
within the arbitration agreement contained in the contract. The court then has an 
inherent jurisdiction to bring a temporary halt to court proceedings brought in 
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breach of that agreement. Accordingly, the court decided that such a dispute 
should be submitted to the arbitration and not  be made a matter for decision by 
the court. Therefore, the proceedings remained for arbitration pursuant to section 
(9) of the Arbitration Act of 1996. 
On the contrary to the arbitration process where the court keeps proceedings until 
the dispute is resolved by the arbitration, the expert determination does not have 
the same statuary privilege given to the arbitration. The expert determination in a 
court has a discretion
208 to decide upon each individual case as to whether or not 
to keep a court proceeding in favour of expert determination. The court will 
examine each case individually to find out the most appropriate decision to the 
relevant case to decide whether or not to grant a stay of proceedings, or proceed 
looking into the litigation. In the case of Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty 
Construction Ltd,
209 court proceedings had been commenced despite a term of the 
contract which provided for the initial reference of disputes to a panel of experts; 
thereafter the disputes are to be the subject of arbitration in Brussels. The House 
of Lords held that the court had a discretionary power to keep proceedings 
brought before it in breach of an agreement, and to determine disputes by an 
alternative method. In other cases such as the case of Thames Valley Power Ltd v 
Total Gas & Power Ltd
210and the case of Cott UK Ltd v FE Barber Ltd,
211 
although there was an expert determination agreement, the court for some reason - 
and by using its discretion - refused to keep proceedings and found that it is more 
appropriate to determine the issue rather than to refer it to the expert. For example 
in the case of Bernhard’s Rugby Landscapes Ltd v Stockley Park Construction 
Ltd,
212 the court found that the contract did not make it a precondition to refer a 
dispute to the construction manager for his decision. Therefore, the proceedings 
before the court did not constitute a breach of such an agreement and accordingly 
refused to keep proceedings. Also the court may reject to keep the court 
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proceedings in the case that the agreement signed between parties is an adhesion 
agreement or is included in unusual or onerous terms.
213 However, in other cases 
such as the case of Cable & Wireless Plc v IBM United Kingdom Ltd,
214 where the 
parties had agreed that in good faith they would refer any dispute arising out of 
their agreement through an alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Contrary to this 
provision, a contracting party may start proceedings claiming for compensation 
while the opponent applies to the court to keep the proceedings pending the 
dispute is referred to ADR in accordance to the agreement. The Colman J 
concluded that there was a sufficiently defined mutual obligation upon the parties 
to go through the process of initiating a mediation, selecting a mediator, and 
presenting that mediator with its case and attending any meeting called by the 
mediator. Since the claimant had declined to participate in any such process it was 
in breach of the agreement and the defendant was entitled to an order for the 
proceedings to be adjourned until the parties had referred all their outstanding 
disputes to ADR. Furthermore, in the case of Edward Campbell & Others v Oce 
(UK) Ltd,
215 the court came to the conclusion that since the parties had agreed that 
some matters would be resolved by an expert and others by the courts, the issues 
that have fallen within the expert determination should then be left for him, and 
any proceedings that may have taken before the expert submits his decision would 
remain. 
  Immunity of the expert    
One of the most distinguishable features in the common law system is where a 
judge and arbitrator have been conferred immunity from being suit. With respect 
to arbitration which is regarded as “litigation in private sector” and in accordance 
with section (29) of the Arbitration Act 1996, an arbitrator is not liable for 
anything done or omitted in the discharge or purported discharge of his functions 
as arbitrator unless the act or omission is shown to have been done in bad faith. 
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On contrary to such a privilege that is given to the arbitrators, the expert does not 
have such immunity and may sued for negligence unless otherwise expressly 
agreed by parties.   
The concept of excluding an expert from being immune from suit for negligence 
or tort has been developed over the last century into various stages. In the first 
stage, the English court
216 decided that the rule of immunity should be extended 
not only to arbitrator but to quasi-arbitrator who is appointed to make a valuation 
under a duty to act fairly and to exercise judicial functions impartially between 
the parties in determining the matters specified in the clauses; accordingly, no 
action would lie against him for negligence in the performance of those duties.   
In the next stage, this trend was overruled by the House of Lords in the case of 
Sutcliffe v Thackrah.
217 In this case the Court set the new trend that although it is 
difficult, an architect who was appointed in accordance to a standard form RIBA 
building contract did not have immunity and may be suing for negligence over-
certification unless the architect could show that he was acting as an arbitrator in 
preparing the certificate. This judgment has become a precedent for the expert 
liability for negligence and sets the principle that the law would not afford the 
expert immunity from suit unless he successfully shows that he was acting as an 
arbitrator. It was not far followed by another case that affirmed this concept. In 
the case of Arenson v Casson Beckman Rutley & Co,
218 the House of Lords held 
that a valuer or auditor who appointed as an expert were not exercising any 
judicial or quasi-judicial function therefore, there is no basis to exclude him from 
any liability in case he had acted negligently. 
 
 
 
Enforceability of the expert decision 
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Generally, unlike arbitration the expert decision is not an outcome of a judicial 
test and process and there is no statutory basis to enforce it.  According to the 
section (66) of the Arbitration Act of 1996 the arbitration’s award can be enforced 
by way of application to the court for summary procedure in the same way as if it 
was a court judgment. Therefore, the way of enforcing an expert’s decision is not 
a similar manner to a court judgment or arbitration award. As a result, and 
because of the expert’s decision to come to exist by virtue of contract between the 
parties, the expert’s decision is not enforceable without court action. On the 
ground of enhancing the law of contract, the courts will pursue to hold the parties 
to their agreement to be bound by the expert decision. In the case of Campbell v 
Edwards
219 the court held that where the parties had agreed that the matter to be 
determined by an expert on a final and binding basis and the appointed expert 
gives his bona fide decision, then in accordance with the principle of the law of 
the contract, the parties are bound by the decision which cannot be set aside. Lord 
Denning stood on what he decided in the case of Arenson v Casson Beckman 
Rutley & Co
220and said that:  
It is simply the law of contract. If two persons agree that the price of 
property should be fixed by a valuer on whom they agree, and he gives 
that valuation honestly and in good faith, they are bound by it. Even if he 
has made a mistake they are still bound by it. The reason is because they 
have agreed to be bound by it. 
Therefore, if a loser party rejected to comply with the expert’s decision, then, 
according to a Civil Procedure Rules, Part 24, a successful party should seek a 
summary judgment from the court where a decision is made at an early stage 
based on a swift trail. 
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Jurisdiction and the Finality of Expert Decision 
One of the features that distinguishes the expert determination from the arbitration 
is the capacity of each of them to determine the dispute. The expert determination 
not governed by legislation is a consensual process by which the parties agree to 
specify the roles of the expert and the ambit of his remit. Therefore, unless the 
parties agree otherwise, the expert has a very wide authority and power to choose 
the most suitable and convenient process. The expert is allowed to use his/her 
own knowledge and investigation to examine the facts and matters in a way of 
inquisitorial process rather than the adversarial process. This approach is quietly 
different from the process that is to be taken by the court process. But more 
closely, after the Arbitration Act of 1996 came into existence the approach may 
be taken by the arbitrators. Although the arbitrators are not allowed to decide the 
dispute based on the their own knowledge, the Arbitration Act of 1996 permits the 
arbitrators to take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and law; consequently the 
arbitrators, by such delegation, move towards the inquisitorial process. Such a 
fashion was adopted by the English court while it was trying to differentiate 
between the judicial decision and the expert decision in the case of Bernhard 
Schulte GmbH & Co KG v Nile Holdings Ltd
221 as Cooke J stated that:  
A person sitting in a judicial capacity decides matters on the basis of 
submissions and evidence put before him, whereas the expert, expert 
subject to the express provisions of his remit, is entitled to carry out his 
own investigations, from his own opinion and come to his own conclusion 
regardless of any submissions or evidence adduced by the parties 
themselves.      
In addition, the scope of export jurisdiction needs to be precisely specified in the 
agreement. As a result, the decision of the expert cannot be challenged as long as 
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the expert has done what he/she’s been requested to do and has not departed from 
the parties’ instructions(1).
222   
Nevertheless, and contrary to the arbitrator’s award, the expert decision cannot be 
challenged on the ground that the expert’s decision even was in error with law. 
Unless there is some allegation of fund (1),
223  the expert answered the right 
question in the wrong way as long as he/she performed the task assigned to 
him/her and not answered the wrong question(2).
224 
In the case of Rhodia Chirex Ltd v Laker Vent Engineering Ltd,
225 following a 
termination of contract by the claimant, a dispute had been arisen between the 
parties regarding the value of the termination certificate. The Court of Appeal 
held that the expert had a jurisdiction to determine the dispute and accordingly his 
decision must be final and binding. And, if the parties had had another intention, 
they should be expressly reflected in the contract’s provision. 
It is not unusual that the expert decision - in any occasion or matter - one party, or 
rarely both parties, may be disappointed by its outcome. Although the expert 
usually carries out his function in accordance to the preceding agreement between 
parties, it is meant that actually his decision is not saved from being challenged by 
either party. Nevertheless, resisting the outcome of the expert decision has been 
narrowed by the court to a very limited means. 
 
Expert’s mistake 
Generally, the expert must run his functions in a fairly proper way. Committing a 
mistake by an expert does not simply mean constituting a grounds to challenge 
the expert decision nor striking it out. In the case of Campbell v Edwards,
226 in 
respect with lease agreement, the parties agreed that when the tenant decided to 
                                                           
222 Jones v Sherwood Computer Services Plc [1992] 1 WLR 277. 
223Mercury Communications Ltd v Director General of telecommunications [1996] 1 WLR 48, 
[1996] 1 All ER 575. 
224 Nikko Hotels (UK) Ltd v MEPC Plc [1991] 2 EGLR 103. 
225 [2003] EWCA Civ 1859, [2004] BLR 75. 
226 Campbell (n 218). 148 
 
assign the property, she should firstly offer it to the landlord on the price that 
would be valued by a third party. The agreed third party surveyor had made his 
assessment which was not agreed by the landlord on the basis that it was in excess 
to the other evaluations made by other surveyors. In the Court of Appeal, Lord 
Denning held that a mere mistake does not constitute grounds to resist the 
expert’s decision since the parties had agreed to delegate him to such authority; 
thereafter he gave his opinion honestly and in good faith.   
Furthermore, the court goes on to specify the mistake which may be accepted as a 
reason to resist the expert’s decision when confined with a “manifest error”. In the 
case of Galaxy Energy International Ltd (BVI) v Eurobunker SpA,
227 an 
agreement had been made between the parties for sale of low sulphur fuel oil with 
requiring a certain pour point (3°C) and a quality to be determined by a third party 
inspector. The buyer rejected the inspector’s report on the basis that it did not 
conform to the required specifications stated in the agreement. Accordingly it can 
be amounted to an error that gives them the right to resist the inspector’s report. 
The court held that to challenge the expert decision there must a “manifest error” 
which means, technically, a plain and obvious error. Thomas J decided that the 
finality of the expert decision is usually very important for the whole commercial 
transaction parties (including the contracting parties’ lenders and banks). 
Consequently, the mere mistake does not constitute a ground to challenge the 
expert decision; it needs a “manifest error”. Such an error is to be related to the 
expert decision itself, or to the procedure, and should come up with such a 
decision to be taken into account alongside the technical knowledge while 
examining the expert decision by the court itself. 
What is more, in the case of Dixons Group Plc v Murray- Obodynski,
228 the court 
gave further clarification pertaining to the definition of “manifest error” as it is 
described in the “manifest error” as a plain and obvious error which may be easily 
seen by the eyes or perceived by the minds of the expert. Moreover, it is not an 
error manifested after a massive or extensive investigation and inquiry.  
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Furthermore, in the case of Conoco (UK) Ltd v Phillips Petroleum (unreported, 19 
August 1996)), Morison J did not give any space for any argument regarding 
whether or not the oversight or blunder may or may not affect the ultimate 
decision of the expert. Therefore, in this situation, he would end this case. 
Morison J came to this conclusion while comparing a manifest error to the fraud 
which would absolutely vitiate the final decision regardless of whether or not it 
was affected by the fraud. 
 
 Simon Brown LJ, in the case of Veba Oil Supply & Trading GmbH v Petrotrade 
Inc (The Robin),
229 did not completely agree with the Morison J trend - especially 
the resemblance made between the manifest error and fraud. He found the 
manifest error to be rather different and should not be treated in the same manner 
that it had been applied to the fraud; in the former, it definitely frustrated the 
determination, irrespective of whether it affected the result. However, he 
suggested that the manifest error that wishes to be excluded from resisting is the 
one which is not significantly affected by the final decision and, therefore, he 
would rather recommend to define the manifest error as ‘oversights and blunders 
so obvious and obviously capable of affecting the determination as to admit of no 
difference of opinion’. Nevertheless, in the course of the expert determination it is 
not obvious whether an error of law made by an expert may be counted as an 
excess of his mandate. In the case of Barclays Bank Plc v Nylon Capital LLP,
230 
Nylon Capital was appointed by the Barclays Bank as a fund manager for two 
hedge funds pursuant to a Limited Liability Partnership Agreement (the LLP 
Agreement). A dispute regarding the allocation of profits had arisen prior to any 
formal allocation of profits had been made; Barclays quit the partnership and the 
dispute arose between parties regarding whether Barclays was obliged to pay 
Nylon the profit on its initial capital investment in hedge funds. Barclays asked 
the court for a declaration that it was under no obligation to do so. Nylon sought a 
stay of Barclays claim pending until a dispute determined by an accountant expert 
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according to the terms of the dispute resolution clause of the LLP Agreement 
provided that an independent expert (accountant) was charged with determining 
any dispute regarding profits - including disputes concerning the interpretation of 
any provisions of the LLP Agreement - and his decision is to be final and binding. 
At first instance, the court refused to stay the court proceedings on the ground that 
the dispute did not fall within the expert jurisdiction. This decision was 
challenged before the Court of Appeal which was to consider whether the court is 
able to determine an expert’s jurisdiction before the expert makes such a 
determination himself. The Court of Appeal held that it is an ultimate power for 
the court to determine the jurisdiction of expert and therefore it is in the interests 
of the justice and it is convenient for the court to act first. The courts may 
intervene where there is a dispute solely of law relating to the scope of the 
expert’s mandate. Lord Neuberger in particular believed there was a powerful 
argument for challenging the decision of an expert made on the basis of a mistake 
of law including a mistake as to the interpretation of principles in which the 
expert was meant to make his decision; therefore if a party wants the expert to be 
able to decide questions of law the expert determination clause should be drafted 
expressly to provide for this. Thus, Lord Neuberger's judgments suggests that he 
would perhaps prefer to give parties to an expert determination the same ability as 
those in an arbitration to make representations to the court, and the same rights of 
appeal for errors of law. Such principles were discussed further in the following 
case of Wilky Property Holdings Plc v London and Surry Investments Ltd,
231 
where the judge reminded the parties of the context in which the Court of Appeal 
in case of Nylon had taken it. In the former case (Wilky) where the parties had 
agreed to refer any dispute as to the interpretation of the terms of agreement to an 
independent expert which his decision was to be binding on the parties. An expert 
was appointed after a dispute had arisen between the parties, however, the other 
party commenced CPR Pt 8 proceedings before the High Court which sought a 
declaration regarding the dispute on the grounds that the expert did not have a 
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jurisdiction to determine the issue. The court had to decide whether to stay the 
proceedings pending until the dispute determined by the appointed expert. 
Snowden J disagreed with the perception that the judgment in (Barclays) was 
intending to set a prescriptive rule to that effect that any decision made by an 
expert regarding his jurisdiction would unavoidably be subject to review by the 
court, and therefore it would be wasteful for the expert to look into this issue first. 
He found that the Court of Appeal did not suggest that an expert determination 
was always inappropriate for the resolution of general questions of interpretation. 
Snowden J referred to the recent case law that agreed with the comments in the 
case of Mercury Communications,
232 in which it was said by Hoffmann LJ that ‘in 
question in which the parties have entrusted the power of decision to a valuer or 
other decision-maker, the court will not interfere either before or after the 
decision’, this is would a general approach that to be taken unless “the decision-
maker goes outside the limits of decision-making authority”. He come to 
conclusion that principle and guidance given by the Court of Appeal may help the 
disputants decide an appropriate approach that should be taken ahead of the 
adjourned hearing at which he heard further argument as to whether to exercise 
his discretion to stay the claim. It was also added in the case of Exxonmobil Sales 
and Supply Corp v Texaco Ltd
233 that a manifest error may be shown on the face 
of the determination by an error of arithmetic or by a misplaced decimal point or 
other typographical error.   
As result, a critical concern may arise regarding a clerical error or slip that may be 
included in the expert determination. With respect to the adjudication under the 
HGRC Act of 1996, it is, as we discussed earlier in the Adjudication Chapter, 
where the adjudicator is authorized to correct a clerical errors or arithmetical slip 
that may contained in his decision provided that the correction does not involve 
any second thoughts regarding substantial issues and must be done within a 
reasonable time limitation and without prejudicing any party. The same concept is 
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also expressly adopted in the Arbitration Act of 1996, section 57(3) which gives 
the arbitrators a power to correct or remove any clerical mistake or slip. 
 
 
With respect to the expert determination, it is not as obvious as it is under the 
adjudication or arbitration. In some expert determination cases, such as in the case 
of Gosden v Funnel, 
234 it was considered that an implied term that gives the 
expert a right to correct an admitted slip in a decision - as it most likely exists in 
the adjudication. However, in the case of Soules CAF v Louis Dreyfus Negoce 
SA,
235 it was averred that regarding the international transaction, where a chain of 
sales is commonplace, the valuer who is appointed to the contract that has its own 
procedure dealing with any discrepancies is not allowed to correct the 
acknowledged errors after the elapse of the time limitation. Steel J left open the 
question whether or not correcting an obvious error would be permissible if it is 
discovered within an agreed or reasonable time. 
However, the question may arise as to what extent the court - while examining the 
validity of the expert’s decision - can scrutinize the documents and evidence 
submitted before the expert. In the case of Dixons Group Plc v Murray- 
Obodynski,
236 Bowsher J took the same approach that had been adopted by Potter 
J in the case of Healds Foods Ltd v Hyde Dairies Ltd,
237 as he ascertained not to 
widen the ambit of the court investigation and, in general, the court may not go 
beyond the expert decision itself due to the reasons given by the expert in 
justifying his determination. Nevertheless, such a limited tendency does not mean 
that the court may not have a jurisdiction to consider all the subsequent 
clarifications of the reasons or any other related material.  
Still, is the expert required to provide reason for his decision as it is required by 
the judges in a normal litigation? Generally, it is a matter of an agreement, and it 
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is based upon the pre-agreement between the parties and what they had agreed to 
remit to the expert and whether his requirement by such an agreement provides 
reasoning to his determination or applies a certain mechanism of valuation. For 
example, in the case of Doughty Hanson & Co Ltd v Roe,
238  the court was to look 
into a dispute between shareholders in claimant company. A resignation of  one of 
shareholders a directorship triggering an obligation to give a transfer notice under 
the Article of Association in respect of his shares. The valuation process 
according to these articles was that a shareholders could give a transfer notice that 
specified price would acceptable to it, or a willingness to sell at a third party 
valuation. This would be considered as an offer given to other shareholders for 
their acceptance at the specified price or elect for a valuation. An expert 
(accountants) was appointed to provide an opinion of a “fair value” which was not 
agreed by the seller and therefore he sought to withdraw his transfer notice and 
challenged the experts’ valuation on the grounds that they had departed from their 
instructions by valuing something else other than that which they were supposed 
to adhere to. The court held that the valuation was not open to challenge. Given 
that it was a ‘non-speaking’ valuation, it was not possible to infer how the experts 
had come to their decision and consequently to see whether they had adopted any 
particular approach or taken any particular facts into account. There was no doubt 
that the valuer had valued the correct shares in the correct company. The mistake 
attributed to the expert was not as to the identity (as the only mistake to attack on 
the valuation in accordance with Walker LJ in the Morgan Sindall
239) of either of 
those things, but the attributes that the valuer gave to the company for the 
purposes of his valuation hypotheses. This is was happened following the 
judgment in the case of  Morgan Sindall Plc v Sawston Farms (Cambs) Ltd,
240 
where the Court of Appeal dismissed and ascertained that it is impressible to 
attack the reasons of the determination where there were no reasons given by the 
expert regarding his decision. However, the situation would be treated differently 
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where the parties’ agreement requires the expert to provide reasons for his 
decision. In the case of Halifax Life Ltd v Equitable Life Assurance Society,
241 
pursuant to the agreement between the disputants, the expert was required to 
provide adequate reasons for his determination; therefore, the court had adjourned 
the course of trial until the expert provided the court with detailed reasons of his 
decision for further evaluation by the court. 
 
  Expert Failing to Adhere to his Instructions 
The expert determination, as a technique of amicable dispute resolution, is a 
contractual arrangement which is subject to the terms of its contract and based 
entirely on the parties’ agreement. As such, any attempt to breach, which goes 
beyond its provisions, may lead to invalidate the outcome. 
In spite of the principle discussed in the previous point which states that the mere 
mistakes do not invalidate the expert’s determination, the expert must obey and 
follow his instructions; otherwise, his decision would be most likely considered as 
invalid. 
In the case of Jones v Sherwood Computer Services Plc,
242 an agreement made 
between parties regarding a sale of share capital in the company is a case that is to 
be evaluated in terms of a certain calculation to be carried-out by an independent 
chartered accountant who is running his task as an expert - not as an arbitrator - 
and his decision would be bound and final. 
The expert’s determination was resisted by one party on the basis that the expert 
failed to take certain matters into his consideration when forming his opinion; 
hence his decision is no longer valid. 
The Court of Appeal held that where the parties had agreed to be bound by the 
determination of an independent expert, his decision could not be challenged on 
the grounds that mere mistakes had been occurred in the formation of the decision 
unless it could be proved that the expert had departed from his instructions in 
certain material respects. 
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Such a conclusion did not provide precise criterion to what may or may not be 
considered as a material departure. 
In the case of the Veba Oil Supply & Trading GmbH v Petrotrade Inc (The 
Robin),
243 the expert was consensually engaged to determine the quantity and 
quality of the sold goods (gasoil) at the loading installation in accordance to the 
contractually specified methodology of the test which was known as D 1298. 
Rather than employing such an agreed test methodology, the appointed expert 
used another more accurate and modern test which was known as D 4052. This 
movement was challenged by the buyers on the grounds that the expert had 
materially departed from his instructions and thus the determination is longer 
binding. Brown LJ, after looking at and observing the previous related cases, 
came up with the following rules: 
 
·  The difference between the mistake and the departure from the 
instructions is quite obvious. The mistake can be considered to exist when 
the expert merely moves wrongly through the process while carrying out 
his instructions.   
·  Under the law a mistake may invalidate the expert’s decision if it 
could be proven that a mistake had affected the outcome, which is not so 
in the case of a departure from instructions. 
·  Contrary to committing a mistake, the position of the expert who 
departs from his instructions has not changed under the modern cases. 
Such doctrine has been clearly stated by Lord Denning in the case of 
Campbell v Edwards.
244 
 
·  The test of materiality devised for identifying vitiating mistakes 
does not carry across to the quite separate field of departures from 
instructions. 
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·  Although it was rightly decided in older cases such as Dean v 
Prices
245 and Frank H Wright (Constructions) Ltd v Frodoor Ltd,
246  this is 
must be no longer considered as authoritative with respect to an expert’s 
mistake as it is mostly overturned in Jones v Sherwood Computer Services 
Plc.
247 
 
·  Once the court found there was a material departure from the 
expert’s instruction, it will not take into consideration its impact on the 
ultimate decision of the expert, and the expert’s determination in those 
cases is plainly not binding on the parties.  
Nevertheless, the court held that although a material departure vitiates the expert 
determination irregardless of its effect on the result, any departure will be 
considered material unless that departure was truly trivial and de minimis such 
that it was clear that it could make no possible difference to either party.   
Moreover, Lord Dyson suggested that the best test to judge whether the departure 
from instructions was material or not is to check if the parties would reasonably 
have considered such departure as sufficient to invalidate the expert’s 
determination. 
Fraud and Collusion 
It is very unusual to resist the expert’s determination on the basis of fraud or 
collusion. However, the right to challenge the decision of the expert on the ground 
of fraud or collusion - which may be committed by an expert with the other party 
- is expressly given to the suffered party. Campbell v Edwards
248 is one of the 
leading cases that affirms such ground to vitiate or set aside a decision of the 
expert in the case of perpetrating a fraud or collusion. Lord Denning while 
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examining the expert determination, averred that a fraud or collusion performed 
by the expert reflects his bad faith and could not be forgivable. His decision, 
therefore, would not be binding on the injured party, and he stated that “if there 
were fraud or collusion, of course, it would be very different. Fraud or collusion 
unravels everything”. In an Australian case, Crusader Resources NL v Santos 
Ltd,
249 if it could be proven there was a breach of fiduciary obligation, then the 
outcome of the valuer would be invalid and not binding on the parties. It is also 
averred that the agreement would be validly rescinded for misrepresentation and 
deception. 
Attention must also be drawn to the distinction between expert decision as 
opposed to an arbitration award since it is one of the main differences between the 
expert determination. Although arbitration is regarded as a means of private 
dispute resolution, it is clearly and profoundly organised by the statute.  As a 
result, and with respect to the arbitration award in particular, it sets out the 
mechanism for enforcement of the arbitration award nationally as well as 
internationally. However, the expert determination mechanism does not have the 
same privilege that is given to the arbitration by law, as it does not rule the statute 
nor is it regarded as a result of a judicial examination. Therefore, expert 
determination is less likely to be protected and enforced as arbitration.  
The expert determination as a private dispute resolution method has been set out 
to determine the matter from the fact, and is from a technical point of view rather 
than from a law point of view. 
Furthermore, the outcome of the expert determination process would be agreed as 
being binding and enforceable regardless of its conformity with law as long as the 
expert himself had not departed from his/her instructions.  
Nevertheless, the enforcement of a decision of expert does not have the same 
privilege or power that is given to the award of arbitration or to any decision that 
comes out of judicial evaluation.  
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An expert decision is unlikely to be an award as such; it is more likely to be a 
fact-finding decision, which is thus relevant to the resolution of the dispute 
between parties. Therefore, attention should be drawn to the case where the expert 
mostly has the evaluation regarding the facts, rather than the law point of view 
since the expert’s finding may be used by parties or a concerned tribunal as 
conclusive evidence, or may be against the expert himself in the case that he is 
sued for damages by either party.  
An expert must comply with his jurisdiction according to the terms of reference 
that are agreed by parties. An expert authority shaped and identified in accordance 
with his jurisdiction can give him/her the power to decide on facts and law 
matters, or limit him with technical and fact matters. Thus if an expert goes 
beyond the jurisdiction and the terms of reference, then all the consequences may 
not be readily enforceable. 
According to the case of Jones v Sherwood,
250 the decision of the expert is not 
open to challenge in courts and the court will not look at such matters as long as 
the expert had not departed from his instructions and the evaluation was made in 
accordance with his/her jurisdiction. 
However, according to Australian courts, as in the case of Fletcher Construction 
Australia Limited v MPN Group Pty. Ltd,
251 an agreement to refer both the issues 
of facts conclusively to the technical expert with no legal experience may be 
regarded void as an ouster to the court’s jurisdiction. While he was examining the 
expert determination agreement, Rofle J said:  
The effect of the clause is to make the decision of the expert final and 
binding provided the matters referred to him are ones which the agreement 
contemplates. The expert’s decision is, however, susceptible of attack in a 
Court if there is a failure to comply with the contract or there is some 
vitiating factor relevant to the decision. 
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As a result, if the expert did not do so, then the determination would be more 
susceptible to be resisted; consequently, the court may use its discretion to 
intervene and examine the subject matter. In the case of Campbell v Edwards,
252  
Lord Denning stated:  
It is simply the law of contract. If two persons agree that the price of 
property should be fixed by a valuer on whom they agree, and he gives 
that valuation honestly and in good faith, they are bound by it. Even if he 
has made a mistake they are still bound by it. The reason is because they 
have agreed to be bound by it. If there were fraud or collusion, of course, 
it would be very different. Fraud or collusion unravels everything. 
In the event where the expert was not required to give reasons for his 
determination, the court may not constitute its judgment upon his final on the 
grounds that the evidence ‘properly before the court’ did not include oral evidence 
or justifications by the appointed valuer in the face of resistance from the 
opponent . 
 
Conducting the Process of the Expert 
Generally, similar to any type of an umpire who is engaged to resolve a dispute or 
conflict, there are essential rules that are applied and which govern the conducting 
of expert processing. Although the expert determination process is mildly 
different from the judge and the arbitrator, there are important principles that an 
expert must bear in mind and comply with while carrying out his duty - from the 
outset of the trial until reaching his decision.  
The doctrine of natural justice is the main principle that must be taken into 
consideration by an expert while running the procedure. But to what extent must 
the expert comply with such rules? Is it at the same level that is required by the 
judge in a regular judicial procedure or required by the arbitrator in the arbitration 
trial? 
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In essence, breaching natural justice is one of the most common concerns in the 
field of construction contracts due to the nature of the dual function of the 
architects, engineers and construction managers since they generally carry out a 
dual function - both to act as an agent for their employer and to act independently 
as a decision-maker.  In the case of Scheldebouw BV v St James Homes 
(Grosvenor Dock) Ltd,
253 Jackson J raised such a concern while examining such 
dual functions regarding the appointed construction manager. He ascertained that 
the duties allocated to the construction manager have two separate types of duties 
which require him to act individually and separately for each of them. He had to 
act firstly as an agent for one party in accordance to the principal’s instructions; 
and secondly as an independent certifier (decision-maker) who is required to act 
impartially, fairly and to hold the balance unbiased between the employer and the 
contractor. Jackson J had come to such a conclusion in accordance to some old 
cases which dealt with the matter, and clearly said that:  
the decision-maker is required to act in a manner which has variously been 
described as independent, impartial, fair and honest. These concepts are 
overlapping but not synonymous. They connote that the decision-maker 
must use his professional skills and his best endeavours to reach the right 
decision, as opposed to a decision which favours the interests of the 
employer. 
 
Fairness 
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Generally, anyone who carries out the judicial function, whether it is an 
arbitration or process that so-called “quasi-arbitration”, must act fairly. In the case 
of Sutcliffe v Thackrah,
254 the House of Lord affirmed that when a certifier 
carrying out judicial functions as “decision-maker” for the construction project 
rather than as an agent to the employer, then the functions should be regarded as a 
so-called quasi-arbitration which in turn requires him to act fairly and 
independently from the employer - making a fair balance between the parties. 
Nevertheless, with respect to expert determination, there is no general 
requirement for the rules which natural justices or due process should follow. As 
per the case of Bernhard Schulte GmbH & Co KG v Nile Holdings Ltd,
255 it is 
usually impossible to resist the expert determination on the basis of breach of 
natural justice unless there is an apparent bias on the part of expert; in essence, 
there is no certain standard of fairness that must always be obeyed by the expert. 
In this case, the parties entered into an agreement for purchasing a number of 
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) vessels. In accordance to the provisions of the 
agreement, the price of the vessels may adjust upon the outcome of inspection of 
vessels and any downward adjust to be decided by an expert. An expert was 
nominated by the vessels’ class society to provide his opinion on the certain 
vessels. The expert decided a price reduction for some inspected vessels. The 
claimant requested payment and brought proceedings accordingly to the 
defendant who resisted proceedings on the grounds that the expert had acted 
impartially and did not give them an adequate opportunity to defend their case 
and failed to consider their submissions. The court held that there is no 
requirement for the rules of natural justice or due process to be followed in an 
expert determination for the purpose to have a valid and binding decision. This is 
was averred by the Court of Appeal in the case of Homepace Ltd v Sita South East 
Ltd
256 that each case depends on its particular terms of contract and the appointed 
expert has to carry out his duties in accordance to the express provisions of his 
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merit. In this case, the Court of Appeal refused to enforce an expert's decision 
because he had answered the wrong question. In the judgment, Lloyd LJ noted 
that the enforceability of an expert's determination turns on the terms of the 
agreement under which the determination is made. These terms govern what the 
expert has to decide and the extent to which that decision is binding on the parties.  
In this case, the expert was asked to state whether minerals in a particular area 
were economically recoverable. He considered only those minerals which were 
currently being extracted by one of the parties, rather than all types of minerals. 
The Court of Appeal concluded that the expert had answered the wrong question.  
Therefore, the expert is generally required - to some extent (not actually the 
typical standard of natural justice that is normally applied to the regular judicial 
proceedings) - to heed the rules of natural justice. Comments made by Lloyd LJ 
on the importance of the exact terms of the agreement were reinforced by the 
judge in the case of Owen Pell Ltd v Bindi (London) Ltd.
257 However, this time the 
court was not looking at whether the expert had answered the right question. 
Instead, it had to determine other arguments as to why an expert's determination 
may not be enforceable. In this case the applicant was a building company 
contracted by the respondent to execute various works at its property. The 
applicant left the site before the work was complete and a dispute arose between 
parties regarding the payment of a final account and a deduction amount for the 
defected work.  The expert had been appointed by the RICS under the Agreement 
between the parties that included a term that the parties would be bound by the 
decision of the expert. The appointed expert moved to the site and attended the 
premises and gave detailed written decision in favour of the applicant. The 
defendant did not agree with the expert decision and persisted in its refusal to pay 
for the applicant. This led the applicant to seek an enforcement of the expert’s 
decision according to the Agreement.  The defendant contended that the 
Agreement to refer a dispute to an expert determination, it was actually contained 
an implied provision that the decision of expert was only enforceable if free from 
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gross or obvious error or perversity in its decision as well as that the expert acted 
partiality and on perceived bias on a number of occasions and in consequence the 
expert’s conclusions contained “gross and obvious errors” and were perverse.  
The expert’s determination was challenged on the basis that the expert had failed 
to act fairly in accordance with principles of natural justice. It was argued that 
there was an implied provision that the expert must comply with. In terms of the 
rules of natural justice being unbiased, it should not give an appearance of being 
biased. Kirkham J decided that the term for applying natural justice would not be 
implied in the contract. The judge also found that there was no evidence showing 
that the expert had acted against the challenger party, or that he was influenced by 
partiality or prejudice in reaching his decision. The court found that there was no 
evidence of real bias and by applying the test in Porter v Magill,
258 decided that a 
fair-minded and informed observer would not conclude that there was a real 
possibility that the expert was biased. 
 
Impartiality   
Principally, everyone is entitled to a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal. With 
respect to the litigation and arbitration, as it is very rare to prove there is an 
actual-bias, the court has adopted the principle that the only appearance of 
partiality in proceedings is quite enough to invalidate the judgment.
259 However, 
in the process of an expert determination there is different and more stringent 
requirements to disqualify the expert’s determination, and to prove that there is an 
actual partiality that had been conducted by the expert. In accordance with the 
case of Barber v Kenwood
260, proving actual partiality requires evidence of actual 
influence by partiality proving the implied or actual prejudice in acting against 
one party or in favour of the other one. Therefore, due to the nature of the expert 
function, an expert is not strictly required to treat parties equally.  
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In the case of Midland Montagu Leasing (UK) Ltd v Tyne & Wear Passenger 
Transport Executive and Ernst & Whinney,
261 although the expert had held a 
meeting and communication with one party without the presence of the other, the 
court did not invalidate the expert’s determination on the basis of partiality. 
However, the court emphasised that the expert should act impartially and keep 
himself aloof from discussion. In the two cases which were discussed in the 
previous paragraph (Macro and Bernard) it was affirmed that it is required to 
prove that an actual or conscious bias had been conducted by the expert - not only 
the apparent bias to justify a disqualifying of his determination. Nevertheless, the 
court in the case of Owen
262 has given, in a very rare case, some space to imply 
the obligation of apparent impartiality in the process of expert determination in 
the case that the expert had no relationship with either party. 
In essence, as the expert is appointed as a valuer or appraiser and is required to 
ascertain a matter and prevent a dispute rather than a judicial arbiter who is 
required to settle a matter, he is not obliged to carry out an enquiry that is worked 
out in a judicial manner. Therefore, it is unnecessary for the expert to hear 
evidence, and the parties are to determine judicially between them. The expert’s 
decision typically would be made through specialist knowledge or skill, and rely 
on his own investigation from his own opinion to come to his own conclusion 
irregardless of any submissions or evidence rendered by the parties
263. 
Nevertheless, in some particular cases - and upon to the contract itself and the 
expert’s instructions and depending on individual situations - the expert may be 
required to some extent to hear the evidence adduced by the parties
264. 
 
Expert Evidence under Kuwaiti Law 
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Expert witnesses play an important role in legal proceedings by sharing their 
expert knowledge of a particular specialist field. In doing so the expert witnesses 
help the tribunal interpret the factual evidence it has heard and understand all of it 
its application. 
As a result, the general purpose of expert evidence pertains to facts and not as 
much to law . Therefore, with particular respect to the construction of the 
contract, expert evidence is not appropriate to assist the court to interpret the 
terms of the contract, nor is it appropriate to for advising the court as to whether a 
particular head of claim is admissible. 
With respect to the construction industry, the expert evidence becomes highly 
relevant as it relates to the majority of - if not all of - cases, primarily in order to 
express his/her opinion regarding matter in the construction contract. 
In accordance with the Kuwaiti Evidence Law No.39 of 1980 and the Law of 
Rules of Expert Evidence No.40 of 1980, the means of evidence in the civil 
procedure are limited with seven tools that are prioritized in certain categories. 
One means of evidence is the expert witnesses. Due to the importance of the 
expert witnesses in civil litigation (and in criminal procedural as well) the Kuwaiti 
legislator gives a special treatment through issuing an individual enactment that 
only deals with rules of the expert witnesses. 
Different from the process that governs the expert witnesses in the English legal 
system, the law of expert witnesses in Kuwaiti sets the rules for how or where the 
court may be obliged to consider the expert to assist persons or parties looking for 
the most appropriate valuation or assessment of the dispute in a certain field of 
expertise that the court could not conclude it solely without assistance from a 
professional specialised expert. 
 
Features of Expert Witnesses under Kuwaiti Law 
 
•  Generally the court is fully authorised, and it is up to its discretion to 
decide whether the expert witnesses are necessary in order to reach an informed 166 
 
judgment on the facts. The court is not obliged to accept either litigant’s 
application to instruct an expert witness for his/her opinion. 
•  The court has an ultimate jurisdiction to regard the expert witness’s 
opinion as a whole, or dismiss it partially or as a whole. 
•  If the court decides to take into consideration the opinion of the expert 
witnesses, then it should include it in its judgment as an essential part of the 
judgment and its reasons.  
•  The competent court can call an expert other than whom the litigants 
identified, or reject the application of parties to call another expert. 
•  And the court is not required to stick with the opinion of the parties’ 
selected expert and its discretion to measure and select between the experts’ 
opinions. 
 
Admissibility of the Expert Witness 
Generally, contrary to other comparative civil law systems, the Kuwaiti court is 
fully authorised to overrule the opinion of the expert. The court is not required to 
contend the opinion of the expert or to give any justification for dismissing an 
expert opinion.  
Such jurisdiction reflects the power of the court. In general, where there are 
matters of issue before the court which requires expertise for their observation, 
analysis or description, the court may apply for aid regarding the expertise which 
it concerns. However, the court is not obliged to accept an application to pursue 
the aid of concerned expertise. 
As a result, where the court does so and calls for an expert, the court is then 
completely delegated to specify all the aspects and restrictions of the expert’s 
duty, such as the extent of an expert’s role, time limitation, or oral or written 
opinion. 
In addition, the court may, at any stage of the trial, change the scope of the expert 
either by expanding or narrowing his role, time duration or any other important 
matter. 167 
 
The court may also apply for aid of expert at any stage of the trial, whether in the 
beginning, middle or even at the final stage - as long as the court has not come to 
its conclusion.  
Contrary to the other civil law jurisdiction systems, neither the Kuwaiti Court of 
Cassation nor the Kuwaiti legislators expressly limit such power or jurisdiction. 
However, there are implied exemptions that may be conceived of by some rules 
scattered over other laws which require the tribunal to seek the aid of specific 
sciences or faculties. For instance, the court is required to call for an assistance of 
an expert in a medical matter regarding medical expertise, such as the provisions 
of Articles (91-97) of the Kuwaiti Labour Law. Such Laws require the court to 
refer an injured employee to a specialized medical committee to examine his case, 
including the percentage of his disability, in order to calculate his compensation. 
Furthermore, although litigants have been granted by the Law of Expert Witness   
to agree upon a specific expert, the court still has the discretion to call the agreed 
expert or another one, provided that it gives reasonable justification for such a 
decision. 
Additionally the court, according to the Article (16) of the Law of Expert Witness 
and its discretion and jurisdiction, has full authority to discuss with the expert(s) 
his/her conclusion regardless of the matter (i.e., technical or legal). 
The Roles of the Expert 
Due to the importance of expert witnessing due to the tribunal’s reliance upon the 
opinion of an expert witness, a body of rules and legal principles have developed 
which regulate the manner of how the expert conduct’s himself. 
 
 The most important rules and principles are found in the Law of Expert Witness 
and the Kuwaiti Court of Cassation, which are the rules that apply to the conduct 
of the expert witness. These rules can be summarised as follows: 
 
•  The expert should be, and should be seen to be, independent and not 
influenced by others. 168 
 
•  The expert is required to provide independent assistance to the court by 
way of an objective unbiased opinion. 
•  The expert must consider and identify all material facts upon which the 
opinion is based or detracted. 
 
•   He/she should not look into any issues that fall outside his/her expertise 
and should inform the court if he/she does so. 
•  If the expert needs any judicial assistance, he should call the court for such 
assistance if the concerned parties resist to do it voluntary. 
•   The expert must be open as to the way in which he/she has reached the 
opinion, so that it may be understood and challenged. 
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Chapter Six 
Mediation 
What is Mediation? 
Conflicts commonly arise between two or more corporations or groups when their 
interests or needs become incompatible; at such a point, an intervention is 
inevitably required to settle the conflicts, which is a regular occurrence in life.
265  
Mediation is plainly defined as a process conducted by an independent third party 
in a strictly confidential manner where the objective is to assist the parties in 
resolving their dispute. The outcome of successful mediation is a deed of 
agreement that is accepted by all disputants.
266 
Mediation is the use of a third party intervention to assist the parties in a dispute 
through facilitating in their reaching an agreement which, unaided, they may 
never reach, or may reach but much later in the dispute where both parties have 
lost much.
267 
The essence of mediation is the common-sense idea of a ‘shuttle diplomacy’, 
whereby disputants invite an experienced, independent, neutral third party to 
assist disputants in their disagreement via a negotiation in an amiable and less 
aggressive or defensive way rather than an adversarial way.
268  The Centre for 
Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR) has defined mediation as ‘a flexible process 
conducted confidentially in which a neutral person   actively assists parties in 
working towards a negotiated agreement of a dispute or difference, with the 
parties in ultimate control of the decision to settle and the terms of resolution’.   
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The idea of mediation is to enable people to talk to each other in a way of good 
will and with a problem-solving objective; to clear up misunderstandings; to fill 
gaps; to clarify difficulties; and to facilitate negotiation by bringing realism and 
objectivity to a dispute.
269 It is open to the mediator, when in a private caucus 
meeting with one or more parties, to ask searching questions designed to 
encourage parties to face-up to issues and difficulties in the dispute. 
Mediation is an extremely effective method by which parties to commercial 
disputes can resolve their differences without going through the cost and 
disruption of a lengthy trial. These objectives were judicially emphasized by the 
courts such as in the case of Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust.
270 
Regarding this, Dyson LJ said: 
We recognize that mediation has a number of advantages over the court 
process. It is usually less expensive than litigation which goes all the way 
to judgment… Mediation provides litigants with a wider range of solutions 
than those which are available in litigation: for example an apology; an 
explanation; the continuation of an existing professional or business 
relationship perhaps on new terms; and an agreement by one party to do 
something without any existing legal obligation to do so. 
The mediation agreement addresses the issues with a mutually acceptable 
solution, and is structured so that it is not necessarily based on the underlying 
legal rights or obligations, but rather is structured in a way that helps to maintain 
the relationship of persons involved. With the assistance of mediation the parties 
may reach the most appropriate solution that is acceptable to all parties in the 
dispute, so they may tailor a solution or a combination of solutions in order to 
meet their needs and interests.
271  
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Mediation is mostly a management of other people’s negotiations or contentions 
and the mediator is a manager of negotiation. The parties will maintain control 
over the dispute and its settlement, and the mediator will be responsible for 
organizing the arguments regarding issues to be settled. A more coherent and 
organized process will help parties reach an agreement in a timely and cost-
efficient manner.
272 The mediator is in charge of the process, while the parties are 
in charge of the results. 
Mediation is essentially a technique for an alternative dispute resolution that is 
closest to the negotiation’s meaning rather than a dispute determination. 
Generally, a mediator assists parties to understand each other, clarifying an 
ambiguity and removing obstacles to help them find their own solution 
(facilitative mediation). In some cases, mediators may introduce a view of the 
merits regarding what might be a fair or reasonable solution, where all the parties 
agree to delegate the mediator to do so (the ‘evaluative mediation’). Then, as a 
facilitator or evaluator a mediator may become much closer to each side of the 
type of mediation in accordance to what parties had agreed upon, and to the extent 
of their delegation. 
Facilitative Mediation (Interest Based) 
In this way of managing the dispute resolution, a mediator does not give an 
opinion on the issues. A facilitator mediator assists the disputants to explore the 
most appropriate options. The mediator asks the questions, validates and 
alleviates the parties’ claims, and tries to lighten the negotiation environment, 
searching for the interests behind the positions and assists the parties in finding 
the outcome by themselves from the interests’ point of view, rather than the rights 
and obligations. The facilitator mediator does not give any recommendations nor 
advises or predicts the outcome of the final resort tribunal. However, some 
commentators find such a criteria as ‘interest-based’ to be deceptive as many 
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facilitative mediators may also consciously or unconsciously focus on legal rights 
and obligations and the predicted results in case of not reaching an agreement.
273 
In such a manner of mediation, disputants and their representatives will play an 
objective role in the process in persuading each other while the mediator’s roles 
will be restricted to managing the process and helping the disputants to 
understand each other. Indeed, the facilitative mediator - by influencing and 
leading the process - would make the negotiations between the parties more 
amiable and comfortable, which consequently enables the mediator to utilize the 
parties’ own efforts to formulate their resolution.
274 However, facilitative 
mediators should not deliberate or judge the merits of the issues. 
The facilitator mediator should be an expert, highly talented in the process of 
dispute resolution and negotiation rather than an expert in the field of disputed 
matters. Conciliation is sometimes used as an alternative term for the facilitative 
mediation, as it involves neutral third party intervention. It is the neutral third 
party’s role to distinguish between conciliation and mediation as it may be shown 
as a continuum. 
Evaluative Mediation (Right Based) 
In such a way of dispute resolution method, a mediator - by figuring out the 
strengths and weaknesses of the parties’ cases - predicts what the final resort 
tribunal would possibly decide, and assists in reaching a resolution.  Evaluative 
mediators exert more influence over the process, and in trying to re-open the 
communication between disputants, searches for the most appropriate options and 
ultimately provides his recommendations in settling the dispute. The evaluative 
mediator relies on his/her expertise and specialist field more than his/her skills. 
He is usually a lawyer or legal expert that focuses on the parties’ rights and 
obligations, and provides them with his opinion on such a basis; he might also act 
as an expert regarding the disputed issues who can also provide the disputants 
with his opinion according to the normal rules and practices of the field. 
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 The evaluative mediator approaches the process by assessing the parties’ 
positions in accordance to the facts and applicable laws and regulations and gives 
his opinion accordingly. He makes it look like an early neutral evaluation (ENE), 
and the non-binding judicial appraisal or expert opinion carries on an initial 
assessment of the facts whilst measuring the evidence presented to the situation. 
This in turn helps the parties to anticipate what their future position would be in 
case the dispute goes to the final resort of dispute resolution - litigation or 
arbitration.
275 
Essentially, the evaluative mediator could not approach such a way of managing 
the mediation without prior consent of the parties since they may stipulate that the 
mediator should give his opinion in a caucus meeting rather than an open meeting. 
Moreover, sometimes he/she may not be allowed to express their opinion on the 
merits of the dispute or provide a clear indication of the possible outcome as it 
may raise a dispute regarding his malpractice which may occurr due to a shortage 
of information, facts and documents.
276 Nevertheless, some interested parties, e.g. 
disputants, commentators, mediators and judiciary people prefer this form of 
mediation due to its speed and decisiveness. The Law Society’s Code of Practice 
provides that:  
While impartiality is fundamental to the role of the mediator, this does not 
mean that a mediator may never express a comment or view that one party 
may find more acceptable that another. However, the mediator must not 
allow his or her personal view of the fairness or otherwise of the substance 
of the negotiations between the parties to damage or impair his or her 
impartiality. The mediator must appreciate that his or her involvement in 
the process is inevitably likely to affect the course of the negotiations 
between the parties… this would be the case whether the mediator 
intervenes directly or whether he or she deals with issues directly, for 
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example, through questions. Consequently, all mediator intervention needs 
to be conducted with sensitivity and care in order to maintain impartiality. 
The mediator and the parties should agree, as far as practicable, at the outset 
whether the mediator’s role will be purely facilitative, or whether the mediator 
may at his or her discretion provide an evaluative element based on his/her 
knowledge of the subject matter or legal issues involved. 
The mediator should not impose his/her preferred outcome on the parties. The 
mediator may suggest possible solutions and help the parties to explore these 
options. 
Transformative Mediator 
In practice, it is not completely right that the mediation is only limited with the 
previous mentioned approach (facilitative and evaluative). Mediation does not 
have a rigid process to be followed, like litigation or arbitration, and therefore it is 
not required to strictly follow a specific approach of either facilitative or 
evaluative mediation. An approach that falls in between these common forms of 
mediation is a transformative mediation that focuses on the process and considers 
it as important as the outcome of the resolution itself. As a result, transformative 
mediation is more close to the facilitative mediation rather than evaluative. It is 
mainly based on the identification of the opportunities that are possible for 
empowerment and recognition, and how it can be reflected in the outcome of the 
negotiation in order to maintain the relationship between parties as much as 
possible.  
As a result, mediators usually use various techniques to assist disputants to have 
an informative and productive dialogue which may help them understand each 
other and to run a successful negotiation. This very much depends on the 
mediator’s skill and training, where he should be well trained in negotiation 
techniques, and understand how to break any deadlock that may be faced as well 
as having an understanding of the commercial and technical aspects of the 
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Most of the dispute resolution institutions offer various means of training and 
teaching that help mediators become more constructive with conflicts, and more 
skilled with running and managing negotiations and dialogues.  
Since mediation began to be utilized as a means of an alternative dispute 
resolution for various type of fields - especially in the construction field - it has 
become very successful and considered by high-expertise observers to be an 
efficient integral part of the legal process.
277 Most of the commercial field comes 
to rely upon the mediation rather than litigation as the primary means for 
peacefully resolving disputes.
278 
The Benefits of Mediation for the Construction Industry  
Cost Saving  
The main object of mediation and other ADR is to mitigate the expenses of the 
litigation. Due to the complexity of construction projects, a dispute that arises out 
of one requires the involvement of experts and lawyers which may in turn exceed 
the amount of judgment itself. According to the experience of one of the 
mediators, the cost of the experts and lawyers approached 11 million with no 
settlement expected, which led the disputant to settle the case amid trial with a 
great deal of pain.
279 On contrary, it is proven that mediation is cost-effective and 
avoids the high cost of litigation or decreased productivity due to unresolved 
disputes. 
 
 
Time 
The mediation is an informal process that can be arranged very quickly. Typically 
a resolution can be reached within a minimum amount of sessions, and can be 
held within a matter of days or weeks from the date of agreement to being the 
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process of mediation. As the settlement conforms to the wishes of parties rather 
than being confined by the elements of judiciary requirements, mediation often 
lasts for one day to reach a settlement. 
Business Collaboration 
In the construction projects, parties usually focus on building a strong partnership 
that enables them to keep projects going under their own momentum. A non-
adversarial dispute resolution, such as mediation, would help to preserve ongoing 
business relationships between parties rather than a litigation or arbitration.   It is 
a win-win means of settlement since all participants participate in the resolution, 
and everyone has a vested interest in the outcome as well as a stake in its success. 
It is a foreseen expectation that if the parties would be satisfied with the outcome 
of the resolution, their business relationships would remain active and strong.  
Main Features of Mediation 
To achieve the objective of utilizing the mediation as an amicable dispute 
resolution, disputants must feel comfortable to speak openly and unimpeded about 
any of their needs, concerns and/or interests. Parties are usually concerned about 
their issues being aired in public, in particular where it involves confidential 
business information; accordingly, they are interested in being ensured that what 
they say and disclose - within all stages of the mediation - will be treated as 
strictly confidential, and will not be used or produced before any judicial or 
arbitral proceedings.
280  
Furthermore, whenever the mediator is with a party in private caucus, whatever is 
said is never revealed to the other side unless the party and the mediator expressly 
agree to transmit particular information, e.g. when one party wishes to make an 
offer to the other party. This means that each party can be honest with the 
mediator about how they see the case, including their view of the weaknesses in 
their own position. Only when the mediator is privy to such information is he be 
able to work most effectively. 
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Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is to be operated in two stages. First, confidentiality would be 
applied between the parties themselves and their advisors, protecting them from 
third party knowledge of what they disclose or reveal in all sessions. Secondly, 
confidentiality must also be applied between the parties and the mediator himself, 
whether the information was disclosed in private sessions or caucuses, and should 
not be produced or disclosed to any other party without prior clear consent.
281  
Confidentially is vital and is the most important and attractive feature of 
mediation to its users, which makes it much more workable than the other 
comparative means of alternative dispute resolution.  
Obligations on the parties and the mediator to treat what is revealed in mediation 
as confidential are usually found in all mediation agreements. Generally, the court 
upholds confidentiality in the interest of concerned parties and does not allow the 
production of any evidence without an express consent of parties except where 
such information would be necessary for the interest of justice.  
In the case of Farm Assist Ltd (in Liquidation) v Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs,
282 the court was to consider an application 
by a mediator - who had led a successful mediation between the disputants - to set 
aside a summons issued by the defendant seeking her to provide evidence at the 
trail of action following the mediation.  
A settlement agreement had been agreed between disputants following the 
successful mediation. A long time after the settlement was reached, the claimant 
had gone into liquidation and claimed that the settlement agreement should be set 
aside on the grounds that they were subjected to the economic duress during the 
mediation proceedings.  The defendant (the Secretary), in its defence, wanted the 
mediator to give evidence and a witness statement together with the release of any 
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notes or papers provided to her from the mediation process. Although the 
claimant did not object to such an application, the mediator refused to comply 
with the defendant’s request on the basis of the confidentiality provisions of the 
mediation agreement. Then, the defendant served a witness summons to the 
mediator seeking her presence at the trial of the action. 
The mediator applied to the court to have the witness summons set side on the 
grounds that according to the mediation agreement between the mediation and all 
the parties, not only the mediator but also the other parties are obliged to keep 
confidential all information, and documents produced or disclosed during the 
mediation process, including all the parties, are barred from calling the mediator 
as a witness in any future trials. In addition, any notes, papers, documents or other 
evidence produced for, or arising in relation to, the mediation were legally 
‘privileged’. 
With respect to ‘confidentially’, Ramsey J found that the obligation to keep 
confidential all matters produced or discussed during mediation proceedings was 
binding on the parties and the mediator. This obligation could not be ordinarily 
waived by the parties themselves without the consent of the mediator. However, 
taking into consideration previous cases and authorities on the matter, Ramsey J 
held that such exceptions could be made to this general rule, particularly where it 
is in the interests of justice and for the fair disposal of the case.  
Furthermore, in dismissing the application of the mediator to set aside the witness 
summons,  Ramsey J found that the provisions of confidentiality in the mediation 
agreement - which prevent the mediator from being called as a witness - was 
applicable only in relation to ‘the dispute’.  And according to his judgment, the 
matter before him was not ‘the dispute’ which had been the subject matter of the 
original mediation, but an entirely different dispute as to whether the claimant had 
been subjected to the economic duress during the mediation process. By having 
found such a distinction, the parties were not barred from the confidentiality 179 
 
provisions of the mediation agreement from calling the mediator as a witness in 
this case. 
Without Prejudice 
 Under the English legal system, it is required, as a matter of general public 
policy, for the application to contain certain rules requiring discovery and 
disclosure of documents in civil proceedings. These have been carried through 
according to the Civil Procedure Rules. The purpose of the disclosure of 
documents is to provide the concerned parties with relevant documentary material 
before a trial, thus helping them in assessing the strength or weakness of their 
respective cases and providing for the disposal of proceedings before or at the 
trial. 
Nevertheless, the obligation to disclose documents is subject to exceptions, where 
documents of certain categories may be privileged from being disclosed. For 
instance, the content of discussion and the communications of a party and its 
lawyers or advisors - whether for the purpose of legal consultation or in 
connection with proceedings - are privileged from disclosure.   
In the previous case Ramsey J also noted that there was an overlapping and 
unfortunate tendency for the words of ‘confidential’, ‘privileged’ and without 
prejudice’ to be used in conjunction when  referring to the rules which apply to 
the conduct of mediations. Therefore, it is important to consider each term 
separately. 
Regarding the term ‘without prejudice’ privilege, Ramsey J cited Kirkham J in the 
case of Cumbria Waste Management Ltd v Baines Wilson (A Firm),
283 in which 
she stated that there was a long line of authorities encouraging the parties to settle 
disputes through ‘without prejudice’ communications and mediation, which 
accordingly the courts would be slow to find exceptions to the rule of the term 
‘without prejudice’. 
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‘Without prejudice’ plays a very important and critical role in the success of any 
mediation and ADR. It is a principle that provides parties with the environment in 
which arguments, suggestions and documents can be freely exchanged among 
parties during the mediation process and treated as privileged and would be 
conducted on the same basis as without prejudiced negotiations in an action in the 
courts or similar proceedings. So, the main purpose of ‘without prejudice’ 
privilege is to enable parties to negotiate without risk of their proposals being 
used against them if the negotiations fail. Documents exchanged between parties 
during the course of negotiations when attempting to settle the disputed matters, 
whether or not labeled ‘without prejudice’, may be privileged from disclosure 
during subsequent proceedings. The underlying rule is that parties should be 
encouraged so far as possible to settle their disputes without resort to litigation 
and should not be disheartened by the concern that anything produced in the 
course of negotiations may be used to their prejudice in any subsequent legal 
proceedings. 
 
In the case of Cutts v Head,
284 Fox LJ said that: 
As to public policy it obviously is desirable to facilitate compromise rather 
than forcing the parties to litigate to the end, but to achieve a compromise 
one of them has to make an offer. He might be apprehensive that his offer 
might be used against him if the negotiations failed, so he would make his 
offer ’without prejudice’ to his position if the offer was refused. 
The term ‘without prejudice’ has been examined by the English courts in a 
different aspect. For example in the case of Rush & Tompkins Ltd v Greater 
London Council,
285 the Court of Appeal had reviewed a different sense of 
exception which applied to ‘without prejudice’. In this case the claimant was the 
main contractor to carry out work under a contract with the defendant who was 
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the owner. Following a claim by one of the subcontractors, the claimant came to a 
compromise agreement with the defendant according to the liability of the 
defendant in order to pay any sum which the claimant was liable to pay to its 
subcontractor. Disputants had entered into a compromise agreement under which 
the defendant paid a sum of money to the claimant who was responsible for 
meeting all the subcontractors’ claims. One of the subcontractors applied for 
specific discovery of ‘without prejudice’ correspondence regarding the 
negotiation of the compromise between the main parties and how the whole 
settlement had been arrived at and in particular how his own claim had been 
evaluated. In the first instance, the court refused the order to disclose the 
correspondence between parties on the basis that it was a ‘without prejudice’ 
correspondence and therefore privileged from disclosure. It was overruled by the 
Court of Appeal where it held that a privilege from disclosure would be ceased 
when the negotiation ‘without prejudice’ complete and came to fruition in a final 
agreement.  The Court of Appeal set the following guidelines regarding ’without 
prejudice’: 1) the main purpose of the ’without prejudice’ privilege is to give the 
parties opportunity to negotiate without fear that their correspondence may be 
used against themselves if the negotiation failed; 2) it is possible for the parties to 
use the label of ’without prejudice’ on their correspondence, although there is no 
final settlement has been reached. For example, on the issue of the parties’ 
liability as to costs; 3) the ’without prejudice’ privilege will enable a party to 
make statements and correspondence which cannot afterwards be used as 
evidence against him in the course of any litigation. Therefore, such privilege 
would be limited to the circumstances that the documents include statements that 
might be considered as admissions of liability; 4) use of ’without prejudice’ too 
liberally may give rise to a situation where a party is precluded from relying upon 
a letter which contains no material admissions against its interest but rather 
helpful statements which that party might benefit from disclosure.  
Nevertheless, the question may arise regarding the documents prepared for the 
purpose of negotiation, whether it is necessary to be labelled ’without prejudice’ 182 
 
in order to have be privileged from disclosure in subsequent proceedings. In the 
case of Schering Corp v Cipla Ltd,
286 the court was to assess - on a reasonable 
basis - the intention of the producer of the document whether or not to be part of 
or to promote negotiation. The defendant in this sent a letter to the claimant 
labelled ‘without prejudice’ stating that it wished to launch a product but it was 
aware of the claimant’s patent in relation to such a product, and would not like to 
face any confrontation without seeking a commercial solution. It was mentioned 
in the letter that no response to this letter within a specific time would be 
considered since there is no confrontation; accordingly, it would proceed as 
deemed appropriate.  The claimant did not respond but alternatively commenced 
the proceeding alleging patent infringement based upon the contents of the letter. 
The defendant, by resisting this allegation, argued that the contents of the letter 
were to be treated as privileged, and that being the case, the claimant had no 
material that it could rely upon for its action. The court was to examine the letter 
as whether it was a negotiation document and therefore should be treated as a 
privileged document or not. The court was to take into account the approach taken 
by the Court of Appeal in some authorities; in the case of Standrin v Yenton 
Minster Homes,
287 the court stated that: 
 The principle to be derived from these authorities, if it can be called a 
principle, is that the opening shot in negotiations may well be subject to 
privilege where, for example, a person puts forward a claim and in the 
same breath offers to take something less in settlement…but where the 
opening shot is an assertion of a person’s claim and nothing more than 
that, then prima facie it is not protected.  
Additionally, in the case of Cutts v Head
288 the court affirmed that: “a) the 
heading ’without prejudice’ does not conclusively or automatically render a 
document so marked privileged; b) If the privilege is claimed but challenged, the 
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court can look at a document so headed in order to determine its nature; c) 
Privilege can attach to a document headed ’without prejudice’ even it is an 
opening shot”.  
Following these principles, the court was able to determine whether or not the 
communication was bona fide and whether it intended to be part of or to promote 
negotiations. To determine that, the court had to work out what was the intention 
of the offer and how it would be understood by a reasonable recipient and to 
examine all the factors and circumstances that provide the indication of how the 
parties intended their document to be treated, and the court should not only be 
limited with the label of ’without prejudice’ as conclusive evidence. 
 
 
Mediation against Litigation 
Mediation as a way of an alternative dispute resolution is strongly encouraged by 
the courts either before, or during, the litigation process. The court may, in certain 
events, stay proceedings for the favor of mediation and also may penalize the 
costs on a party who refuse to participate in mediation. 
Agreement to Agree and Negation in Good Faith 
What would happen if a provision in the agreement contains an undertaking by 
the parties to enter into good faith negotiations to resolve any conflicts? 
In the case of Willis Management (Isle of Man) Ltd v Cable & Wireless Plc,
289 the 
appeal had come before the Court of Appeal against the decision of the first 
instance judgment declaring that a binding agreement had been concluded 
between the parties regarding the appellant’s acceptance of liability for the 
conduct of its employees. Under a management agreement, the appellant was 
employed by the respondents as an underwriting manager. Some of the 
                                                           
289 [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 597.  184 
 
appellant’s employees had allegedly entered into a fraudulent scheme to divert 
premium income from the respondents to companies which they beneficially 
owned.  
Respondents commenced proceedings against these individuals claiming 
damages. As a direct manager, the appellant agreed to cooperate with 
investigation and provide them with all information that may help them assess the 
claim. The respondents intimated to the appellant to be liable for its employees’ 
breach of duty and the appellant accepted the legal responsibility for such acts and 
would not argue the facts. However, there would need to be a mechanism - such 
as arbitration or mediation - agreed between the parties to quantify the extent of 
its liability since it concerned the ‘deep pocket’ defendant such that they might 
have to pay the whole of the loss. After further negotiations, the appellant signed 
and returned a letter put forward by the respondents with a covering email saying 
that the acceptance of legal responsibility was intended to be an undertaking of 
full responsibility for the damages suffered, but in effect was an acceptance of a 
share in them which the parties were agreeing to negotiate at a later stage in good 
faith. The effect of those exchanges came before the court. The appellant argued 
that such exchange documents were no more than the agreement to agree which 
required further discussion and agreement between the parties. Therefore, there 
was no binding agreement between the parties because it lacked certainty. The 
court at first instance found that the parties had agreed that the appellant would be 
responsible for a ‘fair’ share of loss and there was no difficulty in the courts 
determining what that ‘fair’ share should be. Therefore, the court held that the 
agreement was quite certain enough to be enforced. The appellant challenged the 
award on the basis that as long as the parties had not agreed yet the extent of its 
liability which was the subject of their negotiations, then no certainty comes to 
exist between the parties and consequently there is no binding agreement but 
merely an agreement to agree. The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant’s 
submissions. It was clear to Tuckey LJ that the agreement that the parties had 
made intended that the parties would discuss and agree the way in which the 185 
 
appellant share of liability would be determined and the parties never did so. 
Moreover, up to that time the agreement was incomplete in an essential issue.   
Although the parties’ exchange described the appellant’s share as a ‘fair’ share, 
there was no suggestion in the agreement that the parties intended for the court to 
determine the matter. The Court of Appeal came to the conclusion that although 
the court must strive to give legal effect to what the parties have agreed, an 
agreement to agree an essential term or terms was not an agreement which could 
be held to be binding upon the parties. 
Furthermore, the debate may come to surface according to the enforceability of an 
agreement to enter into good faith to resolve essential terms for the making of a 
contract. 
It is usually difficult, at the end of any negotiation, to figure out whether the 
termination was brought about in good faith or in bad faith. Also, as it can never 
be seen whether good faith negotiations could come up with an agreement - or 
what the terms of any agreement might have been - it would be most difficult to 
determine any loss caused by the breach of the obligation. For these reasons, the 
courts of England would be reluctant to enforce an obligation to negotiate in good 
faith.   
The most popular and dominant case in this regard was the case of Walford v 
Miles,
290 where in a course of a sale of property the vendor for consideration 
agreed not to negotiate with anyone else and to negotiate only with a prospective 
purchaser. This undertaking was agreed although there was no concluded 
agreement between the parties as it was deferred to be ‘subject to contract’. It was 
said by the House of Lords that such an agreement is not enforceable as it did not 
specify for how long such an undertaking would last, and held that in the absence 
of an express term, it would become impossible to imply a term that the parties 
would negotiate in good faith, as it is unworkable in practice as it is inherently 
inconsistent with the position that the parties were negotiating ‘subject to 
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contract’.
291 Lord Ackner stated: ‘While negotiations are in existence, either party 
is entitled to withdraw from those negotiations at any time and for any reason. 
There can be thus no obligation to continue to negotiate until there is a proper 
reason to withdraw. Accordingly a bare agreement to negotiate has no legal 
content’. 
This approach was ascertained in the case of Pitt v PHH Asset Management 
Ltd,
292  where the court emphasized that there is a lack of necessary certainty in 
the agreement to negotiate the same as to the agreement to agree. A negotiator 
must remain free to withdraw if he is not satisfied with the terms on the table and 
it is not possible for the court to assess whether any failure of negotiation was not 
for a reasonable reason or even to force the negotiators to reach an agreement.  
However, in the case of Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras (No. 
3),
293 the Court of Appeal has taken a distinguishable approach where suggested 
that the obligation to negotiate in good faith may be enforceable in certain 
situations, and particularly in the circumstances of express terms. The facts of this 
case were related to the agreement between the parties to the payment of 
‘reasonable costs’ and in particular that the parties would negotiate in good faith 
on the evidence produced as to such costs. This approach is unlike the case of 
Walford v Miles, where no express agreement had been held to negotiate in good 
faith and everything was ‘subject to contract’. In this case, it was derived from the 
provisions of the agreement that the parties expressly agreed to negotiate in good 
faith. Lord Longmore, who raised such a demarcation, found that it would be a 
strong thing to declare unenforceable a clause into which the parties had 
deliberately and expressly entered. The court admitted that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to the court to figure out whether the negotiation had been brought to 
an end in bad or good faith since that would always be fairly elusive. 
Nevertheless, the court dismissed the argument that loss caused by breach of 
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obligation could not be ascertained, on the grounds that courts are regularly 
required to assess such matters. The Court of Appeal has come to the conclusion 
that the position of the Walford position remains good law in the absence of an 
express term to negotiate in good faith, and then would consider the undertaking 
merely as an agreement to agree and as such it would be enforceable due to lack 
of certainty. However, where there is an express written agreement containing a 
provision to negotiate in good faith, and in particular where it has been drafted by 
a legal advisor, the Court of Appeal held such provisions to be enforceable. This 
was enhanced in a less liberal way recently in the case of Daventry DC v 
Daventry & District Housing Ltd.
294 The parties in this case had involved 
complicated negotiations regarding the calculation of the contract price. Both 
parties shared mistakes concerning the construing of the provisions of the 
agreement. It was demonstrated by the decision of the Court of Appeal just how 
important it is to review contracts thoroughly and very carefully before being 
entered into it as they may not be able to do anything regarding mistakes at a later 
stage. 
 
 
 
Mediation and Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR) 
In the mid-1990s the courts began to request that lawyers discuss with their 
clients all available solutions and the expected time and costs. This approach led 
to its incorporation into the final Access to Justice Reform according to the Lord 
Woolf Reforms and was consequently reflected in the Civil Procedure Rules of 
1998 (CPR). Under the CPR, Part 1.4, the court - in order to further the overriding 
objective - is required to manage cases actively such as encouraging the parties to 
use, prior issuing proceedings, the most appropriate alternative dispute resolution 
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(ADR) if the court regards that suitable and the facilitation of the use of such a 
procedure. The principal that the litigation or arbitration should be a final resort of 
dispute resolution had been adopted by the court. In the case of Re (Cowl and 
other) v Plymouth City Council,
295 Lord Woolf CJ said: ‘Insufficient attention is 
paid to the paramount importance of avoiding litigation whenever this is 
possible’. Thus, if the court does so, a refusal by either party to consider the ADR 
may be in breach of the CPR and could be penalized by the court exerting its 
authority for the award of costs to the successful party. In the case of Dunnett v 
Railtrack Plc,
296 when the Court of Appeal granted permission to appeal, it had 
been strongly advised that the disputants should consider the possibility of 
alternative dispute resolution. However, it appeared to the court that the 
respondent had refused such a way, and the Court of Appeal refused its costs of 
the Appeal although it was successful. As far as the respondent was concerned, it 
would win the appeal and could see no point in an alternative dispute resolution, 
which no doubt included the payment of its costs. Lord Brooke noted that a 
skilled mediator might have been able to reach results satisfactorily in many 
cases, which are quite beyond the powers of courts or lawyers to achieve. 
Therefore, he held that the failure of respondent to proceed in this manner was 
sufficient for being penalized in costs. Lord Brooke emphasized the duty of 
lawyers in advising their clients of the overall objective that if they refuse the 
chance of alternative dispute resolution suggested by the court, they may have to 
face uncomfortable costs in consequence. 
The mediation process can be approached at any time of the dispute whether the 
disputants have already commenced the litigation or not. However, if the 
mediation is planned to proceed at a very late stage of the litigation, then it may 
become reasonable to refuse as it was decided in the case of Palfrey v Wilson
297 
for refusing adverse costs due to unrealistic views of the claimant about his case 
proposed only two months before the trial. Also, by applying its discretion, a 
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court may refuse adverse costs if it found that the atmosphere between the 
disputants provide an indication that the mediation would not likely succeed.
298 
Nevertheless, the courts may, in exceptional circumstances, accept justification 
for a refusal to attempt mediation where it can be proven that there was no real 
prospect for success. In the case of Hurst v Leeming,
299 the court gave clear 
principle upon the basis that might justify a refusal to mediate. The claimant had 
lost his claim in this case, and the respondent would normally be entitled to his 
costs. However, the claimant argued that no such order should be made because 
before and after the commencement of proceedings he invited the respondent to 
proceed to mediation, but the respondent refused. The court had come to 
conclusion that the critical factor in this case was whether there was any real 
prospect of success. If mediation can have no real prospect of success a party may 
refuse to proceed to mediation for this reason. According to the facts of this case, 
the court was persuaded that - quite exceptionally - the respondent was reasonable 
in taking the view that mediation had no real prospect of success. Therefore, it 
awarded the costs in favour of the respondent. Nevertheless, in general, the court 
could not compel the parties to  proceed in the mediation if they do not agree to 
do so. It is one thing to encourage the parties to mediate, even in the strongest 
terms, but quite unlikely to order them to do so. To compel the parties to mediate 
would be to impose unacceptable obstacles on their right of access to the court 
and may achieve nothing. Dyson LJ the case of Halsey v Milton Keynes General 
NHS Trust,
300 said: ‘It would be wrong to compel parties to use ADR since that 
would amount to an unacceptable constraint on the right of access to the court 
and, therefore, a violation of article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights’. 
In general, the courts actively encourage the parties to attempt to settle their 
dispute through the means of ADR. However, the courts cannot compel the 
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parties approaching the ADR procedure, but have discretion to penalize a party 
who unreasonably refuses to agree to the ADR.  As a consequence, the 
unsuccessful party will bear a burden to show that the successful party had acted 
unreasonably in refusing to consider ADR before proceeding with a trial. In the 
case of Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust,
301 the appellant claimed for 
bereavement damages against the hospital under which her husband died. Her 
solicitor offered to mediate to settle the claim which was rejected by the Trust and 
as a consequence wrote to the Department of Health warning them of the 
expected unnecessary high cost of trial proceedings. Throughout, the Trust had 
assured its stance that there had been no negligence and the mediation was 
inappropriate. At the trial the claim was dismissed as the mediation approach was 
considered as somewhat tactical and the court held that the CPR was not designed 
to force the parties, who have a solid stance, to settle the dispute that they would 
not. The court came to the conclusion that the Trust should not be deprived of any 
of its costs on the basis of its rejection to the pre-trial mediation. Although the 
Court of Appeal affirmed the general support for mediation and pointed out that 
the CPR included: ‘... encouraging the parties to use an alternative dispute 
resolution procedure if the court considers that appropriate and facilitating the use 
of that procedure’, it was in agreement with the view of the first instance court in 
refusing to impose a cost sanction against a successful party on the grounds that it 
had refused to approach mediation. Lord Dyson held that the burden to satisfy the 
court through mediation had no reasonable prospect of success, and it should not 
lie on the party who refused the mediation. 
Further, these principles have been discussed recently in the case of Rolf v De 
Guerin.
302 In this case, the claimant contracted with the defendant for the 
construction of a domestic property. Work began at the property but the contract 
subsequently broke down due to the claimant’s circumstances. The work with the 
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defendant had been suspended although it was substantially constructed and the 
claimant continued the rest of work with other contractors. 
The claimant initially proceeded a claim of a certain amount against the defendant 
which was followed by an offer to settle the claim amicably. Subsequently, the 
claimant offered to settle the claim according to the CPR Part 36 in a lower sum, 
which was ignored by the defendant who had not responded until very shortly 
prior to the trial, indicating that the amicable settlement may be accepted in a 
lower amount. 
The proceedings commenced before the county court where the defendant at the 
same time preferred to have his day in court so he could prove his position. 
The county court awarded the claimant part of her claim, and it was found that the 
claim had been exaggerated much more than what the claimant had been awarded; 
the claim held that there should be no order of costs for the claimant, and the 
defendant was right to refuse the claimant ‘s invitation for the amicable 
settlement. 
The claimant appealed to the judgment. According to the review of the precedent 
authorities - specifically Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust,
303  as well 
as the dicta in Dunnett v Railtrack Plc
304 - the Court of Appeal reversed the costs, 
and substituted no order for costs. By referring to Halsey, Rix LJ said: ‘… This 
court there held that an unusual order on the ground of a refusal to mediate always 
had to be justified, with the burden on the party seeking such an order to show 
that the refusal was unreasonable...’. 
The refusal to mediate was examined by the Court of Appeal and had taken into 
consideration the fact that the claimant was the all-out winner, and the defendant 
was unreasonably refused the claimant’s offer to settle the issue amicably. 
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Moreover, it affirmed that the court, while exerting its discretion to costs, should 
take into account the facts surrounding the issue and considered the litigation or 
arbitration as the last resort to solve the disputes. 
When he had come to his conclusion, Rix LJ mentioned the following note:  
It is possible of course that settlement discussions, or even mediation, 
would not have produced a solution; or would have produced one 
satisfactory enough to the parties to have enabled them to reach agreement 
but which Mr Guerin [the defendant] might now, with his hindsight of the 
judge’s judgment, have been able to say did him less than justice. 
Nevertheless, in my judgment, the facts of this case disclose that 
negotiation and/or mediation would have had reasonable prospects of 
success. The spurned offers to enter into settlement negotiations or 
mediation were unreasonable and ought to bear materially on the outcome 
of the court’s discretion, particularly in this class of case. 
In the case of Ardentia Ltd v British Telecommunications Plc,
305 the parties 
entered into a project agreement relating to the provision of information 
technology to the NHS. The claimant sought an injunction against the defendant 
who in turn applied to stay such proceedings on the grounds that the claimant did 
not follow their own contract escalation of dispute resolution procedure which 
requires precedent steps to be taken prior to filing a case as stipulated in clause 
66, which says ‘... shall not institute court proceedings until the applicable 
proceedings have been exhausted’. A dispute had arisen between the parties and 
the claimant bypassed the dispute escalation procedure and applied for interim 
injunction on the basis that the escalation procedure does not apply in this regard, 
and the interim injunction procedure allowed them to bypass the escalation 
procedure. The court held that in accordance with the agreed dispute resolution 
procedure that, the court will not look at the matter until the dispute resolution 
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procedure had been exhausted by the parties prior to commencing proceedings 
before the court or arbitration. 
Further, with respect of the pre-action protocol in the field of the construction 
industry, in the case of TJ Brent Ltd v Black & Veatch Consulting Ltd
306 the 
defendant alleged that the claimant had failed to comply with Construction Pre-
action Protocol. Akenhead J held that it is not necessarily required to the Letter of 
Claim to provide information in ‘ultimate detail’ unless it is critical to the claim. 
It should be tested out by the court whether the lack of information was such as to 
prevent or at least make it difficult for the opponent to respond in detail. 
Akenhead J said that: ‘What the Court should do in considering the Pre-action 
Protocol is to look at the matters in substance, not as a matter of semantics…and 
not for technical non-compliance with the letter of claim requirement in the Pre-
action Protocol. 
It was also added by the court that a party who wishes to succeed such application 
must establish that there was some realistic prospect, before commencing the 
proceedings, of (a) a mediation taking place and (b) some prospect (but no 
certainty or even necessary probability) that a resolution would be achieved. 
It is not unusual that the court may stay the proceeding in favour of mediation. In 
the case of Balfour Beatty Construction Northern Ltd v Modus Corovest 
(Blackpool) Ltd,
307  the defendant resisted the claimant application for 
enforcement of an adjudication decision to be stayed in favour of mediation 
pursuant to clause 39.1 of the Contract which states that:  
Either party must identify to the other any dispute or difference…that it 
considers to be capable of resolution by mediation and, upon being 
requested to do so, the other party shall within 7 days indicate whether or 
not it consent to participate in the mediation…The objective of mediation 
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under clause 39 shall be to reach a binding agreement in resolution of the 
dispute…. 
Coulson J refused to grant a stay on the grounds that the mediation’s provision 
was nothing more than ‘an agreement to agree’ and therefore lacked certainty. 
However, Coulson J emphasized that if there was a binding agreement to mediate, 
he would only granted a stay of proceedings in events where (i) the claimant was 
not entitled to summary judgment and (ii) a reference to mediation was 
considered as the best way of resolving the dispute. 
 
 
 
 
 
Mediation under Kuwaiti Law 
Before defining mediation under Kuwaiti law, we will look for its origins in the 
Arabic language, including how it has been utilized in the legal context. The 
terms ‘mediation’ and ‘reconciliation’ have no particular difference in the Kuwaiti 
legal system, and are often used interchangeably. 
Mediation - which is called ‘Alsolh’ in the Arabic language - is a noun that is 
opposite to ‘adversarial’. It is derived from the term ‘good‘, as in ‘goodness’, and 
is the opposite of the term ‘corruption’. 
Kuwaiti law does not differentiate between mediation and conciliation as both are 
based on the same term, whether or not mediation or conciliation has been 
conducted by intervention of a neutral third party. The same rules are applied to 
both methodologies, regardless of the involvement of a neutral third party. In 
reality, Kuwaiti law only recognizes the compromise that takes place within 195 
 
mediation - such a compromise, as far as we are concerned, could also be called 
‘mediation’; therefore, we will focus on this type of mediation (or, compromise) 
in this section.  
Similar to Egyptian law, Kuwaiti legislators define mediation in Article (552) in 
the civil law as being ‘an agreement under which the disputants thereof shall 
settle an existing dispute between them, or avoid thereby a probable dispute, by 
means of release by both parties, as a way of compromise of each part of his/her 
allegation’.  
Kuwaiti law grants parties the right to agree on a process of resolving their 
dispute through way of mediation either before or after the dispute has arisen, 
which is similar to an arbitration agreement. 
Furthermore, the language of this article allows disputants, in addition to 
resolving an existing dispute, protection from any possible dispute by agreeing in 
advance not to approach the court or arbitration proceedings.  
Such a trend taken by the Kuwaiti legislators runs contrary to some Arabic 
jurisdictions, which define mediation as being ‘an agreement between disputants 
to find a determined solution for their disputes’. The notion of this approach was 
taken from Islamic law, particularly the Hanafi jurisprudence which only deals 
with existing disputes, and not future ones. Therefore, a debate regarding parties’ 
rights to agree in advance to mediate their future disputes could not be exist under 
Kuwaiti law as it obviously gives the parties such power. 
The Definition of Dispute 
There are three essential elements required to validate the agreement for 
mediation or reconciliation. 
Regarding conflict between parties, it can be a conflict or dispute that has arisen, 
or may arise, between the parties, whether it comes before the court or is still 
among the parties themselves.  196 
 
Kuwaiti law differentiates between existing and predicted disputes; it is stipulated 
that for any conflict to be regarded as an existing dispute, it must have two 
essential elements. Moreover, in addition to the conflict or disagreement 
regarding an issue, court proceedings must have already taken place by one or 
both parties before a competent tribunal. This is contrary to the predicted dispute 
which assumes that if there is a conflict or disagreement between the parties 
regarding rights or obligations, they may be ultimately resolved by the final 
tribunal even though the parties may prefer not to approach court proceedings. As 
result, under Kuwaiti law, there are two sorts of mediation: a judicial mediation 
that is made during the trial and authenticated by the tribunal, and a non-judicial 
or mediation that is made by the parties themselves without any intervention by 
the court. 
In conclusion, Kuwaiti law recognises two types of mediation/conciliation. The 
first is a judiciary meditation that is made during the trial of case and 
authenticated by the tribunal itself; therefore, it ultimately becomes enforceable 
and cannot be resisted by either party. Regarding the second type, it is a non-
judiciary mediation and may called an amicable mediation which can be taken as 
evidence to prove the agreement for settlement. 
Good Faith to Mediate  
Under Kuwaiti law, parties should approach mediation on good faith in order to 
settle their dispute. They must also have the intention to conclude their dispute in 
a most appropriate way - a way which would not delay the resolution or utilize a 
delaying tactic.  However, this does not mean that the mediation agreement must 
conclude on the entire issues; rather, the parties may agree on the outlines or on 
the principles and leave the details for the final resort of the dispute resolutions. 
Characteristics of Mediation under Kuwaiti Law  
The features of mediation under Kuwaiti law are almost typical to mediation in 
other comparative jurisdictions. This can elaborated as follows: 197 
 
•  Consensual. The main feature of mediation is that it is a sort of consensual 
agreement that is   a required agreement between the concerned people. This is 
essentially formed in the same manner as forming a regular contract, which is 
made on the exchange of offers and acceptance by the disputants, who seek 
commercial solutions by themselves or in assistance by their advisors and a 
neutral third party. Kuwaiti law does not set certain formalities to form a 
mediation agreement.  
•  In a distinguishable way, the mediation agreement is non-binding unless 
the parties expressly and clearly agreed for it to be considered so. Then, the 
general principles and rules of the law of contract would be applied. 
•  Mediation is a sort of barter deal as both parties are setting off their rights 
and obligations against each other. 
•  Speedy. Since mediation is an alternative to the normal litigation 
proceedings, the time is very important and the settlement must be achieved in a 
speedy manner. The solution should be decisive and conclude the issue(s) without 
any further proceedings. 
Mediation and Arbitration 
The study of mediation is sometimes attached to the study of other private 
systems of dispute resolution. A distinction has to be drawn, in particular, 
between mediation and arbitration. The distinction is crucially important to 
specify the rules that are applied to each system. The Law of Arbitration 11 of 
1995 applies only to arbitration while the mediation is subjected to the rules of the 
Civil Law of 1980. Accordingly, the distinction between mediation and arbitration 
is essential in order to figure out which rules are applied to the procedure of 
dispute prior to moving on in approaching the settlement. 
Arbitration is a process of dispute resolution that requires the parties to refer their 
dispute to another, who in turn will determine the matter and impose a legally 198 
 
binding decision. Moreover, while in the mediation process the parties are to 
approach the outcome by themselves with no influence from others.  
Mediation is a mechanism of dispute settlement aimed at compromise and a win-
win situation rather than on the grounds of rights or obligation. On the other hand, 
arbitration - although it is a private system of dispute resolution - favors the 
court’s judgment and decision regarding the dispute on the grounds of technical/ 
legal rights and obligation. 
In mediation a settlement is based upon the parties’ agreements and their 
decisions, whereas in arbitration the ultimate decision is be shifted to the tribunal 
which has the discretion to decide on the dispute with no influence on the parties. 
 
Therefore, the arbitrator must conform to the rules of the natural justice, where it 
is not strictly required in a way of mediation as long as the mediation agreement 
has been made on good faith and without any fraud or massive error. 
In accordance with Kuwaiti law, both mediation and arbitration are strictly 
required to be proven in writing. Oral communication, or any other way of 
evidence cannot be accepted to prove mediation and arbitration, and would not be 
enforceable unless the basic agreement has been made in writing. 
Further, both mediation and arbitration need an intervention and authentication 
from the court in order to be enforced in the case of a resistance by either party. 
The Nature of the Mediation Agreement under Kuwaiti Law 
Similar to any normal agreement, a mediation agreement is subjected to the 
general rules required for the forming of a contract. Therefore, the exchanging of 
offer and acceptance between parties must certainly be done. Both parties must be 
capable; have a power to do the same without any legal restrictions; and must 
have the authority to compromise or to make concessions with a counter party. 
Similar to arbitration and other private methodologies of dispute resolution, 199 
 
mediation shall not be permissible by the law in public order matters except in 
respect to financial issues that come out of such matters. Such matters relate to 
general disciplines such as nationality; eligibility; status of the persons; civil 
interests; bankruptcy; divorce; inheritance; wills; administration; or any penal 
matters that cannot be brought for arbitration. This is called the subject matter of 
mediation. The agreement to mediate must not fall within these categories, and 
the subject matter must be clearly identified in the mediation agreement. 
The nature of mediation under Kuwaiti law is unique as it has two main aspects 
that shape its profile. It is a mechanism of dispute resolution means that forms one 
side, and is a type of agreement that is subject to general rules of the law of 
contract, in addition to its specific rules that are applied individually to it from the 
other side.  
According to the nature of mediation in Kuwaiti law, a mediation agreement does 
not constitute any rights or obligations, and it only reveals what the parties agree 
to be bound to. Therefore, the following examples may come out of the mediation 
agreement: 
-  If the mediation is related to ownership of a real estate property, it will be 
required that a registration of title - at the Real Estate Registration Office at the 
Ministry of Justice - is an authentication provision. 
-  Rights and obligations - the subject of mediation agreement - would be 
transferred along with descriptions, appendants, insurances and defenses. 
-  Such an agreement should not be affected  
-  The most salient feature of mediation according to Kuwaiti law is to 
conclude the case between the parties. Accordingly, the dispute between parties 
would be concluded and neither party has a right to unilaterally rescind the 
settlement agreement (mediation agreement) without prior consent of the other 
party. 200 
 
Furthermore, neither party is eligible to commence a litigation or arbitration 
proceeding against the same other party for the same mediated subject matter 
which already had been settled by the mediation. This is a real implementation to 
the principle of privity of mediation agreement, and as a consequence the 
mediation would be limited to the concerned parties and will not be extended to 
the third party who is not involved in the precedent process. 
Mediation or conciliation as a condition to litigation or arbitration is also applied 
globally, such as in France. The French Court of Cassation  validated an 
escalation dispute resolution by accepting a provision that stipulates a mediation 
or conciliation process as a precedent step that must be taken prior to 
commencing any legal proceedings and, therefore, held that any legal proceeding 
would be stayed in favor of such mediation or conciliation. 
Mediation and International Business Law  
London Court of International Arbitration 
The London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) has its own rules 
pertaining to the procedure of mediation which came into existence on the 1st of 
October 1999. Such rules assist disputants and concerned parties for proceeding 
with the mediation. They also pertain to either how the dispute came into 
existence in the present or past, and provides them with recommended provisions 
that help them in this regard. 
LCIA rules set the procedure for mediation that must be followed from the time of 
commencing the mediation until the matter has been concluded. The rules include 
the Schedule of Mediation Cost (the “Schedule”) in effect at the commencement 
of the mediation. In accordance to Article 4 of the rules, the disputants are free to 
agree with how they will set out the shape of their own matter, and in what form 
they will file and commence their respective case. 
LCIA rules for mediation provide the procedure with how the mediator must 
conduct the case, which impliedly ensures that the mediation moves in conformity 201 
 
with general rules, while the advantages of mediation include confidentiality, time 
saving, flexibility, etc. This may be regarded as one of the strongest advantages of 
these rules, and can be seen in the following rules: 
5.2 The mediator may communicate with the parties orally or in writing, together, 
or 
individually, and may convene a meeting or meetings at a venue to be determined 
by the 
mediator after consultations with the parties. 
5.3 Nothing which is communicated to the mediator in private during the course 
of the 
mediation shall be repeated to the other party or parties, without the express 
consent of 
the party making the communication. 
5.4 Each party shall notify the other party and the mediator of the number and 
identity of those persons who will attend any meeting convened by the mediator. 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation 
The most popular rules for international arbitration are the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, which agree with the United Nations General Assembly and 
took effect in 1976. 
On 24 June 2002, UNCITRAL adopted the Model Law on International 
Commercial Conciliation as a uniform for rules pertaining to the conciliation 
process in order to urge international disputants to use the conciliation, and 
ensures the predictability and certainty in such an approach. Such rules were set 
out to be applied for the international commercial disputes only. As it is adopted 
in this regard, the meaning of a ‘commercial’ matter has a very wide meaning, 
and interpretation can include engineering and construction of work.    202 
 
The disputants are free to exclude the applicability of the rules of this law. 
However, according to Article 1(9)a, the Model law does not apply in the case of 
a judge or arbitrator and in the case that judicial or arbitral proceedings attempt to 
facilitate a settlement. 
Also, in accordance with the Model law, the parties are free, in general, to shape 
their own process for conducting the conciliation. Nevertheless, if the parties 
cannot come to agree on their own procedure, then the facilitator or mediation can 
step in and take the initiative and determine the procedure.  
Similar to the general principles that are applicable to mediation and conciliation, 
the Model law sets out the rules of disclosure of information and confidentiality 
relating to the conciliation procedure among the parties themselves, as well as the 
conciliator . Such confidentially will also be extended to include any further 
proceedings that may be taken by either party subsequent to conciliation, and all 
information and documents that have been exchanged during the conciliation 
proceedings would be regarded as privileges, and will be admissible in further 
litigation or arbitration proceedings . In accordance with Article 12 of the Model 
law rules, a way of Med-arb is not acceptable as this article prohibits that the 
conciliator should be acting as an arbitrator in subsequent proceedings unless both 
parties agree otherwise. 
There are many international cases that have been mediated through international 
institutional organizations such as CEDR. It is becoming usual for international 
disputes to be settled on means of mediation rather than litigation or arbitration 
proceedings. This actually has been done due to the advantages of international 
mediation which mainly can be summarized as follows: 
•  Avoiding the complexity of the conflicts of laws which may lead to the 
difficulty to resolve the case. 
•  Trying to short the distance between the differences through gifted and 
experienced mediators who are supposed to have a very high quality of 203 
 
knowledge, and have high technical skills that help persons deal with various 
cultures, and appreciate their different needs and interests.  
·  The concern of losing cases may not arise in the mediation as it is usually 
based on the parties’ agreement rather than what the tribunal finds. 
 
 
 
Med-arb 
The main duty of any judge is, at the end of the day, to realize the the truth and 
the real issues. Within the capacity given to them by the rules and regulations, 
judges embark upon their journey to come to a conclusion by utilizing all the tools 
that elicit the facts that they are looking for.  
In some cases, the parties agree in advance to have the same person mediate their 
issue first, and if he could not conclude the issue he may transform to arbitrate the 
issue in a way of binding resolution rather than on a friendly basis. 
 To understand this way of dispute resolution, one should be acquainted with both 
means of dispute resolution: mediation and arbitration. It is a hybrid process 
where the parties agree to resolve their dispute in a way of combination between a 
mediation and arbitration.
308  Med-arb is divided into two stages, starting with 
mediation by the person who appointed by the consent of both parties to mediate 
and, in case of unsuccessful, is subsequently to arbitrate a dispute.
309  In some 
jurisdictions, such process may be taken either concurrently or in parallel by the 
same or different empire,
310 however, it may not practical or unacceptable in the 
another jurisdiction to do the same as it may on contrary to nature of med-arb 
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process which constitute on the two stage of mediation and arbitration that taken 
after each other. 
In essence, med-arb is not an exact multitier dispute resolution process that 
involves different stages of the process which are conducted by different person. 
Actually, it is a hybrid procedure consisting of various processes conducted 
autonomously by one party. 
Med-arb has been proven to be an old mechanism of dispute resolution. Professor 
Derek Roebuck who states that ‘everywhere in the Ancient Greek world, 
including Ptolemaic Egypt, arbitration was normal and in arbitration the 
mediation element was primary’.
311 
Basically, the objective of gathering between mediation and arbitration in a 
combined process is trying to overcome all the pitfalls and gaps that are faced by 
each of them individually. Cost and time consumption are the biggest 
disadvantages that may occurr in the arbitration process, while the enforceability 
of mediation is the main concern that may weaken the mediation and make it less 
sufficient. Nevertheless, although it does not move fast, med-arb has started to 
take place in the arena of dispute resolution. 
Meanwhile, rules and requirements for both mediation and arbitration would be 
both applicable to the med-arb and must be taken into consideration while 
approaching such methodology to avoid any prejudice. 
A problem of the med-arb is that the parties are tentative or unwilling to resolve 
their dispute amicably. In such an event, the med-arb method may not assist 
disputants in coming to a conclusion so far as each party may be defensive rather 
and may not move forward to any settlement. Such a concern may be overcome if 
the parties are really willing to solve their conflict quickly and amicably.
312   
                                                           
311 Derek Roebuck, ‘The Myth of Modern Mediation’ (2007) 73 Arbitration (1) 105, 106. 
312 Bevan (n 266). 205 
 
Each process, mediation and arbitration, has its own rules and principles that are 
to be followed  in order to validate them; otherwise they may be vulnerable and 
challengeable.  Nevertheless, by combining these two processes and applying 
their rules, there may arise a contradiction between them which consequently 
affects the new process. As a result, it is essential to consider such concerns and 
to set ways to overcome them. 
As a med-arb encompasses an arbitration process, an agreement to apply a med-
arb is required to be in writing and in accordance with section (5) of the 
Arbitration Act of 1996. 
In the case of Acorn Farms Ltd v Schnuriger,
313 the parties entered into an 
agreement that stipulated in the event of a dispute, it is may be referred to a 
Mediator/Arbitrator, with the person who performs both functions via conducting 
a conciliation process will resolve a dispute amicably along with consensus of the 
parties. If he/she could not do so, then he may act as an arbitrator who may issue a 
final and binding decision. 
The dispute arose and it was concluded through these two stages by the same 
practitioner who had a decision in favour of the defendant. In turn, the claimant 
did not accept the decision and applied to be dismissed on the grounds that he was 
confused over the nature of the dispute resolution method which caused him not 
to defend his case in an appropriate way by missing an opportunity to present 
crucial evidence as he thought it was mediation rather than arbitration. 
Generally, it is arguable whether that, in spite of all precautions, a mediator can 
act in accordance with natural justice as an arbitrator and vice versa.
314 Holding a 
caucus meeting and considering the information received by the mediator as 
confidential and not to be disclosed to the other party, is in contravention of the 
arbitrator rules. 
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The court determined the case and noted that it is unusual that the process of 
mediation could be joined together with arbitration in the same dispute by the 
same practitioner. However, such a combination of these two processes may be 
workable if the following essential precautions had been taken into consideration 
prior to pursuing this procedure: 
a)  It must be made clear to the parties from the beginning that if there is no 
agreement the mediator-arbitrator will impose a binding solution; 
b)  The mediator-arbitrator may not receive information without the 
knowledge of both parties. This rules out the possibility of caucusing at any stage 
of the process. 
c)  The parties must be warned from the outset that anything said to the 
mediator-arbitrator could be sued against that party as the basis for an award, 
including offers and confidential information disclosed for negotiating purposes. 
d)  The mediator-arbitrator must avoid the expression of final views until all 
evidence and argument is complete. 
e)  If the process moves into arbitration mode, both parties must be given full 
opportunity to present their cases. This includes a clear indication when the 
process switches from mediation to arbitration and of the timing and process for 
presenting evidence and argument. 
 
During med-arb the neutral will be in the know about confidential information 
that must be protected and not to be disclosed under the label of “without 
prejudice”. 
In such an event, the position of the neutral impartial may be compromised by the 
role of the mediator. Hence, med-arb may not be recommended to be conducted 
by the same person in the common law legal system.  207 
 
For instance, in English Law, a case of Glencot Development and Design Co Ltd v 
Ben Barrett & Son (Contractors) Ltd,
315 was a good example as the court in duty 
evaluated the process of combining mediation and adjudication. In this case the 
appointed adjudicator was asked to assist negotiation between the parties, and 
thereafter if no amicable settlement had been reached, then the mediator would 
continue his mission as an adjudicator. Actually, the negotiation failed with no 
positive progress and the mediator resumed his duty with no objection, at that 
time, from either party and ultimately he made his decision in favour of the 
claimant. 
The claimant proceeded with the court enforcement which in turn was resisted by 
the defendant who alleged that the decision of the adjudicator was invalid due to 
his participation in the preliminary stage of the negotiation which influenced his 
perception and with no doubt alluded to consider him as no longer impartial. The 
court was of the opinion of the assessment of apparent bias rather than actual bias 
to be applied, therefore it was to be ascertained whether the surrounding events 
would lead to a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a 
real or possible danger that the neutral was not impartial. 
Such concern may overcome by applying, further to the precautions that 
mentioned in the case of Acorn Farms Ltd v Schnuriger,
316 some rules that 
adopted by international organization. For example, one of the prominent 
requirements to be taken account in the med-arb, is the contemplating of the 
Article 7.2 of the ICC ADR Rules which prohibits, unless otherwise agreed by 
parties, to produce as evidence any of the following documents: 
1)  Any documents, statement or communications which are submitted by 
another party or by the Neutral in the ADR proceedings, unless they can be 
obtained independently by the party seeking to produce them in the judicial, 
arbitration or similar proceedings; 
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2)  Any views expressed or suggestions made by any party within the ADR 
proceedings with regard to possible settlement of the dispute; 
3)  Any admissions made by another party within the ADR proceedings; 
4)  Any views or proposal put forward by the Neutral; or 
5)  The fact that any party had indicated within the ADR proceedings that it 
was ready to accept a proposal for a settlement. 
 
Under Kuwaiti Law 
As illustrated earlier, the med-arb is not a very common and practice. Although it 
is appropriate to use med-arb by the same individual, in some jurisdictions, it is 
restricted by some safeguards to ensure that such approaches do not breach strict 
rules of natural justice.  
For instance, med-arb is expressly organized in some common law countries such 
as the province of Alberta. The Alberta Arbitration Act provides: 
35(1) the members of an arbitral tribunal may, if the parties consent, use 
mediation, conciliation or similar techniques during the arbitration to encourage 
settlement of the matters in dispute. 
(2) after the members of an arbitral tribunal use a technique referred to in 
subsection (1), they may resume their roles as arbitrators without disqualification. 
Kuwaiti law does not move far from these trends in handling this matter. It is 
remarkable that the arbitration procedure in the Kuwaiti legal system is tailored to 
give concerned parties some flexibility to meet their needs. 
However, such flexibility is not unlimited, according to Kuwaiti law, and there 
are a number of rules that are to be complied with in the event that the arbitrator 
would act as a mediator during the process of arbitration. 209 
 
The arbitrator may not be authorized to proceed with a negotiation or with an 
attempt to settle a dispute amicably unless he is expressly delegated to do so by 
virtue of the parties’ consent in a way of writing documented. 
If the arbitrator is authorized to act as a mediator then he will not be required to 
comply with the provisions of the pleadings procedures, save those relating to the 
public order (Article 182 of the Procedural Law 38/1980). 
Nevertheless, there are no precise specifications for the meaning of public order 
in terms of  the arbitration process, which could draw the boundaries of the duty 
of arbitrator. However, the rules of natural justice must be taken into 
consideration while carrying on the process of med-arb to the extent that does not 
constitute any manifest of breaching natural justice. Hence, the neutral shall be 
subject to the minimum requirements that are applicable to the arbitrators, such as 
one that is necessary to protect the allegation and the parties. Furthermore, the 
neutral as his duties are combined between the mediation and arbitration, should 
render his decision in accordance with the arbitration procedure.
317 
Generally, the neutral has very wide power and does not have to stick with a 
specific substitute law nor a procedural law saving that related to the public order. 
The med-arb agreement must be in writing pursuant to Article 176 of the 
Procedural law 38/1980 which states that “arbitrators may not be authorized to 
compromise, conciliate or render award as compromising arbitrators unless they 
are mentioned namely in the agreement on arbitration”. Such a requirement also 
stems from the Article 173 which expressly does not accept any arbitration unless 
it is in writing. Thus, according to these articles the med-arb agreement must be in 
writing and the name of the arbitrator who authorized to act as a mediator must be 
mentioned in such agreement. The legislators’ requirements to name the arbitrator 
in the med-arb process was reasoned by some authors as a step to protect such 
processes and ensure that it has been done according to parties’ consent and 
                                                           
317 Yaqaub Sarkhoh, Alosos Alaamah fee Altahkeem Altejari: General Principles of the 
International Commercial Arbitration, 1996. 210 
 
consciousness. Further, there is a debate regarding if the parties have not taken 
such action earlier, whether the agreement would be rescinded or if it could be 
rectified by agreeing at the time of commencing the process.  
In terms of mediation, it is unusual that there is more than one mediator who 
mediates the case. However, it is not prohibited by the law to have more than one 
mediator. Thus, the language of Article 176 does not limit parties with any 
number who could act as mediator/arbitrator as it refers to the mediator/arbitrator 
in plural. This trend is adopted by some intentional institutions such as Article 3 
of UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules which states that: ‘There shall be one 
conciliator unless the parties agree that there shall be two or three conciliators. 
Where there is more than one conciliator, they ought, as a general rule, to act 
jointly’. 
The subject matter of med-arb must be identified specifically in the agreement. 
An agreement to med-arb in an unspecified matter would be considered null and 
void.
318 Furthermore, such matters shall be ones that could be conciliated. Such a 
concept is comprehended in light of the principle derived from the civil law code 
which contemplates that in case the object of obligation is in violation of law, the 
public order or good morals, a contract shall be void.
319The same meaning is 
provided under the principle which reads that matters related to public order may 
not be conciliated and that conciliation only is valid where there are any financial 
rights generated thereof .
320  
 The most significant advantage of med-arb is the enforceability of the neutral 
award.  According to Article 186 of the Procedural Law the med-arb decision is 
final and binding and may not be appealed unless otherwise agreed by the parties. 
This may attract litigants to approach the med-arb internationally as its award and 
conclusion may be enhanced by the New York Convention within the states that 
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ratified the convention. The New York Convention has been counted as the most 
effective system in the spectrum of international business law.
321  
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Chapter Seven 
 
Kuwaiti Law (Case Study) 
Part I 
 
Since Kuwait discovered and started producing oil 80 years ago, the country has 
become entirely dependent on oil resources, and oil is considered to be perhaps 
the sole and main resource for state revenue. 
However, it has been recognized that the country’s petroleum resources are finite 
and would eventually run out. Such recognition has prompted state decision-
makers to call for drastic changes to the fundamental development of the 
country’s economic and business model and direction. 
Transition to the said direction began in the last decade against the backdrop of 
the era of booming oil prices, where the income of individuals and the nation 
dramatically increased. As a result, Kuwaiti law-makers brought forth new 
legislation to achieve such objectives. One of the remarkable initiatives that has 
been taken in this regards was passing the Law 8/2001 of Foreign Direct 
Investment which allows foreign investors - for the first time in Kuwait history - 
to venture into business in Kuwait without the requirement of having a specific 
percentage of Kuwaiti shares, nor a Kuwaiti agent. According to Article 2 of the 
Law 8/2001, the Council of Ministers shall determine the economic activities and 
projects that foreign investors are allowed to undertake in Kuwait whether 
independently or in participation with local enterprises. In essence, the economics 
of Kuwait has been significantly reshaped by this law. Moreover, according to 
Law 8/2001 foreign investors can be granted some privileges that may encourage 
or motivate them to make investments in Kuwait. One of the most important 
privileges that have been given to foreign investors is an exemption from income 214 
 
or any other taxes, as well as an exemption from customs duties on imports for a 
period not exceeding ten years from starting the actual operation of the project.
322 
In accordance with Amiri Decree No. 3 of 1955 regarding income tax, corporate 
income tax is levied on income of foreign companies operating in Kuwait and the 
tax is imposed on foreign company’s Kuwaiti-source income only. The Kuwaiti 
income tax rates range up to 55%, corresponding to different taxable profit 
criteria. 
In light of the aforementioned factors, the most phenomenal piece of legislation in 
the history of the State of Kuwait which has been passed is  the Public Private 
Partnership (PPP) Law (Law No. 7 of 2008), or in other words, Build Operate 
Transfer (BOT). 
According to this law, the private sector is allowed to be the primary financial 
funder to the infrastructure projects that are to be financed and managed by the 
public sector. The common concept is that the only countries that have limited 
financial resources or commercial means will choose to outsourcing its major 
projects on a way of BOT route. Through such a law, Kuwait showed no such 
tendencies. The BOT/PPP route can be utilized to improve efficiency in carrying 
out infrastructure projects; it is a tool that helps to promote the quality of the 
services rendered by the major projects as the private sector - particularly in 
Middle Eastern cultures - mainly pay careful attention to the customers’ 
satisfaction more than the public sector. The BOT/PPP model also helps the state 
to provide job opportunities for the high numbers of the Kuwaiti workforce that 
the government or public sector may not be able to deploy over the next 20 years. 
Article 5 of Law 7/2008 specifies the formula for allocating the special purpose of 
company’s shares (SPV) as follows: 
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·  The concerned government department will offer 40% of its shares of the 
SPV in a competitive open auction for the companies listed on the Kuwait 
Stock Exchange and any other companies that are approved by the Higher 
Committee for the BOT projects. 
·  10% would be offered to the entity that unsolicited the proposal of the 
project; if the project was the same and did not propose public authority, 
it would be given the privilege of a 50% discount of the successful bidder 
rate if it would prefer to take it. 
·  The remaining 50% of shares will be allocated to the domestic general 
public, specifically for Kuwaiti citizens.   
The above means that foreign companies which are listed on the Kuwait Stock 
Exchange or any other companies that may be interested or specialized in a 
specific area of the project are allowed to participate in such a competition. 
The relationship between the project company (SPV) and the concerned 
government authority would entail various aspects and risks of contracting 
arrangements that should be carefully drawn up. 
Among many key points in a concession agreement (BOT Agreement), the 
dispute resolution procedure will be the case of this study. 
It is prudent to recognize at an early stage of agreement the arrangement that 
having a well-defined dispute resolution framework and process is crucial to 
avoid unnecessary actions or steps that may cause further losses or damages for 
both parties. 
Due to the nature of PPP/BOT projects and overlapping duties and liabilities 
between the parties of the agreement, it is imperative that the dispute resolution 
process be clear and early-stipulated - specifically in a concession agreement - 
and by a delegated and authorized entity. 216 
 
The key feature of the dispute resolution provision has been set in Article 15 of 
Law 8/2008 which is partial to BOT/PPP projects; government authority and the 
SPV; and the right to agree, either in advance or after the dispute occurred, to 
refer to a dispute arising under the contract of arbitration. 
According to such an article, all BOT/PPP projects and their agreements shall be 
subjected to the rules of 7/2008 and its by-laws and all other laws of the State of 
Kuwait.  
However, Law 7/2008 gives the parties’ agreement rights to set and choose 
appropriate tools and mechanisms to resolve any dispute that may arise out of or 
in connection with such an agreement, and are also allowed to agree as to what 
may be the most suitable rules for construing the agreement. 
This movement is deemed to be a new trend in the Kuwaiti legal system towards 
changing the legislative philosophy of the administrative law. In combination 
with the context of Article (16) of Law 8/2008 concerning Foreign Direct 
Investment in the State of Kuwait, it states:  
  “Any dispute arising between foreign investment projects and third party, 
(according to explanatory note of this law a third party included also any 
government department), shall be under the jurisdiction of Kuwaiti Courts. 
Nevertheless, the parties may agree to refer such disputes to arbitration”. 
Prior to the passing of Law PPP 7/2007 there was a highly controversial debate 
regarding whether a BOT/PPP would be considered as an administrative contract 
or a civil/commercial since it was signed with a government department for the 
purpose of public construction and procurement. The core of the debate was 
focused on whether the BOT/PPP agreement could be referred to the arbitration 
(domestic/international) or whether the Administrative Court has an exclusive 
jurisdiction for BOT/PPP agreement. Despite such a controversial debate, the 
Kuwaiti government incorporated an arbitration clause in the BOT project for the 
waste water treatment plant that was entered into with the private sector in 217 
 
2000.
323 Such a provision had raised an argument as to whether it prevented the 
government department from the approach of the Administrative Court. There 
were two different opinions in this regard: the first one goes that an arbitration 
provision would be valid and should be applied in conformity to the parties’ 
Accord; according to this view, the ambit of validity of such an arbitration 
agreement would be extended to include any aspects of issues that the parties 
agreed whether that the issue was related to administrative or commercial matters. 
This tendentious leaning toward the language of sub-Article 2-3 of the Arbitration 
Law 11 of 1995 grants a jurisdiction to the arbitration tribunal to look into any 
dispute submitted before them by individuals or the private sector against any 
government department or public authority unless the dispute has already been 
filed and brought before the administrative courts, i.e., being presented to courts 
at the time of proceeding for arbitration.
324 There is also no exemption given to 
the administrative disputes from being referred to arbitration. Additionally, this 
tendency has been affirmed by Article 16 of Foreign Direct Investment in the 
State of Kuwait 8/2001 which gives the parties (foreign investor and government 
department) the right to agree to refer any arising that may arise out of the 
investment to an arbitration. 
Additionally, this was confirmed by the arbitration panel which had been 
impanelled to determine the case brought before it.
325 The panel decided that 
according to Article 2 of the Arbitration Law 11/1995, it has unlimited 
jurisdiction to decide on a case that may arise among public departments 
themselves or its companies, or a dispute that may arise between any one of them 
with a private sector entity as long as the case has not been filed before the courts.  
 
                                                           
323 Clause 4-14-1 of the Waste Water Treatment Plant Project. 
324 Explanatory Note to the Arbitration  Law 11/1995. 
325 Arbitration case no. 12/1995, 21/5/1996. 218 
 
However, other law scholars go with a different opinion that gives the 
Administrative Court an exclusive jurisdiction to determine the administrative 
issues that arise out of administrative contracts. Such opinion has been said 
according to the following reason: a decision of the  Kuwaiti Court of Cassation 
326 which held that the Administrative Court has a regular and  exclusive 
jurisdiction to look into the disputed administrative issues between a government 
department and its contractor that arises out of or in connection to an 
administrative contract. In addition, the exemption that is given by Article 2 of the 
Arbitration Law 11/1995 does not extend to include administrative issues, and is 
only limited to the civil and commercial issues such as the financial issue. This 
opinion has been taken on the grounds that the Administrative Court jurisdiction 
is an inherent jurisdiction that is given by law according to the nature of the 
administrative cases. Furthermore, in accordance to Articles 1 & 2 of Law 
20/1981 for the Organizing of Kuwaiti Judiciary System, the Administrative 
Court has been given an exclusive jurisdiction to determine administrative cases.  
This trend has been most likely adopted by an arbitration tribunal
327 while it was 
examining an arbitration dispute as it is stated that “although the Administrative 
Court has an original jurisdiction to look at administrative cases, a financial 
dispute which arises out of the administrative court may be referred to the 
arbitration if the parties do the same”.  
Nevertheless, after the BOT/PPP Law of 7/2008 had been passed and published, 
the position had been changed.  
In the Egyptian legal system, which is the origin for the Kuwaiti legal system, a 
similar situation had been argued. According to Article 13 of the Egyptian 
Arbitration Law 27 of 1994, it was provided that, in civil and commercial matters, 
if there is an arbitration clause or arbitration agreement the courts will not have 
jurisdiction to hear the case.  However, this Article gives the parties, in civil and 
commercial matters, the right to agree to refer their disputes exclusively to the 
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arbitration and prevents the courts from looking at them. It was strongly debated 
whether such a situation could be extended to include the administrative contract 
where it is signed with the government department. This debate had led ultimately 
to amend the Arbitration Law
328 which affirmed obviously that the disputes that 
arise out of administrative contracts could be referred to and settled through 
arbitration if the parties agree so. 
In order to keep moving at the same pace that is approaching the Egyptian legal 
system, after passing the recent Law of BOT/PPP 7/2008, the Kuwaiti legislators 
concluded that such a debate regarding the possibility of settling an administrative 
contract case should be settled through arbitration or even by any other amicable 
settlement. In essence, promulgating such new legislation reflects how the change 
has been made to the philosophy of the administrative contract in the Kuwaiti 
legal system. 
Nevertheless, in terms of this change to the position of the administrative 
contracts, or in other words the public projects, the most important question that 
may arise is whether the provisions of arbitration of the aforesaid laws are enough 
to organize the dispute resolution in the public projects. 
In the following part of this chapter, we will recommend the proper procedure that 
should be incorporated in the recommended standard model of a public 
construction contract which may assist in avoiding or at least resolving a dispute 
in the quickest and most cost-effective manner. 
According to the nature of BOT projects which involve a very complicated 
overlapping relationship among concerned parties, it is not appropriate to 
approach a regular method for resolving disputes by referring to only one and 
final resort of dispute resolution, such as litigation or arbitration. A two-tier 
system of dispute resolution has become widely preferred by all related parties as 
well as interested professional researchers.  
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Therefore, due to the absence of any dispute resolution arrangements for 
BOT/PPP projects in the State of Kuwait, the standard dispute resolution 
provision for the Kuwait Oil Company
329 LSTK/Turnkey Contract will be taken 
as a recommended example to be adopted in the public BOT project. 
Kuwait Oil Company Model 
Hereunder is a dispute resolution model adopted in one of the biggest national oil 
companies in the Middle East namely in State of Kuwait, incorporated and 
numbered in the Contract as Clause (55). We observe the escalation cascaded up 
from friendly negotiation passing by mediation and ends up with the binding 
arbitration:  
1. The Model Clause 
55. DISPUTE RESOLUTION  
55.1 Friendly Negotiations, Mediation and Binding Arbitration  
Any dispute between the Parties arising out of or in connection with the Contract 
shall be resolved as follows:  
 55.1.1 The Company and the Contractor shall each appoint a qualified senior 
employee or representative to a standing two (2) member board (the “Disputes 
Review Board”) within thirty (30) days of the Date for Commencement. The 
Parties shall keep the members of the Disputes Review Board reasonably 
informed from time to time of the progress of the Works and shall provide to each 
member of the Disputes Review Board such information about the Works and 
such access to the Site as such member may reasonably request. 
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55.1.2 If the representatives of the Parties are unable to resolve a dispute within 
forty-five (45) days after notice of the existence of the dispute from one Party to 
the other (the “Dispute Notice”), either Party may, by a second notice to the other 
Party, submit the dispute for review to the Disputes Review Board. The Disputes 
Review Board shall immediately consider any dispute referred to it and shall 
make a recommendation within twenty (20) days of the date of such second 
notice. If the Disputes Review Board has not resolved the dispute to the 
satisfaction of both Parties within thirty (30) days of such second notice, then 
either Party may, by a third notice to the other Party, submit the dispute to the 
most senior executive officer of the Contractor and of the Company (collectively, 
“CEOs”). A meeting date and place shall be established by mutual agreement of 
the CEOs. However, if the Parties are unable to agree, the meeting shall take 
place at the Company’s offices in (Ahmadi-Kuwait) within twenty-one (21) days 
after the date of such third notice. The CEOs and their representatives as 
necessary shall meet in person and shall in good faith attempt to resolve the 
dispute.  
55.1.3 If the dispute remains unresolved following such meeting of CEO’s 
pursuant to Clause 55.1.2 (Friendly Negotiations, Mediation and Binding 
Arbitration), the Parties shall within ten (10) days take the necessary steps to 
commence mediation under the then-current London Court of International 
Arbitration (“LCIA”) procedures. The Parties will within ten (10) days of the 
receiving of a request for mediation agree upon a mediator. If the Parties cannot 
agree, one will be selected by the LCIA pursuant to the procedures then in effect.  
55.1.4 If the dispute remains unresolved following such mediation, either Party 
may commence arbitration as set out below. Nothing herein shall prevent a Party 
from commencing arbitration at any time (i) when the delay required for 
performance hereunder might materially and adversely affect such Party’s 
interest; (ii) when the other Party fails to fulfill its obligations under this Clause 
55.1 (Friendly Negotiations, Mediation and Binding Arbitration); or (iii) if the 222 
 
dispute remains unresolved after one hundred twenty (120) days of the issuance of 
the Dispute Notice.  
55.1.5 The arbitration shall be held in London and, subject to the provisions of 
Clauses 55.1.6, 55.1.7, and 55.1.8 (Friendly Negotiations, Mediation and Binding 
Arbitration), shall be conducted in accordance with the arbitration rules of the 
LCIA as in effect on the date hereof.  
55.1.6 The arbitral tribunal shall consist of three (3) arbitrators. Each Party shall 
appoint one arbitrator. The claimant in any such arbitration shall give notice of its 
party-appointed nominee within twenty (20) days of filing its notice of arbitration. 
The two party-appointed arbitrators shall appoint the third arbitrator who shall 
serve as the chairman of the arbitral tribunal. If a Party fails to appoint its 
arbitrator within a period of twenty (20) days after receiving notice of the 
opposing party’s selection of its party-appointed arbitrator, or if the two 
arbitrators appointed cannot agree on the third arbitrator within a period of fifteen 
(15) days after appointment of the second arbitrator, then such arbitrator shall be 
appointed by the LCIA.  
55.1.7 In the event that the LCIA is required or requested, whether under the said 
LCIA arbitration rules or otherwise, to appoint an arbitrator, it shall appoint only 
a person who has knowledge and experience in technical matters and with 
experience in international commercial agreements and, in particular, the 
implementation and interpretation of contracts relating to the design, construction, 
operation and maintenance of petroleum production facilities.  
55.1.8 No arbitrator appointed under this Clause 55.0 (Dispute Resolution) shall 
be a present or former employee or agent of, or consultant or counsel to, either 
Party or any Affiliate thereof or any applicable Governmental Authority.  
55.1.9 The arbitration shall be conducted in English. All documents or evidence 
presented at such arbitration in a language other than in English shall be 
accompanied by a certified English translation thereof.  223 
 
55.1.10 The arbitrators shall decide the dispute in accordance with applicable law 
of the Contract by majority of the arbitral tribunal and shall state in writing the 
reasons for its decision. Any monetary award of the arbitral tribunal shall be 
denominated and payable in Kuwaiti Dinars and in immediately available funds. 
The decision of the arbitrators shall be binding.  
55.1.11 The costs of such arbitration, including the fees for the Parties’ legal 
counsel and technical experts shall be determined by and allocated between the 
Parties by the arbitral tribunal in its award.  
2. Nature of the Dispute Resolution Process of Clause 55  
The Company has adopted for their Lump Sum Turnkey Model Contract as part 
of the General Conditions of Contract for Turnkey Contracts a sophisticated 
dispute resolution process at clause 55.1 of the current edition introduced in 2012 
which is the first revision of terms first promoted to the contractor market in 
2007. 
The dispute resolution model adopted in the clause evidences an escalation 
cascaded up from friendly negotiation passing through mediation and, if issues are 
still not resolved, ends up with the binding arbitration in London.  This process is 
flagged by the clause heading.  The clause is divided into the three phases of 
friendly negotiation, mediation and arbitration, although the friendly negotiation 
phase itself envisages three stages: an initial discussion between the party 
representatives, a Dispute Review Board ("DRB") and lastly a meeting between 
CEOs. 
The structure of the clause evidences a strong emphasis on early resolution of 
disputes through a range of relatively informal stages with arbitration as the last 
resort, although sub clause 55.1.4 preserves for either party the right in 
appropriate circumstances to leapfrog the informal stages.   
This focus and the extensive nature of the pre-arbitral process are best suited to 
major project works executed over an extensive period, where the benefits of 224 
 
early identification of issues and their prompt resolution is potentially of most 
value, particularly from the Company side, where a significant problem on major 
projects is the late notification of substantial claims by Contractors, often with 
limited prior notice. 
The analysis below recognises that the law of the State of Kuwait is the governing 
law of the contract and the place of any eventual arbitration is to be London.  
English law will therefore be relevant to determine whether the steps required 
prior to arbitration taking place have been satisfied and how the arbitration will be 
conducted.  
1.  Friendly Negotiations 
   (a)  Dispute Review Board 
The first stage in the overall dispute resolution process is the establishment of a 
DRB.  The KOC approach follows contemporary US practice whereby a DRB is 
appointed and constituted from the commencement of the works i.e. before any 
disputes have arisen. 
In contrast to the US practice to have neutral persons appointed to the board, the 
DRB in these terms and conditions is made up of senior employees of each party.  
This aspect probably has the effect of rendering this a more informal process than 
that seen on major tunnelling projects such as the Boston Corridor and the 
Channel Tunnel and more closely resembles a stage in a process whereby disputes 
are referred to employee representatives of the parties, with those employees 
having levels of increasing seniority, as the process unfolds.   
Here, the DRB can be seen as the second stage following an initial process 
between party representatives. The reference to CEOs pursuant to sub clause 
55.1.2 follows as the third stage. 225 
 
The sub clause 55.1.2 makes clear that the DRB is to have access to the works so 
that they build up knowledge over time, which they use for the benefit of any 
disputes that may arise at a later stage. 
There is express provision that the Parties keep the DRB reasonably informed of 
the progress of the Works from time to time.  If the circumstances justify, the 
party against whom the claim is made could be provided with an additional 
ground of defence in any case where a claim emerges significantly after the 
events in question and the DRB could be shown not to have been informed.  This 
is more likely to benefit the Company side, as cases of late notice of delays to the 
programme are the most common occurrences.  
However, the obligation to keep the DRB notified is not absolute.   
(b)  Dispute Notice 
The process for any dispute commences with a Dispute Notice served by the 
claiming party on the other which the party representatives then have 45 days to 
discuss.  This provision establishes a clear and we believe enforceable benchmark 
for the initial discussions.  Often dispute resolution clauses envisage pre-
discussions between the parties, but often without any clear parameters, with the 
result it is impossible to insist on this in practice. 
Historically, provisions requiring particular steps to be taken prior to 
commencement of the formal dispute resolution process are considered 
enforceable by the English courts, provided there is sufficient certainty and there 
is no question that the provision merely seeks to impose an obligation on the 
parties to agree on a point at a future date.  Such a provision (an agreement to 
agree) is unenforceable in the English courts.   
These principles have been re-emphasised in the context of alternative dispute 
resolution processes and were restated in Cable & Wireless Plc v IBM United 226 
 
Kingdom Ltd
 330 and later followed in Holloway v Chancery Mead Ltd.
331 In 
paragraph 81 of the judgement in the latter case Ramsey J set out the test as  
"It seems to me that considering the above authorities the principles to be derived 
are that the ADR clause must meet at least the following three requirements: 
First, that the process must be sufficiently certain in that there should not be the 
need for an agreement at any stage before matters can proceed. 
Secondly, the administrative processes for selecting a party to resolve the dispute 
and to pay that person should also be defined. 
Thirdly, the process or at least a model of the process should be set out so that the 
detail of the process is sufficiently certain." 
At this stage of negotiations between the parties, only the first of the above points 
is likely to be directly relevant.  However, no question of uncertainty nor an 
agreement to agree should be an issue in the context of an agreement to a period 
of discussion. 
The clause does not impose any obligation on the parties in respect of the 
discussion and English procedural requirement would probably involve little more 
than that any participation should be in good faith.  Anything more would be 
close to an agreement to agree.  In the context of an ongoing project this should 
not give rise to issues in practice.  
 
 
 
(c)  DRB Review 
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The DRB process is initiated by a second notice, which either party may give, but 
equally the structure of the provision would permit the parties to take extra time if 
the nature of the issue suits a longer period of deliberation. 
The DRB have a relatively short period for deliberation, no doubt reflecting the 
advantage of the background knowledge they are expected to have. 
The clause does not identify any particular procedures which the DRB is to follow 
or apply.  In the US standard procedures apply but English law does not have any 
recognised code outside that for the statutory equivalent process of Adjudication, 
which would not be applied in this context. 
Unlike the US practice, as already noted, the DRB consists of party 
representatives rather than neutral persons. This is a further pointer to the parties 
envisaging a more informal process, but the way the DRB is established suggests 
this entails some expectation of an independent assessment  and hence a partly 
quasi-judicial role being undertaken by the party representatives.   
English law has imposed duties to the other parties where one party's 
representative, such as a construction manager, has had a role in determining 
disputed issues.  It may be sensible for the DRB to establish a rule that, at a 
defined stage (and at least once a Dispute Notice (First or Second) is issued) any 
communications involve both parties and individual lobbying is prohibited as a 
minimum procedure.   
The other essential basic principle required by English law is that each party will 
be given an opportunity to put forward its case.  Whether this is in writing or 
verbally can be left to the DRB, providing they give the same opportunity to each 
party. 
From the terms of the clause, an essentially two stage determination is evident 
with the DRB: 
•  first preparing recommendations within 20 days 228 
 
•  then a final decision after 30 days 
From this, it is legitimate to infer that the parties also have at least an opportunity 
to respond to the DRB's provisional conclusion.  Time pressures may dictate 
whether each party gets the chance to reply to the other's comments. 
(d)  CEO Meeting 
The final stage of the friendly negotiation stage of the process is the reference, if 
one party remains aggrieved with the DRB decision, to a meeting of the parties 
CEOs.  This is triggered by a third notice. 
Unlike the DRB phase, this is probably not to be viewed as an independent or 
quasi-judicial process and no formal rules need to be implied. 
As with all stages in the "friendly negotiations" element, time limits are relatively 
short in the context of a process which seeks to identify disputes at any early stage 
and address them whilst the evidence is fresh and there is no reason why this 
should not be workable in general. More difficult issues may arise in practice 
where there are difficulties in identifying the underlying problem or its solution.   
A similar approach of applying strict timetables is adopted by the UK 
adjudication process without necessarily having the benefit of the early warning 
given under the clause 55 process by the DRB element. 
Nevertheless, there are likely to be matters from time to time where the nature of 
the issue, or its solution, demand a longer consultation process.  The goodwill of 
both parties will then be needed on timing if the dispute is not to lose the 
advantage of the process and be propelled to arbitration earlier than is appropriate. 
2.  Mediation 
The intermediate stage of the KOC dispute resolution process is a contractually 
prescribed reference to mediation under the auspices of the London Court of 
International Arbitration ("LCIA") Mediation Rules (the "Mediation Rules").  229 
 
The current rules were updated (including a new costs schedule) on 1 July 2012, 
although no substantive changes were made. 
 
(a)  Condition Precedent to Arbitration 
This provision is, we believe, a binding condition precedent to arbitration under 
the KOC terms (unless a party is able to show exceptional circumstances to justify 
immediate reference to arbitration under clause 55.1.4). 
The extent to which such provisions are enforceable have been the subject of a 
recent review of the English Court of Appeal on 16 May 2012 in Sulamérica Cia 
Nacional de Seguros SA v Enesa Engenharia SA
.332 At paragraph 33 and 36 of the 
Appeal Judgment: 
"Before the judge the insured submitted that condition 11 of the policy contained 
an enforceable obligation to mediate and that compliance with its terms was an 
essential precondition to arbitration. In the present case that condition was not 
satisfied and the insurers had therefore not validly commenced an arbitration 
which called for protection by the grant of an injunction. The judge held, 
however, that condition 11 did not give rise to any binding obligation. He referred 
to, and was content to follow, the decisions of Colman J. in Cable & Wireless Plc 
v IBM United Kingdom Ltd
333 and Ramsey J. in Holloway v Chancery Mead,
334 in 
each of which the court expressed the view that an agreement to enter into a 
prescribed procedure for mediation is capable of giving rise to a binding 
obligation, provided that matters essential to the process do not remain to be 
agreed.  
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[The Judge] held, however, that condition 11 of the present policy did not meet 
those requirements, because it contained no unequivocal undertaking to enter into 
a mediation, no clear provisions for the appointment of a mediator and no clearly 
defined mediation process. Essential matters therefore remained for agreement 
between the parties. Accordingly, condition 11 did not give rise to a legal 
obligation of any kind, and in the absence of a binding obligation there could be 
no effective precondition to arbitration" 
In the present case, unlike Cable & Wireless v IBM and Holloway v Chancery 
Mead, condition 11 does not set out any defined mediation process, nor does it 
refer to the procedure of a specific   mediation provider. The first paragraph 
contains merely an undertaking to seek to have the   dispute resolved amicably by 
mediation. No provision is made for the process by which that is to be undertaken 
and none of the succeeding paragraphs touches on that question...most that might 
be said is that it imposes on any party who is contemplating referring a dispute to 
arbitration an obligation to invite the other to join in an ad hoc mediation, but the 
content of even such a limited obligation is so uncertain as to render it impossible 
of enforcement in the absence of some defined mediation process..." 
In this case, the timing as part of the overall process, the clear identification of a 
process for appointing a mediator and the definition of the process provided by 
the Mediation Rules will meet the relevant test to make this a condition precedent 
to the right to refer the dispute to arbitration, unless the provisions of clause 
55.1.4 apply. 
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Mediation is by its nature a flexible process and the LCIA rules preserve this, 
allowing the parties maximum flexibility in the way they any case is presented to 
the mediator (Article 4).  
The Mediation Rules provide a process for the nomination of a mediator and an 
outline procedure, but Article 9 preserves any choices which the parties have 
made in the context of the dispute which the LCIA will follow.  These provisions 
meet the requirements for the enforceability of this element of the process, as set 
out in the cases referred to in the previous section. 
The balance of the LCIA Mediation Rules address the administrative issues 
concerning the mediator's appointment and immunity from suit, as well as the 
administration of the cost elements. 
The rules further confirm that the process is and remains confidential, both 
generally and in the context of the communications to the mediator by each party.  
3.  Arbitration 
It is in the nature of mediation that, whilst support for the process itself can be 
secured if necessary through court intervention, the parties cannot be forced to 
agree on any particular outcome.  Clause 55 recognises this with the final element 
of the dispute resolution process being a formal stage leading to a determinative 
and enforceable finding. 
The choice taken in clause 55 is in favour of arbitration.  This is a key choice and 
common in the international commercial community and the oil and gas industry 
in particular. As compared with proceeding in national courts the key benefits are 
often seen as  
•  A potentially more neutral/ international process 
•  Relevant experience of the tribunal members 
•  A swifter process than many national court processes 232 
 
•  No appeals 
•  Confidentiality 
•  Wider enforceability through the New York Convention in signatory 
countries  
Although there is some variation depending on the chosen place of the arbitration 
e.g. confidentiality is not a feature of Australian arbitration practice. 
(a)  Seat of Arbitration - London 
Sub clause 55.1.5 provides that any arbitration is to take place in London and to 
be conducted in accordance with the LCIA arbitration rules in effect on the date 
of the contract. 
These are key provisions, as the place of the seat of arbitration selects the law 
under which the dispute resolution process is regulated which in this case will be 
English law.  This is notwithstanding that the contract itself is subject to Kuwaiti 
law.  
The current English law position is enshrined in the Arbitration Act 1996, which 
reinforced a general policy of maintaining a supervisory role of the overall 
process to ensure that the process is effective and meets the minimum standards 
the parties expect from a tribunal, whilst leaving the determination of the 
particular procedure to be followed and the determination of the substantive 
issues to the tribunal chosen by the parties, subject to any question of appeal 
(which we address below). 
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Current English practice accords to the arbitrators significant power to decide on 
their own jurisdiction to determine any matter before them, but there is still 
limited recourse to the court in borderline cases.  However, the most recent 
decisions suggest the opportunity for contesting such matters is now significantly 
reduced. 
(c)  Establishing the scope of the Arbitration Clause  
The English courts have held at the highest level that the scope of an arbitration 
clause under English law will be construed liberally.  The starting assumption is 
that any dispute arising out of the contractual relationship will be decided by 
arbitration.  This assumption that any dispute under the relevant LSTK Contract 
will be the subject of the prescribed dispute resolution process is evident in the 
structure adopted by Clause 55 as a whole.  Issues which in past times depended 
on the precise words chosen for the arbitration clause are now gone. 
The continuing validity of a clause such as clause 55 has also been emphasised 
even in a case where one party, for whatever reason, seeks to argue the overall 
agreement is not valid.  
Lord Hoffman in Premium Nafta Products Ltd v Fili Shipping Co Ltd
 335 
considered the validity of an arbitration clause at paragraph 35 of the judgment: 
"The appellants' argument was not that there was no contract at all, but that they 
were entitled to rescind the contract including the arbitration agreement because 
the contract was induced by bribery. Allegations of that kind, if sound, may affect 
the validity of the main agreement. But they do not undermine the validity of the 
arbitration agreement as a distinct agreement." 
In the context of sophisticated projects under the KOC LSTK terms, the validity 
of the LSTK agreement itself is unlikely to be an issue, but if it is, the benefits of 
clause 55 will remain available. 
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(d)  To prevent the arbitration process being undermined by other 
legal process 
The UK is a signatory of the New York Convention under which precedence is 
given to the parties' selection of arbitration, so that any attempt to bring 
proceedings in the courts of another Convention party state (like Kuwait for 
example) in respect of matters within the scope of the arbitration clause can be 
stayed or stopped on the application of the defending party.  Except in extreme 
cases, the grant of such a stay is almost automatic in the English courts.   
Furthermore, an English court is generally more willing to exercise its supervisory 
role to prevent court applications in other jurisdictions by way of anti-suit 
injunctions as in AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLP v Ust-
Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC.
336 
The position is currently less clear cut where proceedings within the EU are 
concerned because of the impact of the EU Regulation 44/2000 on jurisdiction.  
This Regulation potentially shifts the decision as to whether proceedings can be 
brought to that of the courts of the rival jurisdiction before which the proceedings 
have been commenced.  Such an issue  was referred to the European Court of 
Justice (Allianz SpA v West Tankers Inc (The Front Comor)
337 which ruled that it 
was incompatible for a court of a Member State to make an order restraining a 
person from issuing proceedings in another Member State where contrary to an 
arbitration agreement. 
 
(e)  The Arbitration process  
(i)  Tribunal: three man option 
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Sub Clause 55.1.6 selects a tribunal of three members with each party making one 
appointment and the two party appointed arbitrators selecting the third, with the 
LCIA being given the responsibility of  making any default selections. 
The three man tribunal has been the most common choice for commercial parties 
for many years, although a three man tribunal entails a greater cost and greater 
difficulties over timetabling than a sole arbitrator, experience shows that, for 
serious disputes, the parties prefer the former.  By avoiding the need to secure 
both parties' agreement at the outset when positions are often more polarised the 
commencement of the process is facilitated. 
The LCIA process is capable of accommodating appointees from both civil and 
common law backgrounds.  Later in the process, when the hearings stage is 
reached, the mix of views a tribunal constituted in this way can lead to a more 
balanced result.  
The opportunity has been taken in sub clause 55.1.8 to reinforce the current 
practice of disclosure notices, so as to make express provision for the exclusion of 
certain categories of arbitrator candidate who may be thought to be potentially 
biased.  In a context where judgments on the degree of any candidate's connection 
are often difficult, a clear rule in respect of the more straightforward categories 
provides certainty. 
(ii)  Tribunal: LCIA Appointments 
Sub clauses 55.1.6. and 55.1.7 empower the LCIA to make appointments where 
there has been default by a party in making an appointment or delay by the party-
appointed members in selecting a chairman.  This is an important service which 
the LCIA provides the international business community and avoids the need for 
the English court to fulfil this role which can introduce unwanted delay, because 
of the procedural formalities. 
Equally the presence of a respected third party appointor has a value for KOC in 
assisting in enforceability of any award, should that become necessary.  The 236 
 
alternative provision, whereby the default appointment is supplied by the claiming 
party can often be a ground of objection on enforcement.  
Sub clause 55.1.7 also sets out requirements for the qualifications of any 
appointee by the LCIA, which are generally directed to the nature of the project 
works likely under the LSTK terms.  
There is always a danger that such requirements can, in a particular case, be 
difficult to fill and the requirement of knowledge and experience in technical 
matters and experience in implementation may pose difficulties for the LCIA and 
provide opportunities to a party seeking to delay any arbitration process.  The 
adoption of the various characteristics listed as options in any future revision may 
limit those opportunities. 
(iii)  The steps of the Arbitration process 
Responsibility for the actual process form the initial claim notices to any hearing 
is that of the Tribunal operating within the parameters of the Arbitration Rules of 
the LCIA in effect at the date of the LSTK Contract and the Arbitration Act. 
The LCIA is "one of the longest-established of all the major international 
arbitration institutions" (Bankers Trust Co v PT Jakarta International Hotels and 
Development
 .
338  In 2011, 224 disputes were referred to it, 16% of those 
concerned sums over $20 million.
339   
The LCIA arbitration rules have remained the same since January 1998 subject to 
a new costs schedule introduced on 1 July 2012.  New rules from the LCIA 
governing the arbitration process are expected early next year.
340  
The nature of the rules as they apply to the conduct of the any arbitration is that of 
a loose framework providing the necessary powers but leaving the precise 
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structure in any given case to be developed by the Tribunal with the parties 
involved.  In the context of an international arbitration, it is common for there to 
be cross fertilisation from the practices of other organisations. 
The manner in which the parties' cases are presented, disclosure of documents, 
witnesses and the assistance of experts will all be part of this process, as will be 
general timetabling and the conduct of any hearing.  
The LCIA rules will accord precedence to the parties' specific decisions on any 
part of the process.  Here, sub clause 55.1. 9 makes express provision for the 
arbitration to be conducted in English.  It is common for this to be pre-agreed in 
the contract terms. Specific provision is also made in respect of the use of 
evidence which originally is in a language other than English; again this 
reinforces likely practice. 
As outlined at the beginning of this section, the overriding principle of the English 
arbitration legislation is to minimise interference in the tribunal's work and the 
court's powers in the LCIA arbitration process, under English law, are limited.  
This was recognised in Elektrim SA v Vivendi Universal SA
.341  
It was argued that the court's power to grant an injunction under section 37 of the 
Supreme Court Act 1981 could be used to prevent LCIA arbitration from 
proceeding.  At paragraph 63 of the judgment, Aikens J. considers the possible 
recourse if the LCIA arbitrators had breached their statutory duty to act fairly and 
impartially. 
"First, it was well established under the old regime that the court did not have a 
general supervisory role over arbitrations at their interlocutory stage beyond that 
granted by the Arbitration Acts themselves. Therefore there was no scope to 
invoke the court's jurisdiction to grant injunctions to compel arbitrators to take a 
particular course in the reference. That rule must remain the case under the 1996 
Act. The position is emphasised by the provisions of section 1(c) of the Act, 
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which stipulates that " in matters governed by this Part the court should not 
intervene except as provided by this Part". 
Secondly, the 1996 Act itself provides the remedy for a breach of the section 33 
duty [the basic obligations to properly to conduct the proceedings fairly and 
impartially]. Either before the award is made or after it is made, the party that 
alleges it is aggrieved can apply to remove the arbitrator or challenge the award, 
under (respectively) section 24 (1)(d)(i) or 68(2)(b) . The first section permits an 
application to the court to remove the arbitrator for a refusal or failure properly to 
conduct the proceedings. The second section permits a challenge to the award on 
the basis that there has been a serious irregularity because of the tribunal's failure 
to comply with section 33. In either case there is no need for the court to interfere 
with the arbitral process by granting an injunction pursuant to the powers in 
section 37." 
This confirms there is no legal basis to compel the tribunal to take a particular 
course, except where there has been a failure by the tribunal to fulfil its duties 
under section 24.  The court has the power to remove an arbitrator upon 
application of a party on four grounds, which are: 
•  impartiality of the arbitrators 
•  absence of required qualifications 
•  where the arbitrator is physically or mentally incapable 
•  refusal or failure by the arbitrators to conduct proceedings properly 
 
(f)  The Tribunal's Decision   
Sub clause 55.1.10 makes specific provisions for the tribunal's award to contain 
written reasons which will override any terms of the LCIA Rules. 239 
 
The clause also makes clear that the Tribunal's duty is to decide the case in 
accordance with the applicable law of the Contract, which is Kuwaiti Law.  This 
express provision prevents the tribunal from seeking to decide the matter on the 
basis of what the tribunal might otherwise see as the simple justice of the case 
based on their own outlook or on the basis of some general international standards 
of dealing or more general concept of international law. Failure to follow this 
would be grounds for court intervention on the basis of the tribunal's misconduct. 
This term probably also embraces the additional requirement from the governing 
law clause that the contract wording is to be construed in accordance with the 
normal usage of the English language as related to works of the type in question.  
Had English law instead of Kuwait law been the governing law, this may have 
excluded the latest thinking of the English Supreme Court on issues of 
interpretation. 
Under London arbitration practice, awards in respect of the parties' legal costs are 
made and this is endorsed expressly by sub clause 55.1.11 which will tie in with 
article 28.2 of the LCIA arbitration rules,  
Irrespective of any award, the LCIA arbitration rules confirm that the parties are 
jointly and severally liable for the costs of the arbitration service provided by the 
LCIA and members of the tribunal (article 28.1).  The LCIA determines the 
amounts by reference to the LCIA arbitration schedule of costs.  This details the 
level of the fees, deposits, administrative charges and interest to be charged. 
 
(g)  Appeal 
Clause 55.1.10 provides that the arbitrators' decisions shall be binding.  This is 
reinforced and extended by the LCIA Arbitration Rules which apply.  Article 26.9 
of the LCIA Arbitration Rules also waives any right of either party to appeal an 
award. 240 
 
English law provides an option to appeal on a question of law under section 69 of 
the Arbitration Act 1996, but only if not agreed otherwise by the parties.  The 
LCIA arbitration rules were considered in this context by Walker J in Royal & 
Sun Alliance Insurance Plc v BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd
,342 who quoted article 
26 and stated at paragraph 13 of the judgment: 
  "It is common ground that in arbitral proceedings governed by the LCIA 
rules alone the waiver in article 26 would be effective to exclude the right of 
appeal conferred by s 69 of the 1996 Act: see the opening words of s 69(1)." 
The Arbitration Act 1996 does allow a party to the arbitration the possibility of 
challenging the award, regardless of the LCIA arbitration rules, but only on the 
grounds that the tribunal does not have substantive jurisdiction (section 67) or if 
there is a "serious irregularity" affecting the tribunal (section 68). 
(h)  Additional features consequent of on the arbitration seat being 
London. 
 
(i)  Confidentiality 
Arbitration under English law also imports an obligation of confidentiality on all 
involved. The precise basis of this is a matter of some debate but whether by way 
of an implied term or as matter of general arbitration law the English jurisdiction 
is one of the strongest upholders of confidentiality: 
  "In the last 20 years or so the English courts have had to consider the 
consequences of the privacy of the arbitral process and the scope of the 
obligations of confidentiality in several different contexts. It is apparent that the 
English jurisprudence on this subject (as distinct from the confidentiality of 
awards, which is much discussed in other countries) is much richer than that of 
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any other important arbitration centre, and that it constitutes a major contribution 
to the development of the law of international arbitration." 
(Lord Collins, at paragraph 66, of the judgment of Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd 
v Emmott
343 ) 
There are exceptions where the main arbitration documents are needed to support 
one of the parties legal rights e.g. on enforcement or as a part of an indemnity 
claim against a third party.  Also, the courts will not allow arbitration 
confidentiality to be used to mislead a foreign court. Collins J at paragraph 111 of 
Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Emmott
344 confirm this. 
  "The factors which lead me to the conclusion that the judge was right on 
the substance of the case are these…fourth, without being informed of the London 
arbitration, there was a danger that the NSW court would be misled. These 
matters lead me to the conclusion that the interests of justice required disclosure. 
The interests of justice are not confined to the interests of justice in England. The 
international dimension of the present case demands a broader view." 
What the majority in the Michael Wilson case left unanswered is whether this is 
enforced by the tribunal or the court.  
(ii)  Legal professional privilege and the sanctity of without 
prejudice communications 
Although the application of English law disclosure of documents is a matter for 
the tribunal to decide, in practice an arbitration in London will  be conducted 
against a background of these rules and the rules of legal professional privilege, 
which protect a party's communications with its legal advisers (including in house 
legal teams) and without prejudice communications.  Without prejudice 
communications create a channel of communication between the parties, who are 
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then each protected from disclosure of these communications to the tribunal, 
allowing the parties' to develop their cases and promote any possible settlement. 
The strict basis for this is not clearly defined but the practice is well recognised 
and customarily applied (p.243 of Russell on Arbitration (23rd edition) Sweet and 
Maxwell 2007).  Arguably section 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996 may provide the 
source for this. 
4.  Sub clause 55.1.4 - Leapfrog Provisions 
Sub clause 55.1.4. contains a proviso to the otherwise comprehensive dispute 
resolution process to permit either party (in practice this is likely to be a claiming 
party) to leapfrog the Friendly Negotiation or Mediation stages to initiate 
arbitration in three circumstances: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a)  Material adverse effect of delay resulting from performance of 
the pre-arbitration steps 
This is potentially the most material of the provisions. The right arises at any 
time.  There is no reason why this should not mean what it says. An equivalent 
provision applies in respect of adjudication within the domestic UK constructions 
industry and is given full effect. 243 
 
This is an important safety valve to cover situations which arise where urgent 
action is required and there is sensibly no attempt to limit the situations where this 
may apply. 
Potential examples are any case where injunction style relief (which requires a 
party to take, or prohibits a party from taking, certain action) is required in 
response say to a wrongful termination or any attempt by a contractor to gain 
wrongful advantage at critical stages of the works.  This may also be important in 
respect of ancillary matters such as intellectual property rights. 
A general issue may be where a party is faced with the expiry of a key limitation 
period which is an exception recognised to the English construction courts' own 
pre-action protocol process, which serves a similar purpose to the friendly 
negotiations/mediation stages under clause 55. 
(b)  Failure by a party to fulfil its obligations under clause 55.1  
This proviso recognises the obvious unfairness of requiring one party to follow 
the process where the other party is not participating.  At certain stages in the 
process, this may be more difficult to apply as at certain stage no clear obligations 
are placed on the defending party e.g. in the first party representative phase.  
It is likely that any non performance of a party's representative on the DRB may 
trigger this proviso, notwithstanding the quasi-judicial role involved. 
 
(c)  Expiry of 120 days from Dispute Notice 
This requires little explanation.   
By inference, this applies a short timeframe for the mediation process which will 
vary according to the time taken by the prior steps but in general the timings point 
to the mediation process being initiated after 106 days (45+30+21+10 days). 244 
 
There is however no procedural objection to the mediation process running in 
parallel with the first stages of an arbitration or indeed mediation being retried at a 
later stage of the arbitration process. Experience suggest mediations are more 
successful either at the outset as provided for by the clause 55.1 process or later in 
the process, at the stage where the parties' cases have developed in the formal 
arbitration proceedings shortly before any primary hearing. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
Overall clause 55.1 establishes a multi-layered framework for the handling of 
disputes.  The clause is clearly directed to taking the parties through a process 
designed to address disputes at an early stage with a formal arbitration as very 
much the last resort. 
This clause originally formed part of a contract revision understood to have been 
promoted with a view to attracting contractors to bid for Kuwaiti projects against 
the background of the contracting market of 2006/7. 
But in providing a defined path and opportunities for early resolution of 
contractor claims clause 55.1 also better meets Company's own strong preference 
towards solutions negotiated between the parties.  In this respect the adoption of a 
detailed framework established under the supervision of the English jurisdiction, 
where the value of such procedures are recognised and upheld appears well 
chosen. 
Recommendations 
Part II 
As seen in previous chapters, we have analyzed and evaluated the style of the 
most preferable means of dispute resolution in a way that presents the pros and 
cons of each in an attempt to promote a style that is most efficient. 245 
 
The recommendations are divided into two parts: the statutory approach that may 
be promoted by the legislators, and the consensus approach where the agreement 
is made contractually by the concerned parties. 
The Statutory approach  
With the exception of arbitration, there is currently no statutory organization for 
any alternative dispute resolution, such as adjudication. The Kuwaiti law 
procedure should force, or at least encourage, disputants to participate in an 
alternative dispute resolution as a pre-procedure to be taken prior to pursuing the 
final resort of the resolution or during the trial and before issuing the award of 
such trial. 
The procedure must be set to require the parties to approach an alternative dispute 
resolution as a pre-condition process, otherwise the case may be dismissed by the 
court.  
This step is not entirely new under the Kuwaiti legal system. For instance, 
according to the Kuwait Labour law, a compulsory pre-action process must be 
taken in respect of an employment claim before filing a labour case. Otherwise 
the case would be dismissed on the grounds of breaching public order of 
procedural law. This approach is as follows: 
”An employee before commencing an action in court shall submit an application 
to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour. The Ministry shall call the two 
parties of the dispute and take the necessary steps to amicably settle their dispute. 
If an amicable settlement cannot be reached, the Ministry shall inevitably then 
refer the dispute to the Court of First Instance within two weeks from the date of 
submission of the application by the employee, and such reference shall be 
accompanied by a memorandum containing a summary of the dispute, pleas of the 
two parties, and the Ministry’s comments. The Court’s Records Section shall, 
within three days from the date on which the application reaches the Court, fix a 
date for hearing the action, and both disputants shall be notified of this date. The 246 
 
Court may summon the person who has prepared the memorandum submitted by 
the Ministry to explain the contents thereof”. 
The objective of such pre-procedure in not to bind one party unilaterally; it is a 
reciprocal obligation. It is to compel the parties to put their cards on the table and 
to honestly and rationally discuss matters
345 . 
According to the global practice of adjudication, as well as special experience in 
the UK, we recommend the following changes to be made to the Kuwaiti law in 
order to develop its procedure in respect to resolving construction disputes: 
 “A party to a construction contract has the right to refer a dispute arising under 
the contract for adjudication under a procedure complying with this section.  
The provisions of this part apply only to the construction contract as it is defined 
under articles (661 & 689) of the Civil Law Code. 
A construction contract must be in writing or evidenced in writing, and any other 
agreement between the parties as to any matter is effective for the purpose of this 
part only if in writing. The rules of Law of Evidence apply in this regard. 
For this purpose, “dispute” includes any differences in the matters that are 
permissible to be reached in a way of conciliation in conformity with provisions 
of Article 554 of the Civil Law Code. 
Parties must hold a direct negotiation to settle such dispute(s) amicably.  If no 
settlement is reached between the disputing parties by negotiations, the claimant 
party may move the tribunal for an adjudication to conclude a claim temporarily 
or permanently. 
This step should not be considered as a tactical or mark time until a second stage 
is due to be proceeded. Moving to the stage of dispute resolution should not be 
approached until the applicable proceedings have been exhausted. It is to 
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somewhat strongly encourage parties to settle their dispute amicably before going 
to the court by imposing such obstructions on their right of access to court or 
arbitration instantly.  
A construction contract must be complied with the following adjudication 
arrangements: 
•  Enable a party to give notice at any time of his intention to refer a dispute 
to adjudication; 
 
•  Provide a timetable with the object of securing the appointment of the 
adjudicator and referral of the dispute to him within (7) days of such notice; 
•  Require the adjudicator to reach a decision within (28) days of referral or 
such longer period as is agreed by the parties after the dispute has been referred; 
•  Allow the adjudicator to extend the period of (28) days up to (14) days, 
with the consent of the party by whom the dispute was referred; 
•  Impose a duty;  
•  An adjudicator shall render his decision without compliance with pleading 
the procedure save the proceedings provided for in this section; 
•  An adjudicator does not need to render his decision based on the law 
provisions save those relating to public order.  
An adjudicator must be qualified to act as an arbitrator in accordance with 
Kuwaiti Arbitration Law as both of them perform the same action and have a 
similar mission to resolve disputes in an informal process. 
The most distinguishable feature of the adjudication is the nature of its decision. 
An adjudication decision is an interim and subject to be revisited by the final 
resort of dispute resolution, therefore, for the sake of quick resolution and to 248 
 
maintain the momentum of the project, an application to recuse of an adjudicator 
shall not be accepted as long as his decision is provisional and may be resisted 
before a competent final resort tribunal. 
An adjudicator shall act impartially and fairly and give each party full opportunity 
to defend his case to maximum extent but not to be typical to a judge in a 
litigation system. 
Once a referral notice has been made by a referral party, a copy of such notice 
along with all related and submitted documents must be passed simultaneously to 
the other party. There should be no specific way to exchange such document, but 
to be left to the concerned parties to agree a most appropriate and convenient way 
to pursue to such a procedure.  Adjudication should be flexible and informal, and 
the parties or the adjudicator have a right to tailor their most convenient procedure 
with no strict requirements to be complied with the litigation procedure. 
Moreover, an adjudicator should have maximum authority to set a procedure and 
the discretion to take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and law as well as the 
power to decide on his own jurisdiction to look into the case. This is one of the 
main features that distinguish adjudication from other alternative dispute 
resolutions.  
The contractually approach  
According to Kuwaiti law and to the practice of the government’s department, it 
seems very substantial to include both an administrative and commercial contract 
provision that confers both parties the right to proceed an amicable settlement 
before or during the trial and up to when the dispute ended in the final resort of 
litigation or arbitration. 
This concern was detected by many commentators such as raised by the FIDIC in 
its guidance to the old Red Book which stated the following: “in some countries it 
has been maintained that if there is no reference to amicable settlement in the 249 
 
Contract, then the individual responsible for administrating the Contract may have 
no right to enter into negotiation for an amicable settlement”.
346   
Furthermore, it has been noticed that the best moment to agree on the compulsory 
use of an amicable means of dispute resolution and application to its process, is at 
the time of drafting and forming the agreement itself in order to avoid such 
obstacles as well as to keep the parties confident that the approaching of any 
amicable settlement would not give an indication of a party’s weakness, as such 
action was merely an exercising of contract provisions.
347 It is a good initiative of 
being a reason for either party who would prefer to move into a negotiation or 
amicable settlement with no fear of being criticized, especially in the case of 
representing public authorities. According to my experience, there were many 
cases where a public department was reluctant to enter into a negotiation or use an 
amicable settlement if there was no supported provision included in the related 
contract regarding the reason that may criticized by the state auditor for such 
disrespect towards their justification. Therefore, in such an event the public 
department would prefer to go directly to the final resort of the dispute resolution 
to keep itself away from being commented on. In essence, it does not matter for 
some of the public department leaders to proceed to litigation or arbitration 
instantly if they would protect themselves rather than to look for another valuable 
ways or means. There is no doubt that the leaders who have a mentality of 
thinking commercially would prefer to choose the most beneficial mechanism for 
their enterprise regardless of the amount of criticism that would occurred due to 
their decision. As a result, the best way that may encourage such enterprises to 
use an amicable settlement is to include a provision of amicable settlement in its 
contract from the outset of the relationship between parties.  
•  For instance, a few years ago major project markets were attacked by the 
dramatic increase of steel prices as well as the fluctuation of currency. This led to 
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hurdle managing and handling massive projects in the gulf region for both parties. 
Contractors had struggled to manage a massive exceeding of the project budget, 
and owners in turn found it very difficult to deal with claims of compensation for 
such a crisis or they would face a suspension of very vital projects. KOC, for 
example, had tried to look for a best solution that may strike a balance between 
the contractors’ loss and remaining projects carrying on its schedule without any 
delay which may affect its operations and ultimately lead to lose much more than 
what it would save. However, because such problems had not been contractually 
arranged, KOC as a state-owned company found it difficult to stand on any legal, 
contractual or commercial basis where the reasoning of any decision may be 
taken. Hence, KOC, according to the study that has been made to look for the best 
solution, decided to include its lump sum turnkey provision to set a certain 
procedure that may be taken by both parties in case of the future similar events 
which was drafted as following:”  
•  Currency Fluctuations  
The Contract Price shall be adjusted at the times and in the manner prescribed in 
Appendix??? (Contract Price and Payment) by means of an Adjustment Order 
issued pursuant to Clause (-)of the General Conditions of Contract, to reflect 
currency fluctuations after the Date of Tender in the currencies stated in the Form 
of Tender (hereinafter called “Contract Currencies”) used by the Contractor in the 
compilation of the Contract Price. 
•  Commodity Price Fluctuations 
The Contract Price shall be adjusted at the times and in the manner prescribed in 
Appendix??? (Contract Price and Payment) by means of an Adjustment Order 
issued pursuant to Clause??? of the General Conditions of Contract, to reflect 
currency fluctuations in the cost of certain key materials forming part of the 
Facilities and described in Appendix??? (Contract Price Payment). 251 
 
Consequently, we suggest the following clause to be adopted under the provision 
of dispute resolution in the major projects that would be entered into with an 
international contractor: 
  “In the event of the parties having a matter in dispute, they shall 
expeditiously meet to discuss and if possible resolve such issues as soon as 
practical (parties meet set a certain period if the preferred to stick with time). In 
the event that the dispute cannot be resolved at such meeting, it shall be 
documented in writing and escalated to the representatives of both parties who 
shall use their reasonable endeavours to resolve expeditiously the documented 
dispute, by meeting if necessary. If such dispute cannot be resolved by them 
within (28) days of being escalated, the matter in dispute shall be referred to the 
senior management of both parties for expeditious resolution. If the senior 
management of both parties cannot resolve such matter within (28) days the 
matter shall be finally settled either by arbitration in accordance with sub-clause () 
or by a third party expert in accordance with sub-clause (), whichever is 
applicable”.  
As set out in Clause (), any dispute (including disputes related to the existence, 
validity, enforceability, effectiveness, interpretation, breach and remedies in 
breach of this agreement) in respect of which clause () has been fulfilled without 
such dispute having been resolved shall be resolved by reference to arbitration 
under the LCIA Rules. 
The language of the arbitration shall be English and there shall be three (3) 
arbitrators. Each party shall be entitled to appoint an arbitrator and the two 
arbitrators so appointed shall appoint a third arbitrator of their choice, who shall 
be the chairman. If the two arbitrators cannot settle on the mutual appointee of the 
third arbitrator within fourteen (14) days of referral of the dispute to arbitration, 
the chairman of the LCIA shall appoint the third arbitrator as soon as is 
practicable. 
The award of arbitrators shall be final and binding. 252 
 
The seat of arbitration shall be London. 
Each party shall pay its own legal fees, unless otherwise ordered by the tribunal. 
Dispute settled by third party expert 
Either party may refer a technical dispute (matters that are to be specified for each 
contract individually according to its nature) which cannot be resolved in 
accordance with sub-clause () to a third party expert for determination in 
accordance with the clause. 
Such referral shall be initiated by the party seeking to make such a reference 
notifying the other party of such intention. 
The parties shall thereupon agree on the identity of the third party expert who 
shall determine the technical dispute. in the event that the parties cannot decide 
upon a mutually agreed third party expert within ten (10) days of notice being 
given under sub-clause () or if the agreed third party expert refuses to accept such 
a referral then upon the request of the parties the LCIA shall appoint such third 
party expert.  
A party wishing to refer a technical dispute to a third party expert shall deliver to 
such third party expert all the related documents that help to conclude the issue. 
The referring party shall send copies of such documents, so as delivered, to the 
other party at the time of referral to the third party expert. 
Such third party expert will not be an arbitrator of the technical dispute and shall 
not be deemed to be acting in an arbitral capacity. 
The third party expert, once appointed, shall have no ex parte communications 
with either of the parties concerning the expert determination or the underlying 
technical dispute. 
The parties agree to cooperate fully in the expeditious conduct of such expert 
determination and to provide the third party expert with reasonable access to all 253 
 
facilities, books, records, documents, information and personnel necessary to 
make a fully informed decision in an expeditious manner. 
Before issuing his decision, the third party expert shall issue a draft report and 
allow parties to comment on it. 
The third party expert shall endeavor to resolve the technical dispute within (28) 
days but not later than (56) days after his appointment, taking into account the 
circumstances requiring an expeditious resolution of the matter in dispute. 
In the event that there is a dispute as to whether a dispute should be referred to 
arbitration or a third party expert, the manner shall be referred to arbitrators in 
accordance with sub-clause (), who shall determine the matter should be referred 
to a third party expert. 
It goes without saying that an alternative dispute resolution does not ensure a 
panacea and may face some obstacles that hurdle its movement. However, it is an 
attempt to customize the way of resolving conflicts between contracting parties to 
the maximum extent.  
The recommended procedure was designed to assist parties in not wasting their 
time and cost in every single technical matter but to refer it to their technical 
representative or an agreed trusted expert whom is specialized in the area of the 
disputed matter that in particular focuses on the technical and factual issues rather 
than contractual or law matters. Nevertheless, such a procedure does not prevent 
either party from pursuing a court or arbitration process if he is not sure about the 
nature of the issue or if he would prefer to do so in case of the importance of the 
matter. 
Expert determination is not a new approach to resolve a technical matter. Under 
Kuwaiti law, expert determination is almost like arbitration but it is neither a real 
arbitration nor is the rules of arbitration instantly applicable. It is a sort of 
alternative dispute resolution which is not yet organized by Kuwaiti law.  It is a 
contractual procedure that is subject to the parties’ agreement, therefore, a 254 
 
framework, scope and the details that will govern the expert procedure must be 
addressed and agreed by parties. It may be agreed by the parties to refer and apply 
institutional rules of procedure such as ICC or UNCITRAL or even leave for the 
appointed expert to form his own procedure. 
The proposed clause requires that the expert decision must be made within about 
3 months.  However, it is not often that the time limit is met; therefore, an expert 
with parties’ agreement may extend the time limitation for any further reasonable 
duration. 
As a result, in order to adopt an expert determination approach to resolving 
disputes, parties should essentially agree on advance specific items. Parties should 
specify technical matters that may be referred to and resolved by an expert. A 
legal or contractual matter should not be referred to the expert as it may be 
beyond his jurisdiction or area of expertise. It should be clearly stated that a 
designated expert will act and conduct his rules as an expert, and not as an 
arbitrator. To distinguish an expert determination from any other forms of 
alternative dispute resolution such as mediation or conciliation, an expert decision 
must be final and binding. 
With respect to the international projects, the enforceability of the expert 
determination may face some obstacles. An expert determination is not treated 
consistently in all countries that ratified the New York Convention. Therefore, the 
rules and process of enforcing an international arbitration award may not be 
applicable to the expert decision in some ratifying countries if these countries 
consider the expert determination another way of dispute resolution different from 
the arbitration. Such cases may require further proceedings to enforce the expert 
determination which prolongs the resolving of the issue. In essence, under 
Kuwaiti law, this issue has not been examined by the court, so, it is still possible 
to enforce the expert decision in the same manner that is applicable to the 
arbitration award, unless the expert determination process has been made in a 
country that clearly does not consider it similar to the arbitration.   255 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Conclusion 
 
Coming to the final destination of this thesis journey, it is now the time to brief up the 
story of this long term mission. 
The thesis has described and examined the most common means of dispute resolution 
in the construction industry as it is internationally practiced and under the State of 
Kuwait as well. 
In chapter one, the journey began with the definition of construction contract, and then 
it has been followed by describing the process of forming major construction projects 
agreement in chapter two. 
Next, the common selected methods of dispute resolution have been analyzed 
individually in the following parts of the thesis, i.e. Chapter Three: Arbitration, Chapter 
Four: Adjudication, Chapter Five: Expert Determination and Chapter Six: Mediation. 
The study has found that there are some new techniques of dispute resolution have 
been adopted in the UK and some other common law countries approved to some 
extent its successes. Such methods are not widely recognized in the area of construction 
in the State of Kuwait. 
As a consequence, these techniques have been recommended to be taken in the 
construction industry in the State of Kuwait of Kuwaiti in the second part of Chapter 
Seven while in the first part of this chapter, we were describing and examining the 
practice of Kuwait Oil Company as a case study. 
Finally, the purport of the search under this thesis hopefully shall help to reach balanced 
provisions that lead to a win-win transaction between parties to a contract with the aim 
of contributing to the country national economy. Narration on untraditional methods of 
dispute resolution which unfortunately do not enjoy good reputation in most of the 
third world countries and of course Kuwait is not an exception of this.  
Demonstrating the advantages of these means of the alternative dispute resolution and 
the added value of the right management of the cases which brings about positive 
results to both parties, may refine the gloomy image of these increasingly important 
methods of dispute resolution.  
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